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Atonement

Sheldrake

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



MEDIUM THEORY

OF THE

ATONEMENT,

AND

REVIEW OF DR. BURNEY'S SOTERIOLOGY.

BY REV. G. H. SHELDRAKE,

MAYFIELD, KENTUCKY.

Without shedding of blood is no remission.—*Paul.*
Ye must be born again.—*Christ.*

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TO THE

HONORABLE LUCIEN ANDERSON,

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TO WHOM IS DUE MUCH FOR WARM PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP, AND WHO FOR YEARS HAS BEEN A MOST ZEALOUS AND CONSECRATED MEMBER OF THE CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, UPHOLDING HER DOCTRINE AND SUPPORTING HER CAUSE, THIS MODEST ATTEMPT TO GIVE FORM AND EXPRESSION TO HER MEDIUM THEOLOGY IS MOST RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED.

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PREFACE.

For many years past there has been a revival of Bible study throughout Christendom, going hand in hand with earnest work for the salvation of men. Largely through the work of the Young Men's Christian Association, and prominent evangelists, such as Moody and Whittle, this movement to make the Bible better understood is growing in power. Conferences for Bible study have been held, attended by eager crowds. "Bible Readings" have become general in the churches, and as the movement advances, the rich spiritual treasures of the Word are being unfolded, so that many thousands are led to love the Scriptures as never before.

This book is an effort to give more formal expression to the great Bible truths that have been unfolded in the progress of this movement. Truths that are being proclaimed from hundreds of pulpits in almost every denomination, and that are sung wherever "Gospel Hymns" are used.

Having for years read all books, tracts, and "Reports of Bible Conferences" that throw light upon "the truth," it would be difficult to give due credit for expositions of Scripture that may be found in this book that have been advanced before. But we claim for the theory of the atonement, as such, that it is new.

We submit it to Bible students as an effort to present from a Bible stand-point a view of the atone-

ment free from the objections of the past. We trust it will lead to a greater unity in the church, and the removal of many obstacles in the way of honest inquirers.

We had finished the manuscript of the three first Parts when Dr. Burney's book was published. We have reviewed this in Part IV., as by so doing it makes the work more complete.

The Christian world has been divided into three great divisions, or schools of thought. These, in modern days, are known as Calvinist, Arminian, and Socinian.

Dr. Burney's theory is a medium theory, but it occupies (theologically) ground mid-way between Arminianism and Socinianism. It is, really, semi-Socinianism.

The theory of this book is medium as between Calvinism and Arminianism. A medium Evangelical theory of the Atonement.

While the whole work is essential to the full development of the theory, Chapters III., V., VI., VII., and X., present what is distinctive.

And now this bark, which was built and freighted in an atmosphere of prayer, is launched with the earnest petition that the great Head of the Church will use such truth as it may contain for his own glory and the extension of his kingdom.

G. H. SHELDRAKE.

August, 1888.

ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

The doctrine of the atonement is the great central truth of the Bible, around which all other truths revolve, as our solar system does around the sun.

It certainly can not be regarded as a matter of indifference what we believe about it, because it affects the question of the divine attributes, the Person of Christ, the nature and result of the fall, the character of law and penalty, the conditions of salvation, and the work of the Holy Spirit. Unsoundness as to the atonement leads to error in all the vital doctrines of the Bible, and in exact proportion to the unsoundness. It seems to be the opinion of some that it matters but little what "theories" are held, so long as Christ is looked to as the Savior. But this is to ignore things of the first importance. Error as to the atonement may be so great as to be utterly incompatible with salvation, leading men to self-reliance and the rejection of a Savior. Thus it may lead *directly* to the soul's loss. This is not true, however, of any "theory" that leads or requires men to trust in

Christ. But it may, and does, lead *indirectly* to the ruin of the souls of men, by robbing the preaching of the cross of its spirituality and power.

It is true that in every age the men who have been largely instrumental in leading men to Christ have preached strongly the doctrine of a vicarious atonement. The simple story of Christ's love in suffering—the just for the unjust—has been the power of God to salvation. To modify, or render unmeaning, the preaching of the cross, is infallibly to lessen its vitality and attractive power. So that, indirectly, error may be fatal to the welfare of souls. Indifference to error, here, is criminal.

Again, the connection between a man's doctrine and walk is such that all error tends to destroy spirituality and weaken the testimony of the Church.

In this work we shall discuss the atonement from the Bible stand-point mainly, the Bible being our standard of authority. We believe that it sets forth a vicarious atonement, that from Genesis to Revelation this is the one glorious truth that gives beauty and vitality to its teaching.

Before entering upon our argument we will present in this chapter an outline of the principal theories of the atonement, a brief historical sketch of the development of these theories, and some definitions.

SECTION I.—*Theories of the Atonement.*

It does not come within the scope of this work to enter upon an examination of all the theories that have originated in the fertile brains of men for the last nineteen centuries. Many of them have long

since died a natural death, like the theory of Marcion, who held that Christ's sufferings were divine, but not real.

As most of the early fathers combat the heresy of Marcion, some even writing extensive treatises against him, we have a full exposition of his theory. He denied that the Incarnation was real, holding that Christ was manifested in appearance only.

"Marcion, in order that he might deny the flesh of Christ, denied also his nativity, because, of course, he was afraid that his nativity and his flesh bore mutual testimony to each other's reality, since there is no nativity without flesh, and no flesh without nativity. . . . . At all events, he who represented the flesh of Christ to be imaginary was equally able to pass off his nativity as a phantom; so that the virgin's conception, and pregnancy, and child-bearing, and then the whole course of her infant, too, would have to be regarded as putative." (Tertullian, "On the flesh of Christ," Chapter I.)

It follows, that his body being unreal, his sufferings and death existed in appearance only; the whole being but a symbolic representation that men must die to earthly life to be redeemed, hence the extreme æsthetic character of the life he demanded of his followers.

Omitting such theories as these, and dealing only with those that are current in our day, we would group them into three great divisions: The Moral Influence, Governmental, and Vicarious. There are various modifications of these, but practically they may be so classified.

The Moral Influence theory represents the work

of Christ as affecting the sinner alone. It denies that the work of Christ in any way influenced God, its design being to reconcile man to God, not God to man.

The Governmental theory also holds that the atonement affects the sinner, and not God, but teaches, in addition, that it was demanded by the needs of moral government. As failure to enforce law leads to anarchy, while punishment deters from crime and strengthens the government, the death of Christ was demanded by this governmental need.

The Vicarious theory, which has been, and is, the almost universal faith of Christendom, teaches that while the death of Christ influences the sinner and strengthens government, it first of all was necessary to meet the demands of God against the sinner. Its advocates teach that until that demand was met and satisfied, man could not be saved. They hold that Christ meets and satisfies this demand for us—in our place—as our substitute, so that God can "be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

All theories that limit the effect of the atonement to the sinner may be classed as Moral Influence theories. All that hold, in addition, that it was required by the needs of moral government alone, as Governmental. All that hold that it substitutionally met demands arising from the divine nature, as Vicarious.

The advocates, both of the Governmental and Moral Influence theories, agree in denying that

there is any such principle as vindicatory justice in God (that is, that there is a demand in the divine nature that wrong should be punished), but the Governmental teaches that justice in God "is to be referred to a general governmental rectitude, based upon a benevolent regard for the highest ultimate and most general well-being of the subjects of his moral government."

The advocates of the Moral Influence theory hold that the single ultimate principle that determines God in the great work of redemption is benevolence. They also hold that the sole object of the life and death of Christ is to produce a moral effect upon the sinner, and thus reconcile him to God. They may be divided into two schools as to the character of this effect:

First, the Natural Moral Influence theory. This makes it an influence that subdues the heart and will of the sinner by the natural influence of love, thus bringing the life into harmony with God's will. It does not recognize the necessity of the inner work of the Holy Spirit.

Second, the Supernatural Moral Influence theory. This school emphasizes the need for a divine work to be done in the soul; and while holding that the work is moral and not legal, still maintains a true regeneration, and deliverance from sin by a vital union with Christ, or an imparted life.

Besides holding the views as to justice already indicated, the advocates of the Governmental theory agree:

"1. That law is a product of the divine will, and therefore relaxable.

2. God's sovereign prerogative includes the right of pardon.

3. But the governmental rectitude . . . in view of the fact that indiscriminate pardon would encourage the violation of law, determines God to condition the pardon of human sinners upon an imposing *example of suffering* in a victim so related to mankind and to himself, as effectually to demonstrate his determination that sin shall not be indulged in with impunity."

The advocates of a Vicarious atonement may be divided into two great schools:

First, the Calvinistic. This teaches that the sufferings of Christ were an exact equivalent for those of the saved, fully meeting the demand of law and of the divine justice. It pays the debt in full.

Second, the Arminian. This teaches that the sufferings of Christ, while vicarious, were not a full equivalent, but that God was pleased to accept them in the place of those that the sinner would have to endure.

The Arminian theory was largely elaborated by Limborch, its distinctive feature being that the death of Christ was a *sacrificial offering*. While holding the idea of relaxation, it differs from the Governmental theory in that it recognizes a demand in the divine nature, as well as that which arises from the needs of government. While holding that Christ's sufferings were penal, Arminians deny that they were an exact equivalent. They took the place of the penalty, having the same effect in rec-

onciling God. They were not a substituted penalty (which must be an exact equivalent), as Calvinists teach, but a substitute *for* the penalty (which may be of inferior worth).

SECTION II.—*Historical Sketch.*

It is claimed that the theory of a vicarious atonement was unknown to the church before Anselm, who, it is said, was the author of the theory of substitution. It is true that Anselm was the first to set forth the doctrine of a vicarious atonement in its full, clear, scientific form, just as the Moral Influence theory was first elaborated by Abelard, and the Governmental by Hugo Grotius; but that a vicarious atonement was not the faith of the church before Anselm's time, we can not admit, because the reverse is true.

As to the Apostolic Fathers (those who lived during the life of the apostles), their language was that of the Bible; and therefore they taught, as we confidently believe, a vicarious atonement.

As examples of their teaching, we give the following:

"Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious that blood is to God, which having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world." (First Epistle of Clement, Chapter VII.)

"Let us then continually persevere in our hope, and the earnest of our righteousness, which is Jesus Christ, 'who bore our sins in his own body on the tree,' 'who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth,' but endured all things for us, that we

might live in him." (Epistle of Polycarp, Chapter VIII.)

"He himself took upon him the burden of our iniquities, He gave his own Son a ransom for us, the Holy One for transgressors, the blameless one for the wicked, the righteous one for the unrighteous, the incorruptible one for the wicked, the immortal one for the mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins but his righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation! that the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous one, and that the righteousness of one should justify many transgressors." (Epistle to Diognetus, Chapter VIII.)

"For to this end the Lord endured to deliver up his flesh to corruption, that we might be sanctified through the remission of sins, which is effected by his blood of sprinkling. For it is written concerning him, partly with reference to Israel, and partly to us; and [the Scriptures] saith thus: 'He was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities: with his stripes we are healed.'" (Epistle of Barnabas, Chapter V.)

"Become the imitators of his sufferings, and of his love, wherewith he loved us when he gave himself a ransom for us, that he might cleanse us by his blood from our old ungodliness." (Epistle of Ignatius to the Trallians, Chapter VIII.)

From the time of these Fathers until the eleventh century the church was occupied with the discussion as to the PERSON of Christ, giving but little attention

to his *work*. Yet we find repeated statements that present the idea of a vicarious atonement:

"Having become the 'Mediator between God and men;' propitiating indeed for us the Father against whom we had sinned, and cancelling our disobedience by his own obedience; conferring also upon us the gift of communion with, and subjection to, our Maker. For this reason also he taught us to say in prayer, 'and forgive us our debts;' since indeed he is our Father, whose debtors we were, having transgressed his commandments." (Irenæus against heresies, Book V., Chapter XVII., Sec. I.)

"The first and principal ground of the Logos becoming man was the condemnation of the law by which we are burdened with guilt and eternal punishment, might be removed by the payment of the penalty."

"The death of the incarnate Logos is a ransom for the sins of men."

"Laden with guilt, the world was condemned by law, but the Logos assumed the condemnation, and, suffering in the flesh, gave salvation to all." (Athanasius contra Arianos, I. 45–60.)

Cyril of Jerusalem, Eusebius, John of Damascus, and others, use similar language.

Augustine writes but little of the *work* of Christ, although he taught a vicarious atonement. He seems to have held, however, the opinion that prevailed largely before Anselm, that Christ was offered as a ransom to Satan, who held men by right of conquest, for he says:

"It would have been injustice if Satan had not

had the right to rule over the being whom he had taken captive."

Gregory the Great is more direct than those we have quoted. He says:

"Guilt can be extinguished only by penal offering to justice, . . . hence a sinless man must be offered. . . . Hence the Son must be born of a virgin, and become man for us. He made himself a sacrifice for us, and set forth for sinners his own body, a victim without sin, and able both to die by virtue of its humanity, and to cleanse the guilty, upon grounds of justice." (Moralia in Jobum, xvii. 46.)

So far, therefore, as the period before Anselm was concerned, while we have no formal discussion of the doctrine, it was plainly held by the majority of the Fathers; and in their writings we find all the features that enter into the later and more scientific statement.

In the eleventh century there appeared a man of sterling worth, ripe scholarship, and possessed of a mind of remarkable clearness and depth, who was to turn the thought of Christendom from the consideration of the person to the work of Christ.

Anselm was born in Piedmont in the year 1033. After his mother's death, and because of his father's harshness, he left his home and made his way into France. Here he became a monk, at the age of twenty-seven, in the monastery of Bec, and three years later became its friar. He soon made it the foremost seat of learning in Europe. In 1092 he crossed into England, and in the following year was

elected Archbishop of Canterbury, which position he held until his death in 1109. His writings made a profound impression in his own age, and perhaps more than those of any man influenced the theological opinions of the entire church as to Christ's work.

He has been called "the first scholastic philosopher and theologian."

"In his great work, *Cur Deus homo*, he undertakes to make plain, even to infidels, the rational necessity of the Christian mystery of the atonement. The theory rests upon three positions; that satisfaction was necessary on account of God's honor and justice; that such satisfaction can be given only by the peculiar personality of the God-man; that such satisfaction is really given by the voluntary death of this infinitely valuable person. The demonstration is in brief this: All the actions of men are due for the furtherance of God's glory; if, then, there be sin—that is, if God's honor be wounded, man of himself can give no satisfaction; and as an insult to infinite honor is itself infinite, the satisfaction must be infinite—that is, it must outweigh all that is not God. Such a penalty can only be paid by God himself, and as a penalty for man, must be paid under the form of man. Satisfaction is only possible through the God-man. Now this God-man, as sinless, is exempt from the penalty of sin; his passion is therefore voluntary, not given as due. The merit of it is infinite; God's justice is thus appeased; and his mercy may extend to men."

We believe that while Anselm in many ways presents clearly the doctrine of substitution, his philosophy has some serious defects. The most serious is the making sin committed on earth to be in-

finite demerit. This is part of the Calvinistic theory of substitution; and while it is held by some who are not Calvinists, it is always at the expense of logical consistency.

If the philosophy of Anselm as to the demerit of sin be true, we are logically driven either to the rejection of substitution or the acceptance of a limited atonement.

Anselm held, and rightly, that unless the atonement was demanded by an inherent and necessary attribute of the Godhead, it could never be scientifically vindicated.

The discussion of the theory of Anselm led to the development of that of Abelard.

Abelard, when but twenty years of age, went to the celebrated school of Notre Dame at Paris, becoming a pupil of William of Champeau, who was then teaching the doctrines of Anselm. Possessed of a brilliant intellect and seeing the weak places in the philosophy of Anselm, he soon entered into a dispute with his master, and history says, overcame him in debate. He seems then to have embarked in a career of disputation, traveling extensively, and overcoming all opposition. In 1115 he occupies the chair at Notre Dame, and thousands of students flock to his school. His connection with Heloise, which constitutes one of the great romances of the Middle Ages, led to his downfall; and after a stormy life, he died in 1142.

As to the atonement, he begins and ends with the benevolence of God; which is separated from, and not limited by, his holiness. He denied that

there was any thing in the divine nature that necessitated satisfaction, holding that the object of Christ's work was to produce sorrow in the human soul and reconcile man to God.

The theories of Anselm and Abelard held possession of the field for over four centuries, until the time of Hugo Grotius. It may be said that "in the annals of precocious genius there is no greater prodigy on record than Hugo Grotius." Born in the Low Countries in 1583, he made good Latin verses at nine, was ready to enter the university at twelve, and at sixteen received the degree of Doctor of Law at Leyden, and began the practice of law. His aspirations, however, were for authorship, his writings being very numerous. His contributions to history, politics, and poetry are valuable, and show the versatility of his genius. His contributions to law gave him a world-wide fame, it being said that he had almost created a new science, that of international law. In theology he stands pre-eminent, chiefly as the first to formulate the governmental theory of the atonement. He held that God accepted the satisfaction of Christ, not because it possessed a strictly infinite value, but because, in his benevolence, he is willing to accept it as satisfaction, just as the creditor may discharge the debtor, by part payment, or by none.

Regarding law and penalty he taught:

"All positive laws are relaxable. Those who fear that if we concede this we do injury to God, because we thereby represent him as mutable, are much deceived. For law is not something internal in God,

or in the will of God, but it is a particular effect or product of his will. But that the effects or products of his will are mutable is very certain. Moreover, in promulgating a positive law which he might wish to relax at some future time, God does not exhibit any fickleness of will. . . . It is objected to this view that it is *naturally* just that the wicked should be punished with such a punishment as corresponds to their crime, and therefore that punishment is not a matter of optional choice, neither is it relaxable. In answer to this objection, it is to be noticed that it does not always follow that injustice is done when justice is not done. .. . . Furthermore, a threat to punish is not like a promise to reward. For from the promise to reward there accrues a certain right or claim on the part of him to whom the promise is made, but the threat of punishment only declares the transgressor's desert of penalty and the right to punish on the part of him that threatens."

Relaxation, instead of satisfaction, is the theory of Grotius. But the question arises, if God can relax at all, why not entirely? Where is the necessity for the sufferings of Christ? Grotius replies that, so far as God's nature was concerned, he could have done this; but he could not relax entirely with safety to the created universe. To maintain his government was, therefore, the ground upon which an atonement was required, and not any thing in the nature of God. The theory of Grotius is exemplary, not expiatory, or retributive. It was made to *prevent* future sin, not to *atone* for that which was past.

SECTION III.—*Definitions.*

Definitions are properly in place in this introduc-

tion, although the meaning of the words used that are scriptural, are, in reality, part of the argument itself.

First.—ATONEMENT.

The word as now used by theologians has the same sense that the word "satisfaction" had in the seventeenth century and the word "redemption" still later; it is used to designate the entire work that Christ has done for us. It is so used when we speak of "theories of the atonement." This is never its Bible meaning. The moral influence and governmental are theories of Christ's work; but *in the Bible sense* of the word atonement, they are, in reality, denials of the atonement.

The etymology insisted upon by Socinians of at-one-ment is a very doubtful one, probably suggested by the spelling. Any argument that is founded upon this doubtful etymology must be faulty, because it can not be made from the word used by the Holy Spirit.

כָּפַר (*kaphar*) the verb, has the root meaning "to cover," and is defined by Gesenius:

"1. *To cover over sin, to hide*, spoken of God as the offended party—that is, *to forgive, to pardon* sin. . . . .

2. Spoken of the offender or his representative, *to cover* sin, *to hide*—that is, *to do away* by some expiatory act, *to purge*, so that he may be pardoned; hence (*a*) *to expiate* an offense, fault, *to atone for* . . . . (*b*) *to make expiation* or *atonement* for an offender, *to free him from guilt* . . . . (*c*) *to appease, to placate* the person offended . . . . So of

impending evil—that is, to avert by expiation." The corresponding noun כִּפֻּרִים (*kippurim*) Gesenius defines: "*Expiations, atonement.*"

They are the only Hebrew words translated "atonement," and it is worthy of note that while the root meaning is "to cover," the words are never so translated. Kaphar is translated by other words than "atonement," an examination of which will help us to see the Bible meaning of the word.

Gen. vi. 14, "Pitch it."
Gen. xxxii. 20, "Appease."
Ex. xxi. 20, "Ransom."
Lev. xvi. 20, "Reconciling."
Num. xxxv. 31, 32, "Satisfaction."
Num. xxxv. 33, "Cleansed."
Ps. lxxix. 9, "Purge away."
Ezek. xvi. 63, "Pacified."

How suggestive that the word for atonement has for its root meaning "to cover." It will always be true that we did commit the sin. It may be blotted out of the book of God's remembrance, cast behind his back, removed from us as far as the east is from the west, but it can not be undone. But while it can not be undone, by the grace of God it may be covered over by the blood; hidden away, blotted out.

"Blessed is the man whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is *covered.*"—Psalm xxxii. 1. Rom. iv. 7.

The word atonement occurs only once in the New Testament, and then incorrectly, as a translation of the Greek word *Καταλλαγη* (*katallagee*). The Revised

Version translates this properly "reconciliation." The Greek word translated "propitiation" is the word used in the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew word for "atonement." Atonement in the Old Testament and propitiation in the New are synonymous words.

Second.—PROPITIATION.

Webster defines this:

"1. The act of appeasing wrath and conciliating the favor of an offended party, the act of making propitiation.

"2. (Theol.) (*a*) The influence or effects of the death of Christ in appeasing the divine justice, and conciliating the divine favor. (*b*) That which propitiates, atonement or atoning sacrifice."

Three forms of the Greek word are used in the New Testament, an examination of which will give the Scripture meaning.

First, the verb ἱλασκόμαι (*hilaskomai*).

"To appease, render propitious; in New Testament to expiate, make an atonement or expiation for Heb. ii. 17; ἱλασθητι (*hilastheeti*), be gracious, show mercy, pardon.—Luke xviii. 13."—*Bagster.*

"To be propitious or merciful, favor, befriend; to atone, make atonement for, "expiate."—*Groves.*

This word is used twice in the New Testament, translated "be merciful" and "make reconciliation for."

"Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful high-priest in things pertaining to God, to

make reconciliation for the sins of the people."—Heb. ii. 17.

Here the idea of expiation can not be left out. Making reconciliation for the sins of the people, or more literally, as given by the Revised Version, "to make propitiation for the sins of the people," was part of Christ's priestly work in things which *had a bearing upon God* (*τὰ πρὸς τον θεον—ta pros ton theon*).

"God *be merciful* to me a sinner."—Luke xviii. 13.

Standing in the court of the temple, within sight of the brazen altar with its blood, instructed as to the meaning of that blood, the publican says, "God be propitious to me *the* sinner" (*τω ἁμαρτωλω* —too hamartooloo—*the* sinner). Or, "God make propitiation for me the sinner," evidently on the ground of the expiation made by the blood.

Second, *ἱλασμός* (*hilasmos*).

"Propitiation, expiation; one who makes expiation."—*Bagster.*

"A propitiation, atonement, reconciliation; a sacrifice, sin-offering."—*Groves.*

This word is used twice in the New Testament, translated "propitiation."

And he is the propitiation for our sins."—1 John ii. 2.

"Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins."—1 John iv. 10.

The texts are plain, showing that Christ himself is the propitiation for our sins.

Third, ιλαστηριον (*ilasteerion*).

"Propitiatory, invested with propitiatory power."—*Bagster.*

"A propitiatory thing; a propitiation, atonement, expiation; the lid or covering of the ark, the mercy-seat."—*Groves.*

This word also occurs twice and is translated "propitiation" and "mercy-seat."

"And over it the cherubims of glory shadowing the *mercy-seat;* of which we can not now speak particularly."—Heb. ix. 5.

The mercy-seat was the place where the blood was sprinkled on the day of atonement. The mercy-seat was properly a propitiatory.

"Whom God hath set forth a *propitiation* through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God."—Rom. iii. 25.

The Greek word here used is the one used in the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew word for "mercy-seat." If we retain that translation it ought to be so rendered here, which points out more exactly Paul's thought. Propitiatory would, however be a more literal translation, and should be substituted for "mercy-seat" both in the Old and New Testaments.

By this examination it is seen that the classic meaning of the words is evidently their Bible meaning. There is nothing in the context to indicate a new meaning, and in the absence of this, we are justified by every principle of sound exegesis in

saying that propitiation is to make God favorable by an expiation.

Third.—EXPIATION.

Theologians distinguish between propitiation and expiation. As both are expressed by the Greek word, it is better to distinguish them as that which makes God favorable, and God's being favorable. When we speak of God as being propitiated, we mean that he has been made favorable. When we speak of Christ as the propitiation for our sins, we mean that which makes God favorable. Expiation is limited to this last thought—the cause. Propitiation includes both — the cause and the effect. Webster defines expiation:

"1. The act of making satisfaction for an offense; atonement; satisfaction.

2. The means by which atonement for crimes is made; atonement.

3. An act by which the threats of prodigies were averted among the ancient heathen."

Fourth.—REDEMPTION.

This means to bring from a state of bondage into liberty; to set free. This can be done in two ways. First, by *purchase*—that is, by the payment of a price or ransom. Secondly, by power, as when God gave freedom to Israel from the captivity of Egypt. This twofold manner of redemption is a very important distinction.

Fifth.—PENAL SATISFACTION AND DEBT.

Dr. A. A. Hodge makes the following distinction —following in this the celebrated Swiss theologian Turretin:

"The distinction between a *penal* and a *pecuniary* satisfaction. The first concerns crime and person, the other concerns debt and things. They differ (*a*) In crime the demand terminates upon the person of the criminal; in debt upon the thing due. (*b*) In crime the demand is for that kind, degree, and duration of suffering that enlightened reason discerns to be demanded by justice; in debt the demand is precisely and only for the thing due, an exact *quid pro quo*. (*c*) In crime a vicarious suffering of the penalty is advisable only at the absolute discretion of the sovereign; and the consequent release of the criminal is a matter of grace; in debt the payment of the thing due, by whomsoever made, *ipso facto*, liberates; and its acceptance and the release of the debtor is no matter of grace."

This is defective. The distinction points out, however, the ground of the substitution according to Calvinists.

Dr. Hodge starts wrong, as a "distinction between a penal and pecuniary satisfaction" is not what is meant; but the distinction between a penal satisfaction and debt. The law recognizes many offenses that are punishable with a fine. Where will Dr. Hodge place them? If under the head of "penal," where they belong, the whole distinction gives way. If under the head of "pecuniary," then a pecuniary satisfaction concerns more than debt and things.

Again, what is meant by crime? If it includes all offenses against the law, Dr. Hodge's propositions break down. If it means those offenses punishable by imprisonment or death, it lays a foundation for the objection that a penalty can not be

borne by a substitute without bearing the criminality; in other words, it gives a false meaning to the word penal.

Again, Dr. Hodge leaves out a very important factor—that in a vicarious bearing of the penalty or payment of a debt, the *consent* of the criminal or debtor would have to be obtained.

We venture the following as a substitute for Dr. Hodge's distinctions:

The distinction between a penal satisfaction and debt. The one is a demand arising from a violation of law, the other a demand arising from personal obligation.

1. In penal satisfaction the demand is on the person of the criminal *to suffer;* in debt the demand is on the person of the debtor *to pay.*

2. "In penal satisfaction the demand is for that kind, degree, and duration of suffering that enlightened reason discerns to be demanded" as an expiation for the offense; "in debt the demand is precisely and only for the thing due, an exact *quid pro quo.*"

3. In penal satisfaction a vicarious suffering is only admissible when the demands of justice can be met without the criminality being assumed by the substitute; in debt a vicarious payment can be made with the consent of the debtor.

Substitution is always of grace, whether it be the vicarious bearing of a penalty or payment of a debt. Not grace on the part of law or justice, but grace to the one who is benefited, shown by the one who suffers or pays. Thus it is the "grace of our Lord

Jesus Christ," and as Christ is God, it is the "grace of God."

Sixth.—SUBSTITUTION.

"1. The act of substituting or putting one person or thing in the place of another; as, the *substitution* of an agent, attorney, or representative, to act for one in his absence; the substitution of bank notes for gold and silver as a circulating medium. . . . .

5. (Theol.) The doctrine that Christ suffered vicariously, being substituted, as it were, for the sinner, and that his sufferings were expiatory." —*Webster.*

Some press the thought of Christ being a substitute until it is no longer substitution that is meant but identification. To put a person or thing in the place of another is all that is meant; and that without reference to what is substituted, or why. A merchant in filling a bill of goods substitutes one article in the place of another. They may be totally dissimilar, yet if one is sent *in the place* of another, it is substituted for it. Bank notes are a substitute for coin, yet totally dissimilar. If, then, Christ died for us, and by that death satisfied a demand that was against us so that God is propitiated, then his death was that of a substitute, and that irrespective of the character or duration of his sufferings.

Seventh.—VICARIOUS.

"1. Of, or pertaining to, a vicar, substitute, or deputy; deputed; delegated; as, *vicarious* power, or authority.

2. Acting or suffering for another; as vicarious agent or officer.

3. Performed or suffered in the place of another; substituted; as a *vicarious* sacrifice; *vicarious* punishment."—*Webster.*

Substitution and vicarious are words used synonymously to express what is meant by the words, "*in the place of.*" This is all that the words themselves express when applied to the sufferings and death of Christ. If they were in the place of ours, then they were vicarious, and Christ is a substitute.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

PART I.

THE NECESSITY FOR AN ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS AS TO THE DIVINE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES.

Defective views as to the Godhead and of the atonement go hand in hand. Most of the objections that are urged against substitution have their root here. It is important, therefore, that we be reminded of certain fundamental principles as to the Godhead, and that we contemplate those attributes we are in danger of forgetting.

SECTION I.—*We must banish our material conceptions when we contemplate the Deity.*

It has been the belief of the great body of Christians that the language that speaks of God as having body, parts, and passions, is used only in an accommodated sense.

Words being the signs of ideas, it follows that in the formation of language that which can be conceived of only gets its name from that which is represented to the senses. Thus there is always, even when describing states that are purely mental,

a material conception in the words we use. More, that which is beyond the range of our senses and of our consciousness, can not be conceived of at all; and can only be presented to our minds by words that express ideas we already have.

We find, by examination, two distinct classes of phenomena that can never be attributed to the same substance. Thus we have thought, feeling, and will, known to us through consciousness on the one hand, and extension, inertia, etc., known through the senses on the other.

What is matter? To this question no *direct* answer can be given, because the substance we call matter is in itself unknown, and perhaps unknowable. We can only answer indirectly by describing its properties. Thus we say, that matter is that substance which possesses the properties of impenetrability, extension, figure, divisibility, inertia, etc. These general properties belong to matter in every form known to science. It is only by these properties that matter is known. Who can conceive of matter, in itself, apart from them? And who, with these fully manifest to our senses, can deny its existence?

What then is spirit? As in the case of matter, no direct answer can be given; we can only reply by describing its properties, as these are known to consciousness. Spirit is that substance that knows and feels and wills. As these properties differ from those that belong to matter, and differ also in their mode of manifestation, being known through con-

sciousness and not the senses, they must belong to another substance.

The Bible affirms that "God is a Spirit." Not that he is spiritual, but spirit. God is not a material being, for the properties of matter can not be predicated of him. We can not speak of God as possessing impenetrability, extension, or figure, because he is omnipotent. We can not regard God as material, because the properties of matter manifest themselves to the senses, and our senses have never apprehended God.

"No man hath seen God at any time." (John i. 18.)

"Whom no man hath seen, *nor can see.*" (1 Tim. vi. 16.)

All our material thoughts must be excluded when we contemplate the Deity. How otherwise would the doctrine of the Trinity be other than an absurdity?

SECTION II.—*We must exclude from our ideas of God all our mental conceptions, as well as our material, so far as they are the result of limitation.*

We can not measure the infinite by the finite, the perfect by the imperfect, the immutable by the changeable. To illustrate a danger take the following from B. F. Underwood's lecture on "Materialism:"

"Christianity assumes the existence of a God, infinite in presence and duration, yet he is a personal being, notwithstanding the fact that personality implies limitation in space and time. He is an in-

telligent being, although intelligence—the only intelligence of which we have any knowledge—implies limited faculties, such as reason, memory, imagination, ideality, calculation, benevolence, etc., which can exist only in a being confined to locality, finite in knowledge, and subject to imperfection.

If God *reasons*, he must compare objects or ideas and deduce conclusions; but conclusions arrived at by a process of ratiocination can not have been known to him prior to such reasoning. If he possesses *memory*, the faculty of recalling past events, a knowledge of things present at one time is absent at another. If he has *imagination*, something must be invisible to him for the ideal objects of this faculty exist in the realm of the unseen. If he has *hope*, his knowledge must surely be limited, and his feelings variable, for hope is made up of uncertainty and desire. If he *designs*, he must be finite both in knowledge and power, for to design is to calculate, to cogitate, to decide, and then to use intermediate agencies to accomplish certain ends, which are directly unattainable. If he is *benevolent*, he can not be perfectly happy, for benevolence implies sympathy with the objects of its efforts, and therefore feelings in common with the party needing aid. These faculties and powers, together with others that might be named, can be conceived as existing only in a being confined to locality, limited in time, finite in knowledge, and subject to infirmities. Does God possess them? If he does, he is a finite being. If he does not, then he is a being without memory, without calculation or design, without hope, without benevolence; and a being without these mental qualities or powers is a being without intelligence."

Reduced to syllogistic form, this amounts simply to:

Man's intelligence is limited in every direction.

All intelligence is like man's (because we know no other).

Therefore God is finite, or without intelligence.

This is a quiet assumption of the whole question at issue; for when the Christian affirms that God is a pure intelligence, infinite in all his attributes, he affirms that all intelligence is not like man's.

It well illustrates the danger of taking the phenomena of spirit, as manifested to us with the limitations inseparable from the finite, and rigidly applying them to God. It will, of necessity, lead to contradictions, difficulties, and absurdities.

SECTION III.—*We must avoid all ideas of limitation when contemplating God.*

God can not be limited, either in space, time, knowledge, or power. With us, time presents itself with the relations of past, present, and future. This is the necessary result of limitation in a finite being. We can not believe such limitation to apply to God. Known unto him is the end from the beginning. Infinite in his perfections, he is always the "I am."

"Before Abraham was, *I am.*" (John viii. 58.)

The doctrine of the Eternity of God teaches that he never had a beginning, and will never have an end; that his thoughts, purposes, and acts, are without succession, and are never past, present, or future, as it regards himself. The thought of God being angry and being propitiated implies change and succession from our time stand-point.

Some have from this reasoned that they can have

no real existence, and are therefore only modes of thought in presenting the work of Christ to us. The objection has no weight, however, when we remember the eternity of God; and would apply as against creation, providence, or prayer, as much as against the atonement. The whole work of redemption, and all it implies, is, from God's stand-point, one and indivisible.

SECTION IV.—*The Bible statements of the nature and attributes of God, while made in accommodated language, are real.*

In what we have said of the nature and attributes of God, we do not wish to be understood as taking the extreme ground that the Bible representations of God do not correspond to the reality. Some have held that these representations of God give us *no real idea* of him.

"Being sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect, which tell not what God is in himself, but how he wills that we should think of him."

This, however, undermines the foundations of all religion; for if we are to regard our conceptions of God as unreal, we are left without any certainty that he exists at all. If there is not back of all Bible representations an objective reality, fitly and truly presented by these, then all ideas of duty and religion founded upon them are built upon the sand.

Man being made in the image of God, we must believe that when the Bible represents God as knowing, feeling, or willing, there is a real knowl-

edge, feeling, and will, the same in kind as ours, but without our finite limitations. So, when it speaks of God as merciful, as just, as good, and as true, we must believe that these are real qualities, only without the limitations and the imperfections that they are associated with in men.

SECTION V.—*The Holiness of God.*

The divine holiness is perhaps the most difficult to express of all the attributes. Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his classification of the attributes, places it by itself, and defines it:

"The holiness of God is not to be conceived of as an attribute among others; it is rather a general term representing the conception of his consummate perfection and total glory. It is his infinite moral perfection crowning his infinite intelligence and power. There is a glory of each attribute, and a glory of the whole together. The intellectual nature is the essential basis of the moral. Infinite moral perfection is the crown of the Godhead. Holiness is the total glory thus crowned."

This seems to identify holiness and glory, making holiness the united glory of all the attributes; nor does it fully appear what he means by glory. Does he mean that it is the moral quality of each attribute? Then, as the moral quality of justice is justice, and of truth is truth, it would simply mean that holiness is the union of all the attributes. This would confound holiness with the divine nature or essence. Does he mean a moral quality in each attribute distinct from it? Then his definition is no definition. Does he mean the glory

that comes from the manifestation of the divine perfections? Is this what he means by glory? If so, we can hardly accept it as a definition of holiness.

Oehler's definition is by far the best, the most scientific and complete. Starting with the word itself, קָדוֹשׁ (*kadosh*), he traces the development of its meaning in the Old Testament.

"Etymologically, the root meaning of kadosh can not be exactly defined." Oehler, Baudissin, and others agree in giving to the word as its fundamental etymological signification the idea of "separation."

Gesenius derives it from קָדַשׁ (*kadash*), "to be pure, clean." But this is the developed meaning of the root, as Oehler points out. The weight of evidence is in favor of the primary idea being that of "separation."

The word holiness does not convey the idea of moral purity as its essential meaning, but separation; and is, therefore, applied to animals and things as well as to man and God. When the word is used of men, animals, places, or things, the essential meaning is that they are set apart, separated from a common to a sacred use, to the service of God. Other ideas are developed from this, so that from the idea of that which was set apart being *ceremonially* clean or holy, it expresses that which was intrinsically so.

When the term holiness is applied to God and given the sense of "moral purity" or "freedom from all sin," it logically leads to the search for an ultimate rule, the discussion pertaining thereto being

so prominent in moral philosophy. Unless words are unmeaning, to define God's holiness as moral purity implies a standard for God as well as man.

If the etymological signification is that of separation, what element in the divine nature does it denote? Oehler says:

"As the designation of a divine attribute, there evidently lies in it primarily a negative element, by which it designates a state of *apartness*, God's raising himself above all others. So Jehovah, as the Holy One, stands first in opposition to the other imaginary gods, Ex. xv. 11: 'Who is like thee among the gods? Who is like thee, glorious in holiness?' And, then, also in opposition to all that is of the creature, or, more generally expressed, to all that is not he himself, Isa. xi. 25: 'To whom will ye compare me that I may be like? saith the Holy One.' In other words, as the Holy One, God is he who is raised absolutely above the world. Compare Ps. cxix. 2–5, where God's elevation above all people is connected with his holiness; Isa. v. 16, in which the truth that the holy God sanctifies himself in justice corresponds to his being exalted in judgment. (Compare ii. 17). Accordingly this divine elevation is God's absolute uniqueness (1 Sam. ii. 2:) 'There is none like Jehovah, for there is none but thee.' The positive expression for God's absolute elevation and uniqueness would be, that in his transcendence above the world, and in his apartness from the creature, God is he who ever preserves his own proper character, *maintaining himself in that being which is distinct from every thing created.*"

We thus see in what sense the idea of separation applies to God. This idea is still further developed, for as Schmeider says:

"Holiness would not be holiness, but exclusiveness, if it did not presuppose God's entrance into multifarious relations, and thereby the revelation and communication of himself."

Hence, Oehler adds another element:

"This element is found in the fact that the divine holiness contains not only the divine self-maintainance, but also the divine *self-disclosure* since God as the Holy One does not remain in himself, but gives effect to his holiness out of himself, by instituting a separation in the world, for his own aims, electing a people out of the mass of the nations of the world, accepting them as his property and impressing on the ordinances which he gives to this people, and on the historical providence by which they are guided, the stamp of this separation from worldliness, and of this specific relation to himself. See as to the principal passage, Lev. xx. 26: 'I am holy, and so I have separated you from among the nations to be mine.'"

These are the fundamental ideas that underlie the Bible presentation of the holiness of God, but we see it still further developed; and again we quote Oehler:

"Let us consider what sort of fear it is that seizes man when God is revealed as the Holy One. It is evidently not simply the feeling of creature weakness, but predominantly and specifically the feeling of human sinfulness and impurity (Isa. vi. 5, and

others). Hence, it follows that the divine holiness, even if, as absolute perfection of life, it involves the negation of *all* bonds of creature finitude (from which passages like Isa. xl. 25, are explained), is nevertheless mainly *separation from the impurity and sinfulness* of the creature, or, expressed positively, the clearness and purity of the divine nature, which excludes all communion with that which is wicked. In this sense the symbolical designation of the divine holiness is *light* (compare Isa. x. 17)."

Men are fond of proclaiming that "God is love," but the other thought that "God is light" is in danger of being overlooked. Yet it is as true that God is light, and in the same application, as that God is love.

SECTION VI.—*The Divine Righteousness.*

Righteousness and justice are in the Bible synonymous words, being translations of the same Hebrew word.

The root is צָדַק (*tsadaq*) "to be right, straight." Gesenius defines צַדִּיק (*tsaddiq*):

"1. *Just, righteous*—that is, doing justice, spoken of a judge or king who dispenses justice and defends the right."

It is translated "just" and "righteous." Oehler says:

"The word צַדִּיק (*tsaddiq*, righteous) expresses what is straight and right, in the sense that God in his government always does what is suitable; namely, first, what answers fully to his aim; and second-

ly, what answers to the constitution of the object of the divine action. Specially, but not exclusively, the sphere in which the צְדָקָה (*tsedaqah*, righteousness) manifests itself is the judicial activity of God. . . . . According to Gen. xviii. 25, Jehovah is judge of all the earth, and as such he will do right, and not permit the lot of the godless to fall upon the righteous."

This is sufficiently clear, and points out an element of justice that is important—that of action by rule and measure.

Theologians distinguish justice in various ways. Thus Dr. Hodge says:

"The absolute justice of God is the infinite moral perfection or universal righteousness of his being. The relative justice of God is his infinitely righteous nature, viewed as exercised in his relation to his moral creatures, as their moral governor. This last is called rectoral, when viewed as exercised generally in administering the affairs of his universal government, in providing for and governing his creatures and their actions. It is called punitive or vindicatory, when viewed as demanding and inflicting the adequate and proportionate punishment of all sin, because of its intrinsic demerit."

If Dr. Hodge means that the demand is inherent in the justice, so that without any legal penalty, justice itself demands and inflicts punishment, we must dissent. It is the law that makes the demand in human governments, justice inflicts the penalty. In the divine government there is the administra-

tive demand of the law, and also the demand that arises from the holiness of God.

God's justice, whether exercised in rewarding or punishing, is always the same. The theological distinctions tend to confuse.

SECTION VII.—*The Jealousy of God.*

The Bible very fully presents the idea of God's jealousy.

"For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God." Ex. xx. 5.

"For the Lord thy God is a consuming fire, even a jealous God." Deut. iv. 24.

"Do we provoke the Lord to jealousy? Are we stronger than he?" 1 Cor. x. 22.

See also Ex. xxiv. 14; Deut. vi. 15; xxix. 20; xxxii. 16; Josh. xxiv. 19; Ps. lxxviii. 58; lxxix. 5; Rev. ii. 4, etc.

As to God's jealousy Oehler says:

"This divine zeal is the *energy of the divine holiness*. . . . . It turns itself avengingly against every violation of the divine law. In virtue of his קִנְאָה (*kinah*, jealousy), the holy God extirpates all that sets itself in opposition to him. God's jealousy turns especially against idolatry, by which the divine uniqueness is assailed, see, *e.g.*, Deut. xxxii. 21, and generally against all sin by which God's name is desecrated."

As light is the appropriate symbol of God's holiness, fire—"a consuming fire"—is the symbol of his jealousy. And again, it is as true that God is

a consuming fire, as it is that God is love. By a comparison of the verses that speak of God as holy, it will be seen that it is closely connected with the thought of his anger or wrath.

Oehler says:

"The inner essential connection of wrath with the divine holiness is made especially clear by the passage (Isa. x. 17): 'The light of Israel becomes a fire, and his Holy One a flame, which burns and consumes his thorns and briers.' Because wrath is a manifestation of divine holiness, the occasion for its outburst (as Ritschl and Diestel have rightly urged) does not lie in a capricious divine humor or natural malignity, as the gods of the heathen fell into a passion, but wholly in the person smitten by it. If a man denies and rejects the testimony of the holy God which was given to him, justice must be exercised upon him in his resistance to God's will, which alone is right, by his being reduced to his own nothingness."

Of course when the Bible uses such terms as anger, wrath, indignation, and vengeance, as applied to God, the idea of malice, hatred, or vindictiveness can have no place. In us anger partakes of the feelings of our fallen nature; and hence anger, as experimentally known, and the ideas growing out of this experience, can not be applied to God. Yet there must be something in the divine nature—*a reality*—back of these expressions, that is more fitly represented by these terms than by any others.

Wrong-doing, assailing as it does the divine holiness, arouses the divine jealousy (the zeal of holiness against all that opposes it), and enkindles the divine anger against the sinner. This anger, being *real*, the Deity must be appeased, propitiated, before man can be saved.

CHAPTER III.

SIN AND PENALTY.

In the Bible sin is presented under two aspects.

First, as a nature.

Second, as transgression.

These are important distinctions and are fundamental if we are to have intelligent conceptions of the atonement.

The fact that sin exists as depravity, or nature, is abundantly taught in the Scriptures, as will be seen by a study of such passages as Gen. vi. 5, 6; Ps. li. 1–5; Rom. i. 21–25; i. 28–31; iii. 9–18; Jer. xvii. 9; Eccl. ix. 3, etc.

Among theologians the distinction is made of sin as *actual* and *original*. By actual sin is meant a violation of a known rule of duty, by original sin the pollution or depravity of the nature. The term "original sin" is ambiguous and misleading; we shall therefore substitute sin as depravity and sin as transgression.

SECTION I.—*Sin as Depravity.*

In defining what is meant by depravity, the following points are presented by Dr. A. A. Hodge:

"All men, without exception, begin to sin as soon as they enter upon moral agency."

This being simply a question of fact will not be denied.

"They are all born with an antecedent and prevailing *tendency* in their nature to sin."

This is depravity. It has been recognized by men, apart from revelation. It was taught by the old philosophers—notably by Plato. We read that after Adam's fall he begat a son in his own image; and as like produces like, fallen humanity can only bring forth a depraved offspring. Depravity is the result of the law of heredity by which the corruption is reproduced in the offspring.

"This innate tendency is itself sin in the strictest sense. It is inherently ill-deserving, as well as polluting and destructive, and without any reference to its origin in Adam, it fully deserves God's wrath and curse, and except when expiated by the blood of Christ is always visited with that curse."

This statement we can not receive. It shows confusion of thought as to the nature of Christ's work, and exposes the doctrine of a vicarious atonement to unanswerable objections.

Sin as nature *always* leads to actual sin; and on the ground of this tendency, unfits for heaven. Unless provision is made to remove this unfitness, no man can be saved. This provision is made by the resurrection of Christ, and not by his death and sufferings.

Corruption of nature brings certain results, such as separation from God, and consequent suffering and sorrow; but these results are not the penalty of sin, but its inevitable consequence. As logical

consequences, having the relation of cause and effect, they can never be borne by a substitute, any more than one man can drink poison and another receive the effect. The only way we can be saved from the consequences is to be redeemed from the depravity itself.

Sin as transgression, however, exposes to a penalty; and between this penalty and the sin there is no such infallible connection, otherwise substitution would be impossible.

A consequence is not a penalty; hence we distinguish between them, one standing connected with sin as nature, the other with sin as transgression. God's provision for the one is the expiation of Christ, and for the other his resurrection life.

"Who was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification."—Rom. iv. 25.

While we believe that this depravity is of the nature of sin, and unfits for heaven, we do not believe that it can be expiated. Expiation for depravity, a logical part of the Calvinistic scheme, leads to innumerable theories about the nature and origin of depravity itself. Of these the principal are:

First. That of the pre-existence of souls, who, having actually apostatized in some former existence, are justly exposed to the penalty of the law. Dr. E. Beecher held that these pre-existent spirits were the angels who kept not their first estate, born as men in order that they might be saved.

Second. That all souls were created simultaneously with that of Adam, and in some way consented to his sin, so as to be justly exposed to its penalty.

Third. That all souls were in Adam—that is, they were created at the time Adam was, and were in him potentially and actually, and propagated from him to his descendants.

Fourth. The doctrine of Realism—that the spirits of men are not separate substances, but that humanity is one single substance, the souls of individuals being but its manifestations through their bodily organs. This universal soul having fallen and sinned in Adam, its manifestations in each individual are corrupt.

Fifth. The dogma that Adam was constituted the Federal Head, or representative, of the race, and that, therefore, God imputes to us the guilt of Adam's sin. This is the Calvinistic theory. Dr. A. A. Hodge thus presents this dogma of imputation:

"Imputation . . . is simply to lay to one's charge as a just ground of legal procedure, whether the thing imputed antecedently belonged to the person to whom it is charged, or for any other reason he is justly responsible for it."

"The imputation—that is, the judicial charging of Adam's sin to us—is rather to be considered as contemplating the race as a whole, as one mortal body, than as a series of individuals. The race was condemned as a whole, and hence each individual comes into existence in a state of *just, antenatal forfeiture.* . . . The imputation of the guilt of Adam's apostatizing act to us in common leads

judicially to spiritual desertion in particular, and spiritual desertion leads, by necessary consequence, to inherent depravity."

This theory of imputation and the dogma of the Federal Headship of Adam, of which it is a part, carries with it the logical consequence, that all men are damned before they are born, unless by a sovereign act of mercy God elects some of them to eternal life. This is a consistent part of a system that teaches that God has from all eternity fore-ordained some to eternal damnation.

The doctrine of the Federal Headship of Adam teaches that Adam was placed in the garden in a state of probation, not only for himself, *but for the race.* To this probation it is taught that the following principles applied:

1. That every moral agent was created holy,
2. Yet in a state of instable moral equilibrium;
3. Hence, confirmation in a state of holiness is a divine gift, not included in the natural endowments of any creature,
4. Always suspended upon conditions of perfect obedience during a period of probation. If Adam had obeyed he would have been confirmed and made impeccable.

The reasons given why Adam's probation was also that of his descendants, are:

1. God had a right to order as he pleased.
2. Probation was thus ordered in the very best condition for it, as Adam had no infancy, no evil surroundings, influences, etc.

3. Adam's natural relation to his descendants made him the proper person to represent them, because of the organic unity of the race.

4. The headship of Adam lays a foundation for the headship of Christ.

According to this theory heaven was promised to Adam *and his descendants* on the ground of *his* obedience, while the entire race are justly condemned to eternal despair *for his* disobedience.

As the logical counterpart of this, Christ frees from the penalty of sin by his vicarious sufferings and death and gives us a title to heaven on the ground of his law keeping, which is imputed for righteousness.

The dogma of the Federal Headship of Adam teaches that we are justly condemned for a sin committed by another before we were born, and in committing which we had no part and exercised no volition. It makes Adam our representative, but gives us no choice in electing him as such. It is from first to last arbitrary. If this be just, then logically it is also just to elect some to eternal life and "pass by" the rest. The principle is the same in either case—the sovereign good pleasure of God. Our condemnation for the sin of another is in conflict with those ideas of right common to the race; hence, it can only be defended on the ground of God's sovereignty. "It is just because God willed it." If we accept this, the doctrine of a limited atonement can be received also, as it rests upon the same principle. The dogma of a limited atonement really necessitates that of the imputation of Adam's sin.

To reject a limited atonement and still hold the dogma of the Federal Headship of Adam results logically in Universalism. If we recognize any rights of man, if we abandon the ground that *all* is of God's sovereign will *without any* reference to the creature, then we can not be held justly condemned for one man's sin without receiving the benefits of the obedience of the one man. The one should be as general as the other. The only consistent logical conclusions from the dogma of "imputation" would be either a limited atonement, or Universalism, as we recognize or not any rights in man.

We do not believe this dogma of imputation, because it is foreign to the Scriptures.

Adam was a type of Christ, "the figure of him that was to come," but the first Adam was not the expression of God's thought and purpose for the race. That is found in the second Adam, not the first. Here is the great mistake of the schools; making the first Adam the expression of God's purpose for the race, they bring in Christ *to restore* and gain for us what Adam should have done. This fails, ignobly fails, to comprehend the scope, the grandeur, and the glorious extent of Christ's work.

To put Adam under the moral law to win heaven for himself and his posterity, to find eternal issues in the rewards and penalties of the Old Testament, is the great root of error in the church, especially as to the atonement, and has well-nigh reduced the doctrine of substitution to an absurdity.

Adam was never told of heaven, nor was its possession promised him on the ground of his obedience. All this is man's thought, not God's. As we will show, the death penalty was corporeal, and nothing more; and his obedience was the ground of his continuance in the garden, but not of his title to heaven.

Never in any age was heaven ever promised on the ground of obedience; even under the law it was "This do and thou shalt *live*," but never "This do and thou shalt have a place in heaven." The consistent thought of the Jew was always of blessings on this earth, as an examination of the Old Testament will abundantly show.

The great absurdity of a double substitution grows out of error in respect to Old Testament penalties.

We hold the theory of the *Natural* Headship of Adam, rejecting the Federal. The name is of very little importance, but as the dogma to which it belongs has become thoroughly identified with the name, we prefer calling our theory the natural. Discarding the doctrine of imputation as in conflict with both reason and revelation, we still believe that Adam was truly the representative of the race, because the divinely constituted head of it. As the first man, from whom all others have come, he of necessity stood charged with the interests of mankind. But this representative character was founded upon natural law—that of heredity—a law that is distinctly recognized by science as among the facts of nature. By virtue of this law, a cor-

rupt nature, and all that it implies, came upon Adam's descendants. In this there is nothing but what is in harmony with reason, science, and revelation, which last indicates the principle when it says:

"How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" —Job xxv. 4.

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh."—John iii. 6.

The distinction between the Natural and Federal theories of the Headship of Adam are, briefly:

First. While both agree that a depraved nature has been transmitted from Adam to his posterity, the dogma of imputation makes this a judicial infliction (see Hodge above), the other makes it the necessary result of the law of heredity.

Second. The Federal theory includes in the covenant of works made with Adam the destiny of his descendants, Adam's probation being theirs. The Natural theory makes the covenant to involve only his own title to life, and not that of his descendants.

What was this covenant (if we call it such)?

"Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:

But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."—Gen. ii. 16, 17.

Not one word here about his descendants, not even a promise for obedience, but simply a penalty

for disobedience. The whole record shows that there is entire silence as to any such tremendous issues being involved as the federal theory demands, and the story shows that Adam was ignorant of them.

If Adam had raised children in the garden, their personal obedience would have entitled to life, and their disobedience would have wrought only personal ruin.

The Bible does not teach any thing as to the sin of Adam, but the fact that depravity and all that it implies comes to us as the result, not the penalty, of Adam's sin.

The difference between the two theories is brought out by a comparison of the Westminster Confession of Faith with that of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. We quote from the Confession as adopted by the founders of the church and from the Revised Confession adopted in 1883. Cumberland Presbyterians hold the "Medium Theology."

For convenience in making the comparison we place them in parallel columns:

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.	CUMBERLAND ORIGINAL.	CUMBERLAND OF 1883.
"They being the root of all mankind, the *guilt of this sin was imputed*, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."—Chapter vi. Section iii.	"They being the root of all mankind, by their sin all were made sinners, and the same death in sin, and corrupted nature, conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."—Chapter vi. Section iii.	"They being the root of all mankind, sin entered into the world through their act, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men."—Section xviii.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.	CUMBERLAND ORIGINAL.	CUMBERLAND OF 1883.
"The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and *in him* to his posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience."—Chapter vii. Section ii.	"The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and in him to his posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience."—Chapter vii. Section ii.	"The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam upon condition of perfect and personal obedience."—Section xxii.

The Bible teaching is set forth in the following texts:

"For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."—Rom. v. 19.

"Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."—Rom. v. 12.

"For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."—1 Cor. xv. 22.

We believe these verses present fully *all* that the Bible teaches as to the connection of his descendants with Adam's sin. They embody nothing but what is implied in the Natural Headship of Adam. Certainly the theory of imputation is not contained in them. This will be more fully shown when we come to consider death as a penalty.

SECTION II.—*Sin as Transgression.*

Sin as transgression differs from sin as depravity. The one exists as an inseparable part of man's

nature, and altogether apart from his own control; the other requires an action of the will choosing in opposition to a known rule of duty.

It is because of this last element that we deny that sin as transgression, and purely as such, is followed by suffering as a logical necessary consequence. For example, if a man commits theft, what suffering follows the act as *cause* is followed by *effect?* Absolutely none. If the person robbed, or the government under which he lives, inflicts punishment, it must be inflicted *by them*, if inflicted at all. This is a penalty, not a consequence. Many a man has committed theft without suffering for it in this life. There is not, and in the nature of things, can not be, such suffering following transgression as effect follows cause. If there were, *all punishment by law would be unjust.*

That men sometimes suffer from their transgressions is true; but it is an accident, not a *necessary* consequence. Thus, disease sometimes follows adultery, but this is the result of the physical condition, not of the sin. The same result follows from the physical condition in honorable marriage.

Of course, some sins are violations of physical laws, and this brings suffering; but for that very reason it becomes a sin. There is no sin in eating, but a vicious habit of eating to excess violates the laws of health, and brings suffering. It then, but not till then, becomes *the sin* of gluttony.

Cause and effect are immutable and inseparable. There is no suffering in the experience of our race that is inseparable from transgression.

SECTION III.—*Suffering as Consequence and as Penalty.*

It is important that we give a definite meaning to the word penalty, as it is often used so loosely as to become ambiguous. Webster defines it:

"1. Penal retribution; punishment for crime or offense; the suffering in person or property which is annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime, offense, or trespass.

2. The suffering to which a person subjects himself, by covenant or agreement, in case of non-fulfillment of stipulations; forfeiture; fine."

A penalty is suffering, or loss, threatened for the violation of a known rule of duty; and when enforced is always a positive infliction.

A penalty must never be confounded with a consequence. Here is the fruitful source of confusion, as it is often used in both senses by writers and speakers without any discrimination.

A penalty and a consequence differ:

First. A consequence has the relation of effect to cause; a penalty has no such relation.

Second. A consequence always follows the act; a penalty may or may not.

Third. A consequence follows the act without any intervention; a penalty requires the intervention of an intelligent agent for its infliction.

Fourth. A consequence is inseparable from its cause, and therefore can not be set aside or remitted; a penalty is separate and distinct, and may or may not be remitted.

Fifth. A consequence can never be suffered vicariously, because cause and effect are inseparable; a penalty may be borne vicariously, because it is possible to remit it.

Sixth. A man can only be saved from a consequence by being saved from its cause, which is always a matter of power and not of grace; a penalty may be set aside, on just grounds, by the lawful authority, and is always an act of grace.

Sin as nature is followed by certain consequences; sin as transgression exposes to a penalty.

Depravity and transgression are so closely joined in our experience, that we shall find the suffering connecting itself with depravity, so interwoven in our experience with our sinful acts, that it will be hard to recognize it as only a consequence of depravity.

Before we leave this subject we may refer to the use of the word punishment. In many ways it is synonymous with penalty, but underlying it is the thought of personal demerit linked with the suffering. For this reason it has been reprobated by many of the best thinkers. Rev. Joseph Cook uses the word "chastisement" instead of punishment when speaking of the sufferings of Christ; but chastisement is for the good of the person suffering, and is, therefore, inapplicable to the sufferings of Christ.

Penalty is the best word we can use, as it does not express in itself the thought of personal demerit. You can not truly *punish* an innocent man, but you can execute upon him the *penalty* of the law. A

punishment can not properly be borne vicariously; a penalty may, as it indicates more the suffering without reference to the demerit. A man who gets drunk is fined ten dollars, this being the penalty for the offense. A friend pays the fine, thus meeting, or satisfying, the demand of the law vicariously without any transfer of personal demerit. Penalty is the word we have chosen.

SECTION IV.—*Death.*

As this word is so closely connected with sin, it demands a separate examination. It is presented under three aspects in the Bible:

1. Physical Death.
2. Spiritual Death.
3. The Lake of Fire.

The central thought in every use of the word is that of *separation.*

Physical death is the separation of soul and body.

"Let this child's soul *come into* him again. And the Lord heard the voice of Elijah; and the soul of the child *came into him* again, and he *revived.*"—1 Kings xvii. 22, 23.

"Willing *rather* to be absent *from the* body, and to be present with the Lord."—2 Cor. vi. 8.

"Having a desire *to depart* and to be with Christ."—Phil. i. 23.

"The time of my *departure* is at hand."—2 Tim. iv. 6.

Spiritual death is an immutable necessary consequence of sin. "God is light," and it is only in

the light that we can have communion with him. (1 John i. 5–7.) How can God sanction or have fellowship with wrong-doing? It is simply impossible. Sin, therefore, of necessity separates from God. The divine holiness, which is "mainly separation from the impurity and sinfulness of the creature, or expressed positively, the clearness and purity of the divine nature," excludes all communion with that which is sinful, and thus of logical consequence sin separates.

"Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." —James i. 14.

This is the key to another difficulty—the fact of eternal punishment. Nowhere in the Bible is it taught that eternal punishment is the *penalty* of sin —that is, it is nowhere said that if a man tell a lie or is guilty of any other offense he will be punished forever for it. To insist that eternal punishment is the penalty, involves us in hopeless confusion and innumerable difficulties regarding the nature of Christ's work for us.

Those who teach that eternal punishment is the penalty of sin are driven to one of two positions in defense of it, in order to avoid making the penalty out of all proportion to the offense.

First. That sin being against an infinite God becomes infinite in demerit, and deserves, for that reason, infinite suffering.

This fiction of infinite demerit is rank nonsense, utterly unknown to the Scriptures and indefensible at the bar of reason. It is usually coupled with the explanation that Christ's sufferings were infinite

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in degree, in the place of ours, which would have been infinite in *duration.*

From any stand-point this is objectionable and but serves to aid the enemies of religion to find arguments against the truth.

(*a*) As it was only the human nature of Christ that suffered, how could he as man have endured suffering infinite in degree? The infinite *has no bounds.* God would have had to work a miracle to constitute his humanity equal to divinity before it would be possible.

Anselm said:

"Such a penalty can only be paid by God himself, and as a penalty for man, must be paid *under the form* of man."

This is logically sound, as it could only be paid by God himself. If the words mean any thing they teach that it was God who suffered, but this has been rejected by the church in all ages. The doctrine that Christ's sufferings were infinite, logically carries with it the necessity for God himself to endure the suffering.

(*b*) If sin is infinite demerit, to meet the claim a divine person must die for every sinner. That is, on the ground of an exact equivalent. If the sin of each individual merits infinite suffering, as Christ's sufferings can not be more than infinite, they can only avail for one individual.

(*c*) If the demand is for infinite suffering, the punishment must be infinite both in degree and duration. The infinite knows no bounds. Infinity and eternity are two very different things.

(*d*) The theory is in opposition to the Bible doctrine of degrees of punishment, which it logically denies.

A finite being can never do any thing that merits infinite punishment, that would be to reason that the finite can produce the infinite.

Second. Others, to account for such a penalty as eternal punishment, speak of the sinner as eternally sinning, and, therefore, as eternally punished. This also is without Bible authority and out of harmony with the final triumph of right there revealed.

We believe that as the saved are raised above the possibility of sin, the lost are sunk below it; and that in hell God's power will be supreme, and "every knee shall bow."

All these difficulties are avoided when we see that the eternity is no part of the penalty, but one of the inevitable results of sin as nature. While a sinful nature remains forever, sin as transgression will cease. The eternity stands connected with the nature as its consequence, because if it unfits for heaven, the unfitness remains as long as the depravity endures. As God's provision for man's redemption has been rejected, and the depravity can not be otherwise removed, the depraved nature eternally separates from God. The penalty of sin is another thing, admitting of degrees, the "many stripes" or "the few."

There are usually very undefined views as to the relation of physical death to law and penalty, largely due to a failure to apprehend dispensational truth.

The first penalty is found in Gen. ii. 17, and suggests the question, What death is meant? Those who deny that it is corporeal, reason that Adam did not die physically the day that he sinned. This, however, overlooks the most precious lesson of the fall. It was in Eden that the great truth of substitution first appears.

The first effect of sin was that Adam saw that he was naked; and we find him making for himself a garment of fig-leaves. But when the voice of God is heard, Adam is afraid; for he says:

"I am naked."

Yes, naked even with his fig-leaves. Fig-leaves did well enough until he was called to go into God's presence, and then he sees their worthlessness. "I am naked." Then comes the judgment in the garden; but mingled with this judgment is the precious promise of a Savior. No sooner does sin appear than atonement is proclaimed. The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head, but it shall bruise his heel. Victory gained by the Savior, but victory through *suffering*, his heel will be bruised. The heel only—the lower part—a suggestion of the sufferings of his humanity. No sooner is this blessed proclamation made than Adam's faith grasps it; for we read that at once he called his wife, as the mother of this promised seed, *Havvah* (Eve)—that is, "life," or "living." How suggestive all this as following so close upon the promise! And then, as faith appropriates and saves, instantly the Lord made them "coats of skins." To provide these coats of skins, there

must have been the death of the victim, the shedding of the blood. Why was this blood shed? Why did God make a coat of skins? Why did it follow so close upon the proclamation of the gospel and Adam's expression of faith in that promise? Because this blood was shed in the offering of a sacrifice. Thus, by the death of a substitute *the same day*, Adam's life is spared. All this is harmonious. If God is to save by a vicarious suffering, this would be proclaimed in the garden, at least in type; and so we find it in the coat of skins. Adam fell, but the same day a Savior is preached to him; and while he is banished from the garden, by faith in that Savior he leaves it saved by the grace of God. Substitution removes the difficulty, arising from the fact that Adam did not die that day.

We hold the penalty threatened in the garden was corporeal death. That it meant more we do not believe the Bible teaches. Not one word can be found that points beyond. Not one sentence that to Adam was presented any other future than life in Eden. It is purely an invention of the schools. That corporeal death was meant is seen in many Scriptures.

"Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

Here in the repetition of the penalty the character of the death is pointed out in language that can not be misunderstood.

In the fifth chapter of Romans, Paul, speaking of the fall and its effects on the race, presents three things.

First. "By one man sin entered into the world." This is depravity; and as the depraved nature leads to the actual transgression, all sin may be thus traced to its source in Adam. John goes beyond, tracing it back to the devil, with whom we have the "origin of evil."

Second. "And death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."

This was the death he could *point to* as undeniably reigning from Adam to Moses; and as this could be done only of corporeal death, it indicates what death is meant. The universal reign of death from Adam to Moses showed that sin was universal, even though they did not sin "after the similitude of Adam's transgression," having no positive law.

Third. "Judgment was by one to condemnation" —"upon all men to condemnation."

Death proclaimed the universal condemnation of the race. This whole argument is obscure from any other stand-point than that of corporeal death. The truth is still further established by comparison with parallel passages.

"For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."—1 Cor. xv. 22.

Paul is speaking of the resurrection *of the body;* that is his theme, and the death that stands connected with this all must admit is corporeal. To deny it is to deny the resurrection.

"For since by man *came death*, by man came also the resurrection *of the dead.*"—1 Cor. xv. 21.

It is objected that corporeal death was in the world before Adam, and for that reason death could

not be the result of his sin. But this is a failure to discriminate. Death in the animal and vegetable kingdom there undoubtedly was, for the Bible speaks of Adam as *eating fruit*, which implies death; while the fossils found in the rocks, even of the oldest secondary strata, tell beyond question of animal death long before the advent of man. Otherwise there could be no fossils. But the death of an animal is very different from that of a plant. A plant has life, an animal has more—a soul. Not an immortal soul, not a soul in the popular sense, but still a soul—a *nephesh*—as the Bible often affirms. For this reason the animal has instinct, affection, memory, and will. Then its death is different from that of the plant. Man not only has with the animal a soul, but possesses an *immortal* spirit. How very different is the meaning of death when used of man because of this immortality and because of what it leads to. There is nothing in the Bible to warrant the assumption that the death that came by man was entailed upon the beast for Adam's sin.

That Adam was in any sense a different being physically, is not probable, although possible, as we can not tell what influence depravity has on the human organism. The long lives of the antediluvians, the sudden appearances and disappearances of the Lord Jesus, indicate some changes, but how great we can not say. It is sufficient to remember that there was special provision needed for earthly immortality as indicated by what is said of the tree of life and the effect of its fruit.

Corporeal death, as the Scriptures quoted show, was the penalty of Adam's sin; and because of that sin, death has come upon the race of mankind. This is all the Bible teaches.

It is by trying to make this a *final* sentence involving the eternal issues, that theologians have built up the dogma that all our race has been adjudged to eternal despair because of Adam's sin.

That this death was a *shadow* of the second is true, but the second death it can not be, as that is *after* the judgment. Spiritual death it could not be, as that is never a penalty, but a consequence; and the death threatened was administrative, the governmental award for actual transgression.

This corporeal death was also provisional in its character, introduced in the carrying out of the final purposes of God for wise and benevolent reasons—checking the growth of wickedness, as seen in the long lives of the antediluvians, and preparing for the final bringing into the son's place in the redemption of the body.

This provisional character of death must not be forgotten; and when its mission has been accomplished, this *first* death shall come to an end.

"And *death* and hell (hades) were cast into the lake of fire."

Coming to death under the law, it is important that we have in mind the difference in dispensations. The Jews, as such, were the *earthly* people, called to an *earthly* inheritance, while the church consists of the *heavenly* people, who are called to a *heavenly* inheritance. The two callings are separate and

distinct, and give to each dispensation its *distinctive* character. Nothing but confusion can come, if in our expositions of the Scripture this dispensational truth is overlooked. Long life, freedom from disease and earthly greatness, were promised as rewards for faithfulness; temporal calamities, disease, and death, being inflicted for disobedience. The passages that teach this are so numerous that it seems needless to quote them. As blessings for obedience, we read:

"If thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and *to do all his commandments*. . . . . The Lord shall make thee plenteous in goods, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy ground, in *the land* which the Lord sware unto thy fathers to give thee. The Lord shall open unto thee his good treasure, the heaven to give the rain unto thy land in his season, and to bless all the work of thine hand: and thou shalt lend unto many nations, and thou shalt not borrow."—Deut. xxviii. 1–14, etc.

On the other hand, as penalties for disobedience, we read:

"Cursed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy land, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. . . . . The Lord shall send upon thee cursing, vexation, and rebuke. . . . . The Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with the sword, and

with blasting, and with mildew; and they shall pursue thee until thou perish."—Deut. xxviii. 15–68.

Passages like these can be quoted by the score in proof of our statement as to the penalties and rewards of the earthly people.

The *earthly* character of the calling must not be lost sight of.

"I have been young, and now am old, yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread."—Ps. xxxvii. 25.

Apply this, as it is generally done, to believers in the present day, and it will lead to painful uncertainty and doubt. It is a notorious fact that thousands of the children of Christians have begged for bread. What then of the promises to which the psalmist refers so triumphantly? Their application was to the Jew, to whom they were and *are* fulfilled. Although cast off for a season, or rather set aside from their place on the earth—

"The gifts and calling of God are without repentance."—Rom. xi. 29.

Hence, they are to be grafted in again. In the meantime in great measure they, as a people, are finding the promises still verified, *always so* when they are living obedient lives. How rare is it to find a Jewish pauper! What prosperity attends them in business! How even now they are lending to many nations! As the earthly people, they enjoy a freedom from disease that other races are strangers to, and longer lives than other people.

Statistics show this. Not to burden our pages with side issues, the ecclesiastical registers of Prussia show that while the average life of the Gentile is thirty-four that of the Jew was forty-six; and this in connection with the fact that the birth rate was greater.

It is so very important that we distinguish this earthly and heavenly calling, that we would say there can be no sound exegesis without it.

Each dispensation has its own distinctive character. That of law was designed to show the evil of sin, and the utter ruin it had wrought. It was a school-master to lead men to Christ.

"Wherefore then serveth the law? It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made."—Gal. iii. 19.

"Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law: that *every mouth may be stopped* and all the world *may become guilty* before God."—Rom. iii. 19.

"We were kept under the law, *shut up to* the faith which should afterward be revealed. Wherefore the law was our school-master to bring us unto Christ."—Gal. iii. 23, 24.

It was a great *teaching* dispensation, setting forth in type and symbol man's ruin and sin, proclaiming everywhere the universal condemnation of the race.

This being the design of the law, we may expect that its rewards and penalties will have the same character. This is the Bible thought, so that Paul speaks of the law as "the ministration of death," and the "ministration of condemnation." This is obscure

unless we see that its penalty was physical death. "This do and thou shalt *live*," not obtain heaven. It was given for the *administration* of God's government *on the earth* in the Theocracy. True, none escaped death, but in this one fact is the great lesson that "*shuts us up*" to Christ. The law promised life on the condition of obedience, but as there were *no* "doers of the law," all died. Thus death constantly proclaimed their utter ruin and condemnation, and the worthlessness of their own righteousness. On this view it was the means of reaching the conscience on the broadest scale and of preparing men for the coming of Christ.

That the law speaks of the first death, not of the second, is clear. In the very heart of the Ten Commandments it is embodied:

"That thy days may be *long in the land.*"

A promise distinctly to the Jew, to whom "the land" belonged, and the law was given.

When Moses is exhorting to obedience he urges as a motive:

"That it may go well with thee and with thy children after thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days on the earth.—Deut. iv. 40; v. 16; vi. 3, 18; xii. 25, 28; xxii. 7; Eph. vi. 3, etc.

All through the Pentateuch, in all that is said of law we find no mention of rewards and penalties that indicate any reference to the eternal issues.

Such passages as Ezekiel xviii. 20–22 are made plain by this exposition. The Hebrew had no word

for the self, hence the word nephesh (soul) was generally used. It is the word most generally translated "person." "Eight souls saved" is synonymous with eight persons. Soul should be translated "person" in Ezekiel, as a careful examination will show. "That soul shall be cut off," means person. So "the *soul* that sinneth" is "the *person* that sinneth." Under law, all failure in obedience incurred death, from which they were saved, on repentance, by a sin-offering.

That this is the true idea of the penalty of the law is confirmed by the New Testament:

"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, as it is written, Cursed is every one *that hangeth on a tree.*"—Gal. iii. 13.

It was for this reason that we find death woven and interwoven in every warp and web of the jurisprudence of the Theocracy; and judgment after judgment coming upon individuals and nations; famine, pestilence, and wars are let loose and destroy their millions; so that the dispensation was a very carnival of death. All this is easily understood if we recognize the true character of the penalty of the law. The curse swept over the race, and everywhere was heard the sound of lamentation and woe.

"The earth also is defiled under the inhabitants thereof; *because* they *have transgressed the laws*, changed the ordinance, broken the everlasting covenant. *Therefore* hath the curse devoured the

earth, and they that dwell therein are desolate: therefore the inhabitants of the earth are burned, and *few men are left.*"—Isa. xxiv. 5, 6.

The record shows that it was always so. When Moses came down from the mount with the law in his hand, the law that the people had covenanted to obey (Ex. xix.), and finds them worshiping the golden calf, he gives the command to execute the penalty of the law.

"And the children of Levi did according to the word of Moses: and there fell of the people that day *about three thousand* souls."—Ex. xxxii. 28.

In contrast, when Peter preached "*about three* thousand" are saved. Why under law do we find death, corporeal death, so often being inflicted when Israel sins, if it is not the penalty of the law?

How different now!

"Who *hath* abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel."

This does not mean that he has abolished it in such a sense that men will not die, for its provisional character still remains; but as penalty, *as the curse of the law*, it is abolished. The "ministration of death" ceases. No more does it speak to men as under law, while incorruptibility and life have been brought to light—made manifest—their full meaning proclaimed. The earthly gives place to the heavenly, and the eternal issues are brought into the forefront.

The penalty threatened in the garden and under law—that is, the penalty as specified—death, must not be confounded with the consequences of de-

pravity on the one hand, or with those that *will be* inflicted at the judgment on the other. These remain the same in every age.

Spiritual death being the consequence of depravity, all, in every age, experience it.

The penalties that will be inflicted at the judgment are for men in every age, under law, or without law. These will not be the infliction of a penalty previously named, but such suffering or loss as will be merited by each individual case, God *rendering* to every man according to his deserts. Hence, Christ can suffer without bearing either in kind or degree what the sinner would have to bear. Death, literal death, being a specific penalty of law must be specifically borne; but beyond this, substitution only requires a suffering that meets the demands of law, and this in the judgment will be determined by the lawgiver, and not by the law; otherwise *degrees* of punishment would be impossible. Therefore, the same divine Lawgiver, who will "*render*" to every man *according* to his deeds, knew what to "*render*" to Christ as the sinner's substitute, and in this rendering would estimate the person of the substitute and all that was involved.

Unless we make this discrimination we have no penalty for those who lived from Adam to Moses.

While the penalty in the garden and under the law, in its governmental form, was corporeal death, still in every age the eternal issues were involved in the question of sin, and these were seen and apprehended. Very dimly, it may be, but still seen, so that death threw its shadow beyond the grave.

What was this shadow? "*After* death the judgment." If the eternal issues had not been known, there could have been no "ministration of death," and death would have been simply the penalty of criminal law.

As to the lake of fire, the *second* death, it will be the final doom of the unsaved of every age.

CHAPTER IV.

RESTITUTION, OR RETRIBUTION.

The Bible speaks of the anger and wrath of God as enkindled against the sinner, for which reason God must be propitiated. While we admit that these terms when used of God are accommodated, we insist that they express a *reality* and not a myth.

SECTION I. — *The Reason for Suffering as Penalty.*

The Bible teaches that God's anger leads to the infliction of suffering; which awakens the inquiry, Why is this suffering inflicted? The answers may be reduced to three if we leave out that which simply refers it to the sovereign good pleasure of God.

First. That they are inflicted for the reformation of the offender.

According to this, God's fatherly love leads him to desire the good of his children; and if that good needs suffering to secure it, then his fatherly love will lead him to inflict it. This, of course, means that all suffering is chastisement. Not to dwell upon the question of the fatherhood of God, other than to deny that the Bible ever affirms that rela-

tionship of a sinner, the theory that all punishment is for the good of the offender is open to many objections.

1. It makes the sufferings of Christ unmeaning and unnecessary. They could not be vicarious, for suffering inflicted on one person could not, as chastening, influence another. If they were not vicarious, they could not influence sinners. Unmeaning suffering is no evidence of love, any more than suicide would be. To require the death of Christ simply for a moral effect upon the sinner, would be an evidence of weakness in God's government.

2. Chastisement is referred in the Bible to the love of God:

"Whom the Lord *loveth* he chasteneth."

But the penalties inflicted for sin are referred to his anger. Hence, the theory involves a contradiction.

3. Chastisement, being for the good of the offender, *ought* to be inflicted, therefore, if penalty is chastisement; remission of the penalty would be an injury, and therefore wrong.

4. If penalty is chastisement, eternal punishment is impossible, for endless suffering can never be for the good of the offender. As the Bible teaches "eternal punishment," the theory is untenable.

5. The nature of the punishment precludes the theory of chastisement. How can it be reconciled with the flood and the cities of the plain?

6. Suffering, as such, tends to harden the heart. See, for example, the plagues of Egypt.

7. The Bible never affirms that penalty is for the good of the offender.

Second. That the object is to deter from sin.

It has been often pointed out that this practically reduces the justice, jealousy, and anger of God to forms of benevolence; and this is in reality the philosophy of its advocates. So also with the explanation that it is for the good of the offender. The question resolves itself into this: Is disinterested benevolence the whole of virtue? Dr. Hodge says:

"1. Some exercises of disinterested benevolence, for example, natural paternal affection, are purely instinctive, and have no positive moral character.

2. Some exercises of disinterested benevolence, such as the weak yielding of a judge to sympathy with a guilty man or his friends are positively immoral.

3. There are virtuous principles incapable of being resolved into disinterested benevolence, such as proper prudential regard for one's own highest good; aspiration and effort after personal excellence; holy abhorrence of sin for its own sake; and just punishment of sin in order to vindicate righteousness.

4. The idea of oughtness is the essential constitutive idea of virtue. No possible analysis of the idea of benevolence will give the idea of moral obligation. This is simple, unresolvable, ultimate. Oughtness is the genus, and benevolence one of the species comprehended in it."

We regard this as unanswerable, and as showing that the fundamental philosophy of these theories is unsound.

If the object of suffering is to deter others, what of the sufferings of Christ? If there is no real demand for them, if they are not vicarious, then they can never strengthen government. It is only when the suffering is known to be justly inflicted that it strengthens. To take an innocent citizen and hang him, when it is known that he is innocent, will never deter from crime. It would be an evidence of weakness destructive to the government, because it would be a failure to recognize moral distinctions. Yet on the governmental theory, this is all that can be made of the sufferings of Christ. He did not suffer for any wrong he himself had done. The sufferings were not to meet any demand in the divine nature. They were then unmeaning.

Third. That the penalty is the necessary alternative of the demand for restitution.

All seeming difficulties grow out of the assumption that suffering inflicted purely as penalty is wrong. If this is true, all penalty should be abolished. Underlying the idea of penalty is the demand for restitution, retribution being the only alternative in a moral government when restitution is not made.

"If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it or sell it; he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.

If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.

If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood

shed for him; for he should make full restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft.

If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep; he shall restore double."—Ex. xxii. 1–4, etc.

These and similar texts bring out some very important and fundamental Bible principles, and such as bear directly on penalty.

1. The general principle of restitution. This all will accept as right. If a man does wrong, all believe he should right the wrong.

2. That in making restitution, more is required than the simple return of the thing taken or its equivalent. Why is this? The answer can only be that in some way this was necessary to full restitution. Theft is not only an offense against the individual, but is a menace to the government, a contempt for law, and an interference with the peace and security of society. Therefore, the insult to law must be wiped out, the stability of the government must be vindicated, and society must be assured that its rights shall be respected. Hence, a demand for restitution. If these last elements are ignored, the man's wrong has not been righted, reparation has not been made. This is the principle, and we find it carried out by Zacchæus, when he said:

"If I have taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold."

3. Where there is failure to make restitution, it exposes to privation and loss. A thief was to be sold.

Here, and by divine authority, is the foundation of all penalty. Restitution, or retribution, the alternatives of law, the only way in which the majesty of the law can be vindicated or government sustained. If restitution is not made, to ignore the offense *is to consent* thereunto, and bring ruin to the government, the only possible alternative being the infliction of a penalty. The denial of this principle is anarchism.

"Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid; for then how can God judge the world?" —Rom. iii. 5.

Having shown the principle, we are ready to answer the question, Do the Scriptures teach retribution? Is there a penalty for sin distinct from its inevitable consequences, to be inflicted upon the wrong-doer in the future?

Before we answer directly, we will investigate a subject bearing upon it, the doctrine that the penalty of sin is "remorse of conscience."

(*a*) There is no scripture for the theory, neither can Bible statements be harmonized with it.

(*b*) Our experiences as to conscience show that the greatest sinner is punished the least on this theory. The fact is undeniable that as men increase in wickedness the lashing of conscience becomes less severe, men reaching at last a condition when they are "past feeling," and their consciences

"seared as with a hot iron." A moral citizen experiences more remorse than a hardened criminal.

(*c*) Conscience is not infallible *as a guide*, and its condemnations and approvals are no criterion of the rightness or wrongness of an act. Many a man has suffered compunction of conscience for doing what, when more fully enlightened, he has seen to be right. For this reason, if remorse is the penalty of sin, it is often endured by those who are innocent of wrong. If penalty followed as cause and effect, conscience would be infallible as a guide.

(*d*) If this is the penalty, it is inflicted after sin has been pardoned, as the experience of believers will show.

(*e*) If remorse is the penalty, then hell is not a place, but simply a mental state; and to be turned into hell is synonymous with being turned into one's self.

Some consequences are immutably connected with sin, such as separation from God; others are not, because they depend upon other factors. Thus, the rule in this life is that as sin increases, conscience is weakened. This is the law in our experience. To have an aroused conscience, God must act by vivifying, as in the case of the awakened sinner; or it must be aroused by the judgments that overtake the wrong-doer.

SECTION II.—*That God will avenge Wrong-doing is clearly taught in those Scriptures that speak of his vengeance.*

"To me belongeth vengeance, and recompense; their foot *shall slide in due time:* for the day of his

calamity is at hand, and the things that come upon them make haste."—Deut. xxxii. 35.

"O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth; O God to whom vengeance belongeth, show thyself." —Ps. xciv. 1 (and following verses).

"For jealousy is the rage of a man; therefore he will not spare *in the day* of vengeance."—Prov. vi. 34.

"For the indignation of the Lord is upon all nations, and his fury upon all their armies; he hath utterly destroyed them. . . . . For it is *the day* of the Lord's vengeance, and the year of recompenses."—Isa. xxxiv. 3, 4.

"I will tread *them* in mine anger, and trample *them* in my fury; and *their* blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments, and I will stain all my raiments."—Isa. lxiii. 3, 4.

"Avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath, *for* it is written, 'vengeance is mine; *I will repay*, saith the Lord.' "—Rom. xii. 19.

"Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them in like manner, giving themselves over to fornification, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire."—Jude vii.

"In flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who *shall be* punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power."—2 Thess. i. 8, 9.

"Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord; and again the Lord shall judge his people. It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."—Heb. x. 30, 31.

These scriptures point to a *future* retribution, a positive infliction of suffering upon the wrong-doer. See also Isa. xxxv. 4; lvii. 3; lix. 17; Jer. l. 15–28; li. 6; Ezek. xxv. 14; xxv. 17; Nahum i. 2; Micah v. 15, etc.

SECTION III.—*That God will avenge Wrong-doing on the person of the offender, is taught in those Scriptures that announce a judgment.*

"It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom *in the day of judgment*, than for thee."—Matt. xi. 24.

"But a certain fearful *looking for* of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries."—Heb. x. 27.

"It is appointed unto men once to die, but *after this* the judgment."—Heb. ix. 27.

"To *reserve* the unjust *unto* the day of judgment, *to be punished.*"—2 Peter ii. 9.

"Reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men."—2 Peter iii. 7.

"And *they were* judged every man according to their works . . . *was cast* into the lake of fire."

"This *is* the second death."—Rev. xx. 13–15.

It must be plain from this class of texts, that the Bible teaches a future retribution, a positive *infliction* of suffering.

SECTION IV.—*That God will punish sin, and that this will be a positive infliction, distinct from the consequences of depravity, is taught in many Scriptures.*

(*a*) It is implied in the language describing the penalty.

"*Cast into* hell fire."—Matt. xviii. 8.

"Depart *from me*, ye cursed, *into* everlasting fire, *prepared for* the devil and his angels."—Matt. xxv. 41.

"The rich man lifted up his eyes in hell, being in torment."—Luke xvi. 23.

(*b*) It is implied in every text that speaks of *delay* in punishing.

"Because sentence against an evil work *is not* executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil."—Eccl. viii. 11.

"Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?" —Luke xiii. 7.

(*c*) It is implied in all scriptures which speak of this as a day of grace and not of judgment.

If sin is punished by inevitable consequence, then it is not grace; but judgment, constantly inflicting suffering. Grace and judgment are governmental terms, and stand connected with those sins that are the result of our free volitions. They would be out of place as connected either with corruption or fitness for heaven, as these are not the result of will. They can only apply where penalty may or may not be inflicted.

(*d*) It is implied in every text that speaks of the remission of sins.

If the punishment of sin has the relation of effect to cause, sins committed are *always* punished. Sin that is punished is never remitted. Sins not committed can not be remitted; that is an absurdity. Deliverance from depravity must never be confounded with remission, or pardon. There can be no remission where no wrong has been done; and if the wrong has been punished it is not forgiven. We know that this same argument is urged against substitution — that if Christ suffered the exact equivalent of the sufferings of the saved, then their sin being punished is not remitted. We admit the force of the objection against the "bargain and sale" theory, but not holding this, it has no force against the substitution advocated in these pages.

We have not exhausted the argument, but believe that we have established, or rather demonstrated, that there is a retribution for transgression—that is, a positive infliction, and from which we *may* be saved by the work of the Lord Jesus.

The Bible uses figurative language, because we can not fully comprehend the nature of the sufferings. If they were such as are experienced by men here, the Bible would have so presented them, as there would have been no use for figurative language. The effort to *define* the nature of these sufferings always leads to difficulties. The *fact* is revealed, and that must suffice.

Much labor has been expended to break the force of these scriptures, and it would seem that to many

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the infliction of pain, or retribution, is a defect in the divine nature to be apologized for. Such sentimentality is destructive to all virtue and reverence for God.

When we recognize that our "God is light," and a "consuming fire," as fully as we recognize that he is love; when we insist upon a future retribution, as not only possible, *but as right*, the teaching of the Bible will be more honored by men. Is not just here one of the weaknesses of the modern pulpit—the fruitful source of that lack of reverence and godly fear that is inseparable from a strong Christian life?

From the examination we have thus made of the nature and attributes of God, of sin and penalty and retribution, we see why atonement was needed. The need was twofold.

First. *Sin as nature*, separating as it does from God, and unfitting for heaven, presents an absolute need that must be met before men can be saved. Depravity must be removed, or there can be no heaven for man. This need is met by the impartation of Christ's resurrection life. By this vital union, which is the result of personal faith, we are redeemed from the corruption, and thus from its results.

Second. *Sin as transgression*, with a future judgment for the deeds done in the body, presents another need, no less imperative than the first. Even if redeemed from the evil nature, past sins would have to be atoned for. Paying to-day's debts will not wipe out yesterday's score, nor will honesty to-

day meet the demand of law for the crime of yesterday. Restitution is still demanded. God's provision for this need is to be found in the death and sufferings of the Lord Jesus. A vicarious sacrifice that fully meets the demands of God, and saves from the judgment and all that it implies.

The need for an atonement is imperative.

"For as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so *must* the Son of man be lifted up."

"Ye *must* be born again."

That redemption from the sinful nature is sufficient for salvation is only tenable on one of two suppositions. Either that the nature necessitates the transgression, or that the consequences of sin is the penalty. This last we have already considered, and the first is equally untenable. In the judgment God will "render to every man according to his *deeds*." Nature is *never* brought into judgment. If sin was necessitated by the nature, judgment would be impossible, unless man was responsible for the nature.

Every man knows that he need not do wrong, that not to do it is always possible. This consciousness of freedom never connects itself with what is necessitated. This conviction of freedom is confirmed by the voice of God and of conscience. It is the universal intuition of the race.

It is not possible to meet the need on any ground known to reason without atonement.

"The Son of man *must* be lifted up."

PART II.

THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER V.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

One of the most striking features of Bible teaching is the peculiar personality of the Lord Jesus. He has impressed himself upon the world as no other ever did.

All history and philosophy, the rise and fall of nations, the progress and development of the race, stand so connected with him, that he is the Sun of our Race, the Day-star of Mankind.

What wonder that in the early days of Christianity men should be occupied more with the Person than with the work of Christ, especially when we remember that the Bible demands, not that we assent to a creed, or believe certain facts or dogmas, but that we have *faith in a person?* This has been God's plan of salvation in every age. The truth as to the Person may have been seen but dimly through type and symbol, or fully revealed in the New Testament; but it is the same Person, and the same faith, that saves. As the Lamb

slain from the foundation of the world, he has been proclaimed in every land and age, and the eyes of all men have been turned to him for salvation. The old patriarch, Job, in the triumph of this faith, declares:

"I know that my Redeemer liveth;"

while Abraham rejoiced to see his day.

What is the Bible statement about the Person of Christ? Of course our answer will discuss the question only as it bears upon the atonement. Three points are embraced in the Bible statement.

First. That he was a perfect man, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh, possessing a material body and a rational human soul.

"And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man."—Luke ii. 52.

Second. That he was very God.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."—John i. 1.

Third. That he was but *one* person. The Bible does not teach that he was God and a man, but that such was the mysterious nature of the union between the two natures that he was one person, the object of faith and worship for his people. We find that between the Father and the Son, a relative and personal distinction exists, indicated by the use of the personal pronoun. No such distinction is ever made between the human and divine nature of Christ. The unity of the person is an *essential* part of Bible teaching. What bearing has the truth of the Person on atonement?

SECTION I.—*The Humanity of Christ.*

The popular idea of the work of Christ is that he came to restore what had been lost in Adam. Thus by bearing the penalty of sin, he meets the demand of justice, and by his law keeping he provides a righteousness for us that entitles us to the reward that Adam forfeited.

This, of necessity, leads to a view of the humanity of Christ that obscures the moral glory of his person, and belittles the work he has done for us. If Christ rendered a vicarious obedience, then his humanity must have been like Adam's, fallen or unfallen.

Some hold that Christ's humanity corresponded to that of Adam before he sinned. But Adam's was a state of innocence. To him, with his experiences, the moral law would have been unmeaning. Not having a knowledge of *good* and *evil*, his was pure innocency. Christ's humanity differs from this, for he clearly saw the nature and evil of sin, and fully comprehended the meaning of the moral law. Adam would not have stood for one day with the surroundings that Christ had.

Others, seeing the logical inconsistency of affirming that Christ's human nature existed in the same state of innocency as that of Adam, hold that he was made with all the infirmities and sinful dispositions of Adam's descendants, but without actual sin. This was the doctrine of Irving, who, however, taught that Christ was delivered from this depravity by the inner energy of the Holy Ghost;

and, having wrought out his own deliverance, he is able to save others.

The great objection to either of the above views of Christ's humanity is that they ignore the divinity and the unity of his personality.

Two extremes are to be avoided; the error of the Nestorians on the one hand, and that of the Eutychians on the other. The Nestorians divided the persons, thus practically denying the divinity of Christ. To make Christ as man one person, and Christ as God another, throws every thing into confusion. The Eutychians, on the other hand, so confused the two natures as to destroy both, making a union that was neither God nor man, but the product of both. The Bible teaching indicates that the truth is midway between the two.

If there is a real unity between the divinity and the humanity of Christ, in virtue of such union Christ's humanity must have a character distinctly its own. Hence, it was neither innocent nor fallen, but pre-eminently *holy*. Theologians often speak of Adam as holy, as Dr. Hodge does, in what we have quoted from him about the Federal Headship. But the Bible never affirms that Adam was holy; nor does it of any one but Christ, other than in a ritual sense. In Luke i. 35 we read:

"The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee; and the power of the highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also *that holy thing* which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."

While born of a woman, and thus truly a man, there was a divine action in his birth that distin-

guished him from from all others, and in virtue of which he is that "holy thing." The "Holy One" is the distinctive title of Christ.

It is strange that the contrast in the humanity of Christ and Adam is not more clearly seen.

"The first Adam was made a *living soul*, the last Adam a *quickening spirit*."

"The first man is of the earth, *earthy;* the second man was the Lord *from heaven.*"

Wonderful contrast! What glorious blessings it indicates for the Christian! Paul, quoting the language of an Old Testament saint, says:

"Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered the heart of man, the things that God hath prepared for them that love him."

And then, as standing upon the top of the mountain, with a reach of vision far beyond that of the old prophet, he breaks out:

"God *hath* revealed them unto us by his Spirit."

May we be so led by the Savior in this investigation that the flood-gates of glory may be lifted and our eyes opened to see how glorious it is to be a Christian!

Several consequences follow from the holiness of Christ's humanity.

First. Being holy, he was not in a state of probation similar to that of Adam.

Second. Adam in innocence, as the result showed, was liable to fall. No such liability belonged to Christ.

Third. Therefore, the temptations of Jesus were not *tests*, as if there were a possibility of his yield-

ing, but were for the purpose of *manifesting* the glory and the holiness of his nature. The popular thought is that because Adam was tempted and fell, Christ must be tempted and under the same conditions. Of course, this is a logical consequence of the theory of a vicarious obedience. It is, to say the least, a very low view of the person and work of Christ.

The temptations of Jesus bring out the perfections of his manhood; able to meet the demand for a victim "without blemish." This makes plain why "he *suffered* being tempted." Not *after* being tempted, but *being* tempted.

To Adam in innocence there was no suffering; but a holy manhood suffers. True,

"He was in all points tempted like as *we are*, *yet* without sin."

But if the words in italics, supplied by the translators, are left out, it will be seen how carefully the Bible guards this point. Sin as depravity, being a *tendency* or bias, in the direction of evil, there is always the *inner response* in our experience when we are tempted. We couple this response or lust with the temptation; in fact, we never call it temptation unless this inner response is there, and are apt to think of Christ (and Adam) as *thus* tempted. But this is to deny the moral glory of his person. He was tempted—that is, tried—but it was expressly "without sin." The Greek reads:

πεπειραμένον δὲ κατα πάντα καθ' ὁμοιοτητα χωρὶς αμαρτιας (*pepeiramenon de kata panta kath, homoioteeta chooris hamartias.*)—Heb. iv. 15.

"But tempted in all things in the same likeness, sin apart," or, "apart from sin."

The thought is that Christ did not have this lust or inner response. Hence he suffered, being tempted, and thus can sympathize with us in our infirmities. His "suffering" (like the cry of agony in the garden), was the result of the weakness of humanity. By entering into this he is able to sympathize, not with our sins, nor with our lust—God forbid! But he is able to "be touched with the feeling of our *infirmities*." Not *moral* infirmities—perish the thought; but *bodily* infirmities, or weaknesses. (ἀσθένεια, astheneia, is translated, "infirmities," "weakness," "sickness," but is never used in a moral sense.)

Fourth. There was no necessity of death, his death being purely voluntary. As human, he *could* die, but that he *must* die the Bible does not teach. If he only anticipated the natural course of events by his death upon the cross, the force and meaning of that death is largely lost. Thus Jesus says:

"I have power (ἐξουσία, right or title) to lay down my life and power to take it again."

None but Jesus, and he only as divine, could use such words as these. They imply freedom from the necessity of death, and a voluntary yielding of himself to it. Who but Jesus could in death *yield up* or *dismiss* his spirit? Again in Philippians we read:

"And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."—Phil. ii. 8.

How clearly this shows that he was exempt from the necessity of death. As a man he became "obedient unto death." Obedience implies submission. No other person but Christ ever thus submitted to death.

Death had no claim upon him; and when, therefore, he voluntarily submitted to death, he could not be held by it; but breaking the bands of death, he rose triumphant, conquering and to conquer, bringing a "multitude of captives with him."—Eph. iv.

"Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life *that I might take it again.*

SECTION II.—*The Divinity of Christ as connected with penalty.*

The divinity of Christ is plainly taught in the Bible in such texts as John i. 1, already quoted, or Rom. ix. v.

"Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever."

This last being one of the strongest and most explicit statements of divine supremacy to be found in the New Testament.

The divinity of Christ connects itself with atonement in two relations, as connected with sin bearing and with righteousness.

We believe it to be true that in every age the advocates of a vicarious atonement have emphasized the truth of the divinity of Christ, while the tendency of other theories has been to deny it. The reason is obvious. On no other theory is there a rational necessity for it.

It is not our intention to define the extent of the sufferings that sin demands or merits (even if possible) other than to say we find no Scripture authority for the idea of "infinite demerit" or "infinite sin."

Ours is a material world. We possess material bodies, and such is the connection between mind and matter that we are limited by our surroundings in every way. God's moral government, so far as we are concerned, stands connected with this limited sphere. The great moral law is administrative, designed to regulate the conduct of men to each other and their treatment of God on the earth. Human laws are but the expression of the great moral law, and the powers that be are ordained for its administration. Human law does not bind the conscience only as it is founded upon divine law, for which reason anarchy is the logical outcome of atheism. Human penalties are founded upon the divine, and so far as the divine are administrative, God may be said in some degree to be punishing sin through human administrations. All this has respect to transgression; depravity and its consequences being out of the sphere of the legal and the administrative.

Eternity will reveal a demerit in sin that we see nothing of, but our accountability can not be measured by it. Limited on every side by our material surroundings, as a logical consequence our sin and our accountability must be limited by it also. If those who sinned without law are to be judged without law, then those who sin without the spirit-

ual understanding of another world will be judged by the light they have. Nothing else would be just. The Scriptures do not teach that our responsibility, and the penalties that sin will be visited with, are measured by any other standard than those God has given to men.

"It shall be *more tolerable* for Sodom and Gomorrah, in the day of judgment, than for thee."—Matt. xi. 24.

This shows that *the degree of light* measures the accountability. If so, the idea of infinite suffering can have no place.

While it is not a subject that the Bible deals with, it is reasonable to suppose that sufferings already endured upon earth, may be considered when the judge shall be rendering to every man according to his deeds.

We do not believe that the penalties for sin as transgression are eternal, for in the *governmental awards* of the judgment there will be the "many stripes" and the "few." But the consequences of depravity go on for ever, because between sin as depravity and a holy God there must be eternal separation. How we can justly suffer forever for what we can not help may seem hard to understand; it is, however, a fact, that a corrupt nature entails upon us suffering *here*. If we suffer here, this suffering must remain forever unless the depravity is removed. If depravity has been inherited without any volition on our part, it must be remembered that provision has been made for its removal without our volition also. This provision is as extensive

as the need, so that none need be lost. If any suffer it is not because they *must*, but because of their willful mad rejection of Christ.

When we pass into eternity we enter upon other conditions. Is it not because of this difference of surroundings, and, therefore, the difference in the nature and guilt of sin, that while for man salvation is provided, for devils there is none? A pure spirit, without the limitations of a material body, may sin so that the demerit excludes the possibility of salvation; otherwise salvation would be provided for the angels who kept not their first estate. This indicates why men must be saved in time and not in eternity.

It is possible that the sufferings and grace manifested in this world may affect spiritual intelligences in all worlds, and add to their adoration of the Godhead. Christ's work may exert an influence on millions of worlds. An influence so vast that God may be glorified *even in the lost.*

It may be objected to the position that the penalties of transgression are not eternal, that Matt. xxv. 46 says:

"These shall go away into everlasting *punishment.*"

First. The language does not imply a positive infliction, but a state or condition—"go away *into.*" This points to its being a consequence, not a penalty.

Second. The word translated "punishment" would better express the idea of the suffering re-

sulting from depravity than a penalty. The Greek word used is *Κόλᾶσις* (*Kolasis*). Liddell and Scott give its meaning as:

"A pruning; hence a checking, punishing, chastisement, correction, punishment."

Archbishop Trench, in his "Synonyms of the New Testament," thus distinguishes between *κόλᾶσις* (*kolasis*) and *τιμωρία* (*timooria*).

"In *τιμωρία*, according to its classical use, the vindictive character of the punishment is the prominent thought; it is the Latin 'ultio;' punishment as satisfying the inflictor's sense of outraged justice, as defending his own honor and that of the violated law. . . . . in *κόλασις*, on the other hand, is more the notion of punishment as it has reference to the correction and bettering of him that endures it."

The Archbishop, however, shows that in Hellenistic Greek the word acquires a severer sense, referring to many authors in proof. After a full examination of the word we find that it expresses several ideas. (*a*) Pruning or cutting off. (*b*) Checking or restraint. (*c*) Suffering. It designates, therefore, the condition of the lost as one of everlasting suffering, in a condition of restraint as separated from God. This is the inevitable consequence of depravity if we enter eternity unredeemed.

The penalties of transgression are not fixed by any legal enactment, as those of men are by human laws, or as death was the penalty threatened in the garden. The demerit of different lives is not the same; and if God renders to every man "*according to his deeds*," the demerit of each must receive a

different award. If the penalty, like those of human laws, was legal and specific, then Christ would have to bear the *very thing* to save us. For this reason, he had to die, because death was the legal penalty of the Mosaic law. He had to endure the hidings of the Father's face, because sin separates; and in taking the sinners' place he had to take this place of separation. Beyond this the Bible is silent.

It may be that this was all that Christ suffered; at any rate, we have no scripture for any thing beyond.

The following are points indicated as to Christ's work for us.

First. That the ground of the substitution is primarily the sovereign will of God, who, of his own goodness, was pleased to plan and accept it. There is nothing in the nature of law or penalty that allows substitution as a matter of right.

Nothing, therefore, but the goodness and mercy of God can be asserted as the ground on which it is permitted. The fact can never be known by reason, being purely a matter of revelation and faith.

Second. The sufferings of Christ are of infinite value, not because infinite suffering was demanded as satisfaction, but of pure *necessity*, because of the divinity of his Person.

As no creature can make restitution, because none can do more than fulfill the end of their being, none but God himself could make satisfaction. But Christ, as divine, *could not* have suffered

without those sufferings having an infinite value, and hence, instead of relaxation—God being pleased to accept a part for the whole—they are in reality the substitution of that which has infinite value in the place of finite suffering. It is because of this infinite value, so far beyond the mere commercial idea of an exact equivalent, that God's mercy goes out *to all*, and untold blessings come upon the unsaved.

Third. God having of his own sovereign will given Christ to be our substitute, his death necessarily involved no criminality.

Fourth. The ground in justice of this substitution is the vital union of the believers and Christ. This union is such that as one he can die for us, the sufferings being his and the criminality ours. This will be discussed at length in our next chapter.

Fifth. An unconditional substitution is impossible.

(*a*) As God must accept it and Christ be willing to suffer, the sinner must accept the Savior. *All* must be willing. The sinner has the right, if he so desires, to bear the penalty of his own sin.

(*b*) The nature of the vital union on which substitution rests, is such, that it can only be established by faith.

(*c*) An unconditional substitution implies that God does not require sinners to be reconciled to him.

(*d*) It would ignore the freedom of the will.

SECTION III.—*Christ's Divinity as Connected with Righteousness.*

The old idea that Christ's law keeping is imputed to us for righteousness, giving us a title to heaven is part of the old Calvinistic theory of substitution, the logical counterpart of the dogma of the imputation of Adam's sin. Rejecting the one, we consistently reject the other, holding instead what is the logical counterpart of the Natural Headship of Adam. If Adam was the Federal Head, so was Christ; and either a limited atonement or Universalism would be true. If Adam is the Natural Head of the race, so that by vital union with him we become depraved, then Christ is the Natural Head of the new creation, and we are redeemed from sin in him.

The chief text relied upon by the advocates of the imputation of Christ's law keeping is:

"For he hath made him to be sin for us . . . . that we might be made the righteousness of God in him."—2 Cor. v. 21.

If, however, the Calvinistic theory be true, this should be "that we might be made righteous *by his law keeping.*" But this is just what Paul does not say, but "the righteousness *of God* in him."

Neither is it the same word that is translated "made" in the two clauses—a significant fact in a true exposition. "He hath *made* him to be sin (*ἁμαρτιαν ἐποιησεν, hamartian epoieesen*) for us, that we might *become* (*γινώμεθα, ginoometha*) the righteousness of God in him."

We find fault with the theory of a vicarious obedience, or law keeping, for many reasons.

(*a*) It involves a double substitution. This is inevitable. But a double substitution either undervalues the suffering or the obedience of Christ.

(*b*) If Christ was "made under the law," then he *as man* was required to keep it. It could not, therefore be a vicarious obedience, because rendered for himself. A vicarious law keeping implies that Christ was not obligated to keep the law for himself. His death not being obligatory, could be suffered or endured for others; this can not be said of his law keeping.

(*c*) If Christ obeyed the law for us, then, logically, that releases us from obligation to keep it ourselves, which is Antinomianism.

(*d*) If Christ's law keeping is imputed to us for righteousness, then we are justified by the deeds of the law—that is, by doing what the law requires. The essence of a vicarious obedience is that we are dealt with as having done what the substitute has done. If, then, Christ's law keeping is reckoned to us as having been done by us, and we are thus justified, we are justified by the deeds of the law. The theory is in conflict with the teaching of Paul.

If we are saved by the law keeping of Christ, it can never be said that we—

"Are justified by faith, *without the deeds of the law.*"

The whole theory is necessitated by the mistaken thought that heaven was ever promised *to any one* on the ground of obedience.

Men are always trying to climb up into heaven by the ladder of their own works; and in the effort

to lay a foundation for this, have found in the promise of *life* conditioned upon obedience, a promise of heaven. As we have already shown, this is not Bible teaching. We re-affirm it. Never in any age, to any people, was heaven ever promised as the reward of obedience. Even its possibility is never asserted. If our law keeping was as perfect as that of Christ's, it would create no title to heaven. No human merit could entitle to so great a blessing.

That Christ as born of a woman, "born under law," kept it in every jot and tittle, is certainly true; but this was to bring out the glory and perfection of his manhood as "without blemish." The law was given to manifest the serpent's power. It was a picture in the leprous hand of Moses of what sin is, and by giving a knowledge of sin it showed all the world guilty before God. But in Christ, that which manifested sin in others, but served to bring out the sinlessness and perfection of his manhood. This was far different from a vicarious law keeping. The Bible teaches:

"As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."—Rom. v. 19.

This shows the bearing of Christ's "obedience" on the matter of salvation, but his "obedience" was far more than law keeping. Thus he says:

"I *came down* from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me."—John vi. 38.

"My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work."—John iv. 34.

"Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt."—Matt. xxvi. 39.

"It is finished."—John xix. 30.

What do these—and numerous similar texts—teach as to the obedience of Christ? Why, that it went far beyond mere law keeping. It was an obedience that led him to "*come down* from heaven," to be "obedient unto death," obedient, not to the law, but to the Father whose will it was and whose will he came to do. It was more than legal righteousness, more than human—it was divine. Linking itself with his work as the Eternal Son, an inseparable part of his one Personality, his righteousness was One, it was the Righteousness of God, a heavenly righteousness of infinite value.

Hence, it was the "gift by grace," "the abundance of grace and of *the gift* of righteousness."

It was because Christ was divine that this righteousness has its value, and because of this value poor sinners whose title to an earthly Eden has been forfeited receive a title to the paradise of God.

Coming *from* heaven, the Lord Jesus by taking us into union with himself, raises us to heaven, where man could never have entered on any other ground.

"The glory which thou gavest me I have given them."—John xvii. 22.

"Father, *I will* that they also whom thou hast given me *be with me* where I am."—John xvii. 24.

"It became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are are all things, *in bringing many sons into glory*, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering."—Heb. ii. 10.

While, therefore, Christ's righteousness is imputed to us—that is, reckoned or counted ours—and this imputed righteousness gives us standing before God, we do not believe it to be his law keeping, nor a vicarious obedience. Union with Christ makes us one in him, and on the ground of this oneness his righteousness becomes ours, introducing us into all the glory that such a righteousness brings.

First. Not being a legal righteonsness, it follows that we are not justified by the deeds of the law, neither by a personal nor a vicarious law keeping.

Second. It destroys forever the idea of salvation by works and shuts us up to grace.

Third. It shows the greatness of God's thought for the race, and makes the Old Testament a *preparation for* the New—not the New a restoration of the Old.

Fourth. It brings out the force of the truth that the second man was "the Lord *from heaven.*" Resurrection unto life, our title to heaven, Sonship, all gather around this truth, being made possible only by union with "the Lord from heaven."

Fifth. It shows the ground upon which we become heirs, and indicates the nature of the inheritance. In contrast to the *earthly* calling, it is ours to be made "partakers" of the *heavenly*.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BAPTISM OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

The controversy as to water baptism, especially as to the "mode," has done much to obscure the truth of baptism of the Holy Spirit. Thus, whenever baptism is mentioned in the Bible, men think of the ordinance and of the mode.

Without entering into the controversy as to the meaning of the word *baptidzo*, other than may be necessary to make plain the truth of the baptism of the Spirit, there is a medium ground recognized by both sides in the controversy.

The two ablest writers on the classic meaning of the word, are, the Rev. J. W. Dale, from the Pedo-Baptist, and Dr. Conant, from the Baptist stand-point. Perhaps no others have made a more exhaustive, thorough study of the word—years being spent in the examination and the ripest scholarship being brought to the task. Giving a formal definition of the word, Dr. Conant says:

"The word Baptizein, during the whole existence of the Greek as a spoken language, had a perfectly defined and unvarying import. In its literal use it meant, as has been shown, to put into or under a liquid, or other penetrable substance, generally water, so that the object was wholly covered by the inclosing element. By analogy it expresses

the coming into a new state of life or experience, in which one was, as it were, inclosed and swallowed up, so that, temporarily or permanently, he belonged wholly to it."

Dr. Dale, in answer to the question, "What is classic Baptism?" says:

"I would place this answer:"

"*Whatever is capable of thoroughly changing the character, state, or condition of any object, is capable of baptizing that object; and by such change of state, or condition, does, in fact, baptize it.*"

Between the last half of Conant and this, there is substantial agreement; and here, where they both agree, we have the true meaning of the word. This is in harmony with its classic use. If a ship was sunk, it was baptized; if a man was drowned, he was baptized; if a man was drunk, he was baptized by the wine. Men were baptized by sleep, by ignorance, by debt. Hermerius, speaking of Themistocles, says:

"He was great at Salamis; for there, fighting, he baptized all Asia."

SECTION I.—*What is the Baptism of the Holy Spirit?*

In our examination we turn, first, to the Gospels. Here we find only the simple statement that Christ *would* baptize with the Holy Spirit. During Christ's life it was something still future, and yet miraculous gifts and powers were possessed by the

apostles. This would indicate that the baptism and the "Gift" of the Spirit—the miraculous powers—were separate and distinct.

Next we turn to the first chapter of Acts. Here the Lord Jesus, just before his ascension, tells his disciples not to depart from Jerusalem—

"But to wait for the promise of the Father, which, saith he, ye have heard of me. For John *truly baptized* with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence."

And in answer to the question:

"Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom?" says:

"But ye shall receive power *after* that the Holy Ghost is come upon you."

From these words, together with the record in the next chapter, some have held that the baptism was the *pouring* out. Others make it the *receiving power*, making the baptism to be the miraculous powers and gifts. As we have no miraculous gifts now, it is held that we have no baptism. This confounds the baptism and the gift. Both views are extreme. The baptism was not the pouring out, but the *result* of it. It was not the power, but the *cause* of that power. Just here we appeal to the word used.

"By analogy it expressed the coming into a new state of life, or experience."—*Dr. Conant.*

What is this change of state, of life, or experience, brought about by means of the Holy Spirit?

Out of darkness into light. Out of the kingdom of Satan into the kingdom of his dear Son. This change of state or condition, is brought about *by means of* the Holy Spirit, hence, it is the baptism of the Spirit.

The Greek preposition εν (*en*), when used as the dative of instrumentality, is expressed in English by "*with*," "by," and "by means of." We use this last, as being more in harmony with the personality of the Holy Spirit.

In the second chapter of Acts, in the account of what took place on the day of Pentecost, we read:

"And when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place.

And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting.

And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them.

And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance."—Acts ii. 1–4.

The order of events as here given are:

(*a*) The *sound* as of a rushing wind is heard.
(*b*) The sound filled the house.
(*c*) Cloven tongues are *seen*.
(*d*) They are all filled with the Spirit.
(*e*) They spake with tongues.

Where shall we look for the baptism? Clearly in the fourth item. "They were all filled with the Spirit," and thus by means of the Spirit were bap-

tized. By it they were brought into a new state, a new relation to Christ, and to each other.

They were "filled with the Spirit," and as there is but *one* Spirit, and all were filled by him, as he thus dwelt in each and in Christ, they were by this one Spirit united to each other, and to the Lord Jesus. Thus the body was formed.

"By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body."—1 Cor. xii. 12.

The New Testament teaches that there is a union between Christ and his people, that far exceeds all analogy. He is the Bridegroom, his people the Bride. He is the Foundation, the Chief Corner-stone, and the Head-stone of the corner; believers are the living stones in this spiritual temple. He is the Vine, they are the branches. He is the Head, they the members of the body. All these but illustrate from various stand-points the truth of the believer's union with his Lord. The great bond of union, the link that binds all together, is the indwelling Spirit.

This is the most important truth in the New Testament and the key to the atonement. This baptism has the same relation to the medium theology as God's sovereignty has to Calvinism or the freedom of the will to Arminianism. It is the foundation of the system.

How fully this baptism identifies us with Christ! By this precious baptism Christ and his people are so united that he can say to a Saul on his way to Damascus:

"Why persecutest thou *me?*"—Acts ix. 4.

And at the gathering of the nations before his glory throne:

"Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it *unto me.*"—Matt. xxv. 40.

Christ and his people are so one, that his death is theirs, his burial, resurrection, and ascension, theirs.

"I was (so the Greek) crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."—Gal. ii. 20.

"Ye are dead and your life is hid with Christ in God."—Col. iii. 3.

The use of the word "substitute" when speaking of the work of Christ, hardly expresses the full Bible idea. While it is the best word we can use, Christ's work goes beyond simple substitution. Still no other word applies as well. "Benefaction" has been suggested, but it applies to every theory and every blessing. It is in no sense distinctive. It expresses *what* it is, but not *how* it is. Hence, all of every school, believe that Christ's work is a benefaction. If we use the word substitution in the sense of "in the place of," and confine it to this meaning, it, better than any other word, expresses what Christ did by his sufferings. But we must remember the truth of the union with Christ which places his substitution upon different ground than that of one person dying in the place of another, while not destroying that idea.

The Bible everywhere proclaims the unity between Christ and his people to be such, that it lays a foundation for more than substitution does. Substitution alone would bring no fitness for heaven; union with Christ does.

Here is an unconverted man. Certainly he is not "in Christ," nor is Christ "in him."

"If any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of his."—Rom. viii. 9.

The Holy Spirit so applies the word that the man is convicted of sin. Still the Holy Spirit is external to him and he is told not to "resist the Spirit." Moved by his sense of need, he comes to Christ, receives him as his Savior, believes on him. No sooner does he believe than the Holy Spirit is given to him as the "earnest" of the inheritance.

"In whom having also believed ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit."

His body thus becomes the "temple of the Holy Ghost." Henceforth "the Spirit of God dwells in him." This indwelling spirit, as it dwells also in Christ, links him to Christ, and so by means of one spirit he is "baptized into Christ."

SECTION II.—*What are the results of the Spirit Baptism?*

First. It lays a foundation for the atonement.

The difficulties that have been urged against a vicarious atonement may be classed under two heads.

1. Those that come from the effort to make the sufferings of Christ an "exact equivalent" for those

of the saved. This Calvinistic position logically leads to one of three conclusions. That he suffered the exact equivalent for those of the saved—a limited atonement. That he suffered an exact equivalent for those of all men. This means either that all men are saved—Universalism—or that Christ suffered the penalty for the lost—a double bearing of the penalty.

The sufferings of Christ must *necessarily* be of infinite value from the divinity of his person. Man's sin being finite, it is the substitution of that which has infinite value for that which is finite. (See this fully discussed in chapter on "Day of Atonement.")

2. Those that grow out of the connection between penalty and criminality. The great problem of unbelief has always been, how an innocent man can suffer for the guilty. It has been held that it can not be done justly without a transfer of the criminality; and this transfer being impossible, many have been led to reject substitution. All believe that if substitution requires a transfer of criminality it must be rejected. We believe that except when the penalty is of the nature of a fine, such transfer of criminality would be demanded in a normal case of substitution. As an example, if a man commits a murder, the demand of the law is not for death, but *the death of the murderer.* Therefore, the penalty could never be borne by a perfectly innocent man, however willing he might be. His death would in no sense satisfy the demand of the law, which is inseparably connected with the crim-

inality. It would never be approved by the moral sense of mankind. Criminality being untransferable, substitution is impossible in such cases.

It is here that the truth of the Spirit baptism meets us, placing the work of Christ on such grounds, and bringing in such conditions, that it stands outside of our experiences and distinct from every thing else.

The Spirit baptism lays a foundation in justice for a vicarious atonement.

The union of the humanity and divinity of Christ is such that he is one person, but at the same time his true humanity and divinity are not impaired. So the union of Christ and his people is such that on the ground of it, we are one, and yet our separate identity is not destroyed. This union is similar to that between the Father and the Son; for Christ prays:

"That they may be one *even as* we are one."—John xvii. 22.

This oneness does not destroy identity, so that our sin does not become Christ's. Yet the unity is so real, that while the criminality is ours and the sufferings are his, these sufferings are in our room or place. The separate identity separates the criminality from Christ, the mystic union makes the value of his sufferings ours. This is what we mean by substitution.

Then no benefit can come to any man until he accepts the Savior. But when he believes, being "baptized into Christ," he is "baptized into *his death.*"



Second. It gives us a perfect righteousness.

When a man has suffered the penalty of the law, his standing is not that of an innocent man in the community. The guilt of his crime, although it has been expiated, still clings to the man's character and affects his standing. So with the sinner. The death of Christ as expiating his offense does not give him standing. Hence, righteousness is needed. Righteousness delivers us from the guilt, and gives us a standing as "complete in him." This is "justification of life"—that is, a justification belonging to the life that is given. What a standing it bestows! In Christ, we stand before God in the value of his righteousness, the measure of his love to us being his love to Christ.

"And hast loved them, *as* thou hast loved me." —John vii. 23.

This righteousness is ours solely on the ground of union with Christ. Being "in him," his righteousness becomes ours, but as our separate identity remains, it is said to be imputed to us, and being counted as ours, our standing is perfect even though there be sin in our actual experience. Yet the union being *real* it is more than imputation, the imparted life making us "partakers of the divine nature," so that this righteousness works itself out in our experience until it will be ours in character as well as in standing; an *imparted* as well as an *imputed* righteousness.

"But of him are ye *in* Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."—1 Cor. i. 30.

"And be found *in* him, not having mine own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is through *the faith of* Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith."—Phil. iii. 9.

Third. It is the ground of election.

An unconditional individual election to eternal life is not taught in the Scriptures. Election *is* taught, but always in Christ.

"According as he hath chosen us *in him* before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love."—Eph. i. 4.

No unconverted person is in Christ; then no unconverted person is one of the elect. Election out of Christ is unknown to the Bible. Without the Spirit a man is "*none of his.*" But when by the one Spirit we are baptized *into* Christ, this union with Christ takes us "out of the world" and places us among the "elect."

Over the door of entrance God has written:

"Whosoever will may come."

But when we have entered and looked up we read:

"Chosen in him before the foundation of the world."

Fourth. It is the ground of deliverance from sin.

This will be considered fully in the chapter on "Redemption," and also in Part III., "The Application of the Atonement."

Fifth. It is the ground of the believer's security.

(*a*) It is involved in election which secures certainty.

(*b*) The life that is imparted is Christ's. As we are linked to him in resurrection, not incarnation, it is his resurrection life we receive, which never ends; hence it is "eternal life" the believer has as a present possession.

(*c*) Union being *by* the Spirit, the Spirit's work *in* us, and Christ's intercession *for* us combine to secure our safety.

Sixth. It is the ground of Christian unity.

Oil being the well-known symbol of the Holy Spirit, we have a beautiful type of the "unity of the Spirit" in the one hundred and thirty-third Psalm.

"Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. It *is like* the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down upon the beard, even Aaron's beard, that went down to the skirts of his garment."

As the life is the unity of the body, the spirit is the unity of the mystic body; and there being but one spirit, all Christians are one.

This precious baptism—Christian baptism—the only one that saves, is the foundation of the Medium Theology; the key to the great truth of the atonement.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DAY OF ATONEMENT.

The Day of Atonement is one of the most complete typical representations of Christ's work to be found in the Bible. While all types are but imperfect pictures, this brings out features of Christ's work not so fully brought out elsewhere. Thus the two goats, one to die, the other to bear sin, are distinctive.

They represent a difference in the work of Christ, because both typify him. What is this? The goat that is slain sets forth Christ as *dying*. The other goat having sins transferred to him—"he shall bear upon him all their iniquities"—is a type of Christ as *sin bearer*. Each is separate from the other, bringing out the Bible distinction between propitiation and substitution.

One cause of the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians is a failure to make this discrimination. Propitiation has an aspect to all men; substitution is always limited.

The Calvinist, seeing that substitution is limited, and recognizing that if Christ "bore our sins," we are effectually and certainly saved, and not distinguishing between substitution and propitiation, makes propitiation limited also. This leads to the

limited atonement with its fatalism, or, more correctly, as strictly fate ignores God, its doctrine of "necessity."

The Arminian recognizes that propitiation is for all men; and not discriminating between propitiation and substitution, makes substitution universal also. This leads him, in order to avoid Universalism, to give a lower value to Christ's work for his people, bringing in other conditions of salvation, thus exalting man and degrading the work of Christ.

Both are logical consequences of a failure to distinguish between the two goats, but in opposite directions. We have thus two great systems, each with elements of strength from the truth they possess, but with elements of weakness, because only a part of the truth.

Calvinism is strong as to substitution, decided as to the value of Christ's work for the believer, giving the full glory of our salvation to him. It builds up a sturdy Christian character, and has left the deepest impress upon the hymns of Christendom. Those hymns that have found their way into every land, and that live in the worship of Christendom, are those that tell of salvation all of grace, and of the benefits of Christ's work for his people.

"Grace, 't is a charming sound."

"Just as I am, without one plea."

"How firm a foundation."

These are the hymns that fill the hearts of God's people with love and devotion as they sing.

No hymn that embodies the lower Arminian idea of apostasy has ever crept into the great heart of Christendom.

How strong and massive has been the Christian thought and literature Calvinism has given to the world. Grappling with the deeper questions of theology, always zealous for the glory of the Lord, standing everywhere the earnest defender of the faith against all comers, the literature of our common Christianity has largely sprung into being through its instrumentality. It has been the bulwark of the truth. What great names shine, as stars in its pathway, like those of Augustine and Anselm.

How grand the history it has given to the world. Rivaling in its spirit of heroism the ancient Spartans and Persians, it leaves a heritage of glory to all ages. The heroic struggles in the Netherlands, the victories of the famous "Ironsides," the pathetic story of the Covenanters speak its spirit and record its power.

Strong as to substitution, when it comes to propitiation, Calvinism loses its strength, and with halting step and stammering voice presents Christ to a dying world. It deadens the sense of responsibility and lulls to sleep those who should be aroused.

Arminianism, on the other hand, is strong as to propitiation. It inflames with zeal the followers of Christ, leading them to earnest, aggressive work in winning souls. Under the influence of its teaching, which is the spirit of all mission life, the Christian

army is marching on to conquer the world for Christ. The rugged pioneers of the great Christian army, making their way into the forests and waste places of the earth, crossing the seas to heathen lands as the great advance guard of civilization, are but carrying out the great principle of propitiation for all.

One of the grandest histories of modern days is that of the Methodist church. The struggles and sacrifices, the toil, the flaming zeal of its preachers may challenge the admiration of the world. Propitiation for all men, salvation offered to all, and all men responsible for their acceptance or rejection of it, this is the mainspring of the energy of the great Christian host.

Here, again, we may notice that the hymns that breathe this spirit live.

"From Greenland's icy mountains" is sung in the missionary meetings of all Christendom. No hymn has taken hold of the heart of the church that embodies the idea of a limited atonement.

While strong as to propitiation, Arminianism is vacillating as to substitution, giving an uncertain value to Christ's work for his people, making that value to depend upon the believer's faithfulness, rather than upon what Christ has done, thus leaving Christians without the fullness and blessing of the Christian standing. It keeps men in the valleys, wandering in the fog of uncertainty and doubt, when they might be on the mountain in the grand sunshine of perfect assurance.

Both are extremes. Truth is midway between. Propitiation for all men, in the fullest Arminian

sense, so that a full salvation may be preached unto all, but substitution limited and meaning all that the Calvinist affirms. This is shown by the two goats on the day of atonement.

A Calvinist can not logically believe in a vicarious atonement, or propitiation for all men. It is fundamental to Calvinism that Christ's sufferings were an exact equivalent for those of the saved. Then of course Christ could have died for none but the saved, or you have the contradiction that he paid the debt, and at the same time did not pay it. Calvinism in every fiber of it is logically consistent *with itself*, and "necessitates" the dogma of a limited atonement. But this logical consistency brings it into conflict with the plainest teaching of the Bible, and taxes to the utmost the ingenuity of its advocates in explaining away the force of many texts.

Arminianism, embracing in some form the idea of "relaxation," can never give a definite value to the sufferings of Christ for his people; so that the exact benefit of Christ's work to his people, so far as the standing and security of the Christian are concerned, is shrouded in gloom.

The Medium Theology, recognizing propitiation for all men, but giving to substitution its full value, has the strength without the weakness of both great systems. It is the theology of the future. The drift is already in that direction. A limited atonement and the dogma of apostasy are being preached less and less. A full, free salvation is proclaimed grandly from the pulpits of Christendom, with few

exceptions; while a fuller, deeper estimate is being placed upon Christ's work for his people. Practically, the medium theology is that of a large section of the Christian world; and we trust that in giving it more definite form and systematic expression this book will in some measure help to a greater unity.

SECTION I.—*Propitiation.*

Knowing that the Bible does not teach Universalism, how to avoid it logically, and yet receive the truth that Christ is a propitiation for all men, has been a great problem.

All difficulties grow out of the bargain and sale theory. So many to be saved, so much suffering to be endured—"an exact equivalent"—like the pound of flesh of old Shylock. There evidently underlies this, the thought that Christ's sufferings would have been increased or diminished, if more or less were saved. This loses sight of the principle that it is "the altar that sanctifies the gift." The sufferings of Christ would have been no less if only one had been saved, and no more if all were saved.

The divinity did not suffer, only the humanity; but the union of divinity with humanity gave to those sufferings an infinite value. How far this scatters the thoughts of men as to "exact equivalent," "relaxation," etc. An "exact equivalent," so much suffering for so many saved, as if the divinity could be parceled out and the infinite become finite! How it degrades the work of Christ. The

divinity gave to those sufferings a value that far, infinitely far, exceeds the needs of humanity. This is quite another thing from needless, unnecessary suffering. The value of the sufferings is not in their extent, but in the person of the sufferer.

This broad view of the value of Christ's sufferings leads to a twofold view of propitiation; one general, the other special. One the ground upon which Christ is the *available* substitute for all men, the other the ground upon which he becomes the *actual* substitute of his people only. On the supposition that sins are all counted, as we foot up the sum total of a man's indebtedness, their exact demerit estimated and the exact suffering due to this borne by Christ, such a distinction would be impossible.

The Day of Atonement presents more this general aspect of propitiation, hence the two goats; whereas in sin-offerings for individuals, there was only one.

Looking at the work of the Day of Atonement we find that Aaron first makes atonement for himself and his house, because as a type of Christ he must be clean. Then we read:

"He shall make an atonement for the holy place, *because* of the *uncleanness* of the children of Israel, and because of their *transgressions* in all their uncleanness."—Lev. xvi. 16.

God could not have remained for one moment in the midst of his people, but for the blood; and therefore the tabernacle and its rich provision for

man's need, all stood in the power of the blood. The uncleanness of the people separated from God, hence, atonement must be made for—in order to obtain or retain—

"The tabernacle of the congregation, that remaineth among them in the midst of their uncleanness."

This points out a view of the atonement that is all important, that which is general, and in virtue of which Christ is an available substitute for every man.

Who has not heard preachers proclaiming that God is angry with the sinner; representing him in such an attitude that the sinner has to "cry for mercy," and beg and plead and weep and mourn to make God favorable? This gospel of hate is not that of the New Testament, but is foreign to its spirit and teaching. The psalmist says:

"God is angry *with the wicked* every day."—Ps. vii. 11.

But the words "with the wicked" are supplied by the translators.

The Old Testament everywhere proclaimed that God was separated from the race on account of sin —"angry every day." What this anger was we have already seen; and as long as the demand was not met and sin was not atoned for, God remained "angry every day."

Of course the time element does not apply to God, wherefore God was dealing in grace in every age. Yet as a dispensation it represented God as

alienated from men. Moses, in the symbolical vision granted to him, sees God with his face turned away—his attitude to men before the advent of the Messiah. Even when he comes to dwell in the tabernacle, the veil hanging in front of the holy place tells that God is still unreconciled—"angry every day."

But how different now! When the Babe was born in Bethlehem of Judea, the angels burst into singing, and their grand anthem carries to all nations the tidings of:

"On earth peace, good-will toward men."

This is the gospel—the good spell, or story—of good-will to men.

At the close of his life, when his great mission is ended, we hear him as he hangs bleeding on the cross triumphantly exclaiming:

"It is finished."

At once the hand of God's love reaches down and rends the veil of the temple from "the top to the bottom." Not from the bottom to the top, as if rent from earth, but from the top to the bottom. Not on one side, not a mere *slit*, but in the very midst.

"His love unknown hath broken *every* barrier down."

God has been perfectly propitiated; Christ's sufferings meet all demands and *cover over* the sins of the race. God *is* reconciled, not he has to be.

"To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself." *How?* "Not imputing their trespasses unto them."—2 Cor. v. 19.

God is no longer angry, so that now it is not God that has to be reconciled to the sinner, but the sinner to God. This is what the rent veil proclaims. We have thus, as the result of Christ's work, God propitiated, all barriers removed, and he able to deal in grace with mankind. This view is general, not special, and fully explains those texts which present the work of Jesus as for all men.

"I exhort, therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers . . . . be made *for all men.* . . . . For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior. Who will have *all men* to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. For there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself *a ransom for all*, to be testified in due time."—1 Tim. ii. 2–6.

"For *the grace of God* that bringeth salvation hath appeared to *all men.*"—Titus ii. 11.

"That by the grace of God he should taste death *for every man.*"—Heb. ii. 9.

"He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world."—1 John ii. 2.

In this last the words, "the sins of," are supplied, there being nothing to correspond to them in the Greek. Their omission marks a distinction between propitiation in its aspect to the believer and to the world. As an imperfect illustration of what we mean: If a supper has been provided for every citizen, and all are invited, we have this general view of propitiation. It would be an *available* supper

for every man. Ample provision, and an honest invitation to come. But as none receive any benefit from the supper but those who come, we have propitiation in its special sense. An *actual* supper for those who came only.

"Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world."—John i. 29.

It is not the sins of the world, which would be special, but "*the sin*," which is general. It is not "bear the sin," but "*taketh away*." Sin—the sin of the world—was between God and the race, so that God was "angry every day;" but through the merit of Christ's work sin has been put out of the way. God has been reconciled, and the way opened for mercy to come to the sinner, so that all may be saved.

The general view of propitiation carries with it:

First. It is because of it that any blessings are enjoyed by the unsaved. It is on the ground of Christ's propitiatory work that men who are not Christians eat and drink and live on in their sins. The breath with which men oppose God they owe to the work of Jesus, for if it were not for the atonement they would long since have been in torment. Propitiation lays the foundation for this being a day of grace when mercy pleads to spare a little longer.

Second. By virtue of propitiation in this general sense, God being reconciled, judgment passes to the Son. Having suffered and died, meeting the claims of divine holiness, to call to account becomes his

right, and in the closing scenes pictured in the book of Revelation, we begin to hear of the "wrath of the Lamb." Here, again, *oneness* with Christ carries us on to share in that judgment.

"Know ye not that the saints shall judge the world . . . . we shall judge angels."—1 Cor. vi. 1–4.

Third. By virtue of propitiation in its general sense, the offer of salvation is made to men. So hateful is sin, and so completely does it separate, that without the blood there could be no ground even for the offer of salvation.

Thus the gospel, on the ground of propitiation, is preached to "*every* creature," and because of the infinite value of the blood, "whosoever will may come," and whoever comes will be saved.

SECTION II.—*Substitution.*

It must be remembered that the two goats were closely united, so as to constitute *a* sin-offering, because it is the same sacrifice, but presented from two different stand-points. Of course, in all this it must be remembered that there is no past, present, and future from God's stand-point, and that in the light of God's eternity the seeming difficulties that men urge against the atonement have *no real* force, as the whole work is one and indivisible with him. But different types are used for our instruction, and it is truth as revealed to us that has to be harmonized with our limited conceptions. Conflict here does not imply conflict in reality from God's stand-point. While we can discriminate between the

two goats we must also remember that it is but one sacrifice, but one work. The truth of the live goat is expressed in the following texts:

"This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed *for many* for the remission of sins."—Matt. xxvi. 28.

"So Christ was once offered to *bear the sins* of many."—Heb. ix. 28.

"Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray, and the Lord hath *laid on him* the iniquity of us all."—Isa. liii. 4-6.

"Who his own self *bore our sins* in his own body on the tree."—1 Peter ii. 24.

These give us simply the truth as to the live goat. An attempt has been made to break the force of these scriptures by a reference to Matt. viii. 17, where Christ quotes from Isaiah:

"That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses."

Bushnell says of this:

"It is the one scripture that gives, beyond question, the Bible usage of all vicarious expressions in the Old Testament."

By comparison with Isaiah, we find a difference that gives a clew to the meaning of Matthew.

Isaiah says:

"Surely he hath borne (the Septuagint translates this φέρω, *pheroo*) our griefs and carried our sorrows."

Matthew, quoting freely, but not literally, says:

"Himself took (ἔλαβε, *elabe*) our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses."

This use of ἔλαβε for φέρω is the key to a sound exegesis.

All sickness and suffering is the result of sin. When, therefore, Christ healed the sick, it was distinctly on the ground of atonement, without which none would have been healed. It will be seen from Matthew that the healing of the sick was coupled with the casting out of the devils. Hence, John says:

"For this purpose the Son of God was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil?" —1 John iii. 8.

How did he destroy the works of the devil?

"That *through death* he might destroy him that had the power of death—that is, the devil."

It was by his death and sufferings that Christ became victor, able to deliver the captive, and give healing to the sick, and eyes to the blind. (See Luke iv. 18, etc.) It all links itself to the cross. Who but the one that became a man "that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death," could say to a Lazarus, "come forth," and then only because he was "the resurrection and the

life." This shows that it was in anticipation, in the power of his resurrection, as having made atonement on the cross. Who but he who came "to destroy the works of the devil," could have healed the sick, and then only as the world's great sin bearer? It was in anticipation, the removal of the sickness, on the ground of the *bearing of the sin* on the cross. This is the reason why Isaiah is quoted, and why the word is changed. Isaiah emphasizes the *bearing*, Matthew the *removal*—one the cause, the other the effect.

The use of ἔλαβε for φέρω is the key to a still further opening of the truth. The use of ἔλαβε would not be justified *unless it expressed an idea contained in the Hebrew word that it translates.*

There is much controversy as to what is meant by bearing sin. Some, like Dr. Hodge, explain it to mean—

"To bear the guilt and punishment of sin."

Others, quoting Matthew, claim that it means to remove sin, in the same sense that Christ removed the disease—that is, by taking it away, or curing it. In the controversy, the meaning of the Hebrew word *nasa* has been largely discussed, but in looking for its meaning we must follow some order to arrive at a sound conclusion.

Two Hebrew words are translated "bear" in connection with sin bearing.

1. נָשָׂא (*nasa*). This word means primarily "*to take up*, to lift up, to raise." It is translated "take," "take up," "lift up," some two hundred

and fifty times in the Old Testament. It expresses the lifting up of the hands, head, countenance, eyes, voice, heart, and soul, or the taking up of a weapon, etc.

In the development of this primary meaning of "to take up," it acquires that of "*to take away*," from which we get the application, to take away the sin or guilt of any one, translated "*forgive*."

It also acquires from the primary sense of "to take up" that of "*to take upon*, to bear, to carry," this being applied to bearing sorrow or sin.

The use of the word in the sense of "forgive" comes from the developed meaning of "take *away*."

Its use in the sense of bearing sin comes from the developed meaning of "take *upon*."

Any argument from the meaning forgive, can have no force in respect to "sin bearing." It is only the primary sense of "take up" that can apply. If the use of the word in the sense of bearing was a development of the idea of forgiveness, then it would have.

The idea of carrying—*taking upon*—is in the word when used of sin bearing. The sin is *on*—borne by or carried by—that which carries it, either in a ritual or a real sense. We believe that the dictionaries sustain this definition, and that Bible usage will be found in harmony with it.

2. סָבַל (*sabal*). This word means "to bear, to carry."

Both these words are used in Isaiah liii. 4, while

in Isaiah liii. 11 it is *sabal*, not *nasa*. That *sabal* expresses the idea of bearing the punishment of sin can not be questioned, thus:

"Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne (*sabal*) their iniquities."—Lam. v. 7.

After careful examination we believe that *sabal* is always used to express the idea of bearing sin in the sense of bearing its punishment, but *never* in the sense of removing it.

Nasa means more than this. It not only expresses the idea of bearing the penalty, about which as to some texts there can be no dispute, but it expresses more—the taking away of the sin. *Nasa* expresses *both* ideas, the bearing and the removing. This is indicated by Matthew. To deny the sense of removing is to make Matthew unmeaning. To deny the sense of bearing is to ignore the use of *sabal*. If φερω had been used in Matthew, the criticism of Bushnell and others would have some application. Still the quotation, with the use of ελαβε, indicates a meaning overlooked by Hodge.

Our theory harmonizes both. The bearing of sin certainly was the bearing of its penalty, but this bearing carried with it its removal. Bushnell and Hodge are but the *two sides* of the same grand truth. The sin bearing could never avail for poor sinners, unless it included the removal of the sin itself as well as its penalty.

Substitution implies, in the nature of things, a limitation. It is not limited by any act of God's, nor by any failure in the provision made. It is not

owing to any "inability" that God removes in the case of one man, but not in that of another, but simply and alone to the free, willful rejection of Christ.

"Ye will not come to me that ye might have life."—John v. 40.

The sin was transferred to the head of the scapegoat by confession and the laying on of hands. This last, as the sign of identity, points, in the type, to our union with Christ in the antitype.

There can be no substitution without the transfer of sins, there can be no transfer without union, as we have shown; there can be no union without faith. Hence, substitution is limited; it requires *the assent* of both parties. No substitution is possible without mutual consent, hence, the "receiving," or believing on Christ, makes the substitution individual and personal.

Propitiation is *unlimited*, because it rests upon the will of God alone; it is *general*, because what propitiates for one does for all; it is a *single act*, because it removes the anger of one being only.

Substitution is *limited*, because it rests upon the wills of millions of men; it is *special*, because it requires personal acceptance for its completion; it is not a single act, because it requires a change in many. It is always personal.

Propitiation, on the Day of Atonement, had a universal aspect; the blood carried into the holiest was sufficient for the sins of all mankind, the door of Gentile proselytism standing wide open. The

whole race could have been blessed without adding to the amount of blood that was shed. One goat was sufficient for mankind. But none received any benefit from that blood, but those whose sins were transferred to—laid upon—the live goat. Substitution was, therefore, limited to those whose sins were confessed. If all had become proselytes, no more blood would have been shed, but *many* more sins would have been transferred.

The sins were not transferred until *after* the death of the goat, and the blood had been carried into the holiest; this is the one fact that emphasizes the distinction. One goat shows what Christ *did* by his death, the other what Christ *is* as risen —the sin bearer for all who will lay their sins upon him.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE OFFERINGS.

In this chapter we enter upon a subject of the deepest interest, one so closely connected with the atonement that it is very largely the key—in type—of Christ's work for us.

The cross is many-sided; for which reason it takes many types to bring out the fullness of Christ's work. All the offerings are essential to a full representation of his work in its varied relations.

In searching for the meaning of the five offerings, we find that four of them entail the death of a victim. One does not. This shows that the meat-offering is a type of Christ in his *life*, the other four of Christ's *death*.

Then we find a further distinction in the fact that two of them are "sweet savor" offerings, while the sin and trespass offerings are not.

Of the two that are not, one, the sin-offering, was burnt "outside the camp," the other upon the altar.

The burnt and peace offerings are distinguished by the one being entirely consumed, and the other being partly eaten by the priests.

These are all-important differences, and help us

to see the view of Christ's work which they represent.

As the meat-offering is a type of Christ in his life, it will hardly be in place to discuss it, at any rate here. As a type it represented the perfect humanity of Christ (fine flour), conceived and anointed by the Holy Spirit (*mingled* and *anointed* with oil), and the perfection of that life tested and brought out by temptation, suffering, and law (a threefold testing *by fire*). The thought of atonement does not connect itself with the meat-offering, as it is only on the cross that Christ "bears our sins"—"*on the tree.*" Hence, instead of speaking of the priest as making atonement, we read:

"And the priest shall burn the *memorial* of it upon the altar, to be an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord."—Lev. ii. 2.

That during his life Christ suffered, is true, but these sufferings were not vicarious, being designed to bring out the perfection of that life as "without blemish."

A doctrine that has many advocates, especially at Oxford, in England, represents Christ as taking believers into union with himself by his incarnation, giving to the incarnation the value we give to the resurrection. The objections to this are numerous. It overlooks the holy character of Christ's manhood, it leads to a low estimate of the ruin sin has wrought, and passes by the necessity for death and judgment. On this ground Christ's death could hardly be vicarious.

In opposition many scriptures can be cited.

"Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and *die*, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."—John xii. 24.

No union without death. The figure that more than any other represents the unity for which Christ prayed, is that of the body, but the body was not formed until Pentecost:

"He raised him from the dead . . . . and gave him *to be* head over all things to the church."—Eph. i. 20–22.

The meat-offering was usually coupled with the burnt-offering:

"The burnt-offering and *its* meat-offering."

Before we examine the offerings in detail it is well to refer to the design of sacrifice.

Bushnell, and the advocates of the Moral Influence theory generally, deny that the Mosaic sacrifices were expiatory, and teach that they were to express the repentance and spiritual aspirations of the worshipers. "The essence was the sprinkling of the blood, as the bearer of life, upon God's altar; this being a symbolical representation of the giving of the worshiper's life up to the service of God, in other words, his returning back to God by repentance and faith and self-dedication, after being separated from him by sin."

This was neither the Jewish nor heathen idea of sacrifice. The evidence is simply overwhelming that both heathen and Jewish sacrifices were to propitiate God by an expiation. The occasion of their

being offered, the qualifications of the victims, the terms that are used, the ceremonies connected with them and their effects when offered, all show that the Old Testament sacrifices were vicarious. Jewish testimony might be multiplied to establish the fact that the Jews so regarded them.

"The imposition of hands was a tacit declaration on the part of every offerer that he removed his sins from himself and transferred them to that animal."—*Rabbi Levi Ben Gerson.*

"Whenever any one sins through ignorance, or even with knowledge, he transfers his sins from himself and lays them upon the head of the victim."—*Isaac Ben Arama.*

"The blood makes atonement for the soul; the meaning is life instead of life."—*Aben Ezra.*

"It is just that his blood be shed and that his body be burned. But the creator of his mercy accepted the victim of him as his substitute and ransom, that the blood of the animal might be shed instead of his blood—that is, that the life of the animal be given for his life."—*Rabbi Moses Ben Nachman.*

We believe it is beyond controversy that the Jews regarded their sacrifices as vicarious. Some of the advocates of other theories admit this, but deny that in this they were typical.

"Jewish sacrifices rather show us what the sacrifices of Christ was not than what it was."

As to heathen sacrifices, they were of two kinds, distinguished as *hostia honoraria* and *hostia pia-*

cularis. The first was simply a meal offered as expressive of the relation of friendly dependence. The latter was to appease the divine anger. Thus during the reign of Titus, so many calamities came upon the people that we find him offering sacrifices to turn away the anger of the gods.

"For the relief of the people during the plague he employed, in the way of sacrifices and remedies, all means both human and divine."—*Seutonius, Titus* 8.

SECTION I.—*The Burnt-offering.*

The cross may be viewed from two stand-points. The sinner's, as he sees in the death of Christ that which fully meets his need, and that of the Father, as he beholds in that cross Christ doing his will. Thus we have the sin and trespass offerings setting forth Christ's death as bearing sin and making expiation. These can never be "sweet savor" offerings, for God can never be regarded as taking delight in this aspect of Christ's work. The cross has a yet grander side; for on that cross God was glorified by the work of his Son. This is the truth of the burnt-offering. We are apt to lose sight of this Godward side of the cross, looking at it from that of our self-interest alone. But while it is true that Christ, by his death, makes an atonement, and that this is fully brought out by the offerings, the cross meant much more. It was there that Christ, dying "for the ungodly," was fulfilling the great mission of his advent, which was the glory of God.

"Lo, I come to do thy will, O God."—Heb. x. 9.

"I have glorified thee on the earth; I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do."—John xvii. 4.

This is the key to Christ's life and death. As one writer says:

"It was an ineffable delight to him to accomplish the will of God on this earth. No one had ever done this before. Some had, through grace, done 'that which was right in the sight of the Lord;' but no one had ever perfectly, invariably, from first to last, without hesitation, and without divergence, done the will of God. But this was exactly what the Lord Jesus did. He was 'obedient unto death, even the death of the cross' (Phil. ii. 8). 'He steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem.' And as he walked from the garden of Gethsemane to Calvary, the intense devotion of his heart told itself forth in these accents, 'The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?'"

How resplendent with glory the whole life, sufferings, and death of Christ becomes, under the influence of this precious truth. What wonder the Father delights in it, or that it should be a "sweet savor" unto him. The burnt-offering shows this in type. It represents Christ as glorifying God by doing his will, and not Christ as sin bearer. Thus the very name of the offering is properly *incense*-offering, it being the same Hebrew word that is so translated elsewhere. How rich! How fragrant! What perfect incense is this view of the cross! It makes it *the* offering, so that the altar becomes the "altar of burnt-offering," being offered night and morning, as if God would have this thought of the cross always before his eyes.

The same truth is brought out by the peace-offering, but there, our participation in the delight that this thought of Christ's work gives is the leading idea.

"*Let him offer a male without blemish.*"

Here we have a very beautiful figure of Christ as the Holy One—"without blemish."

The meat-offering represents the life of Jesus tested by fire, so as to exhibit its perfect sinlessness. But the more that life is tested, whether by suffering, law, or temptation, the more is its perfection manifested. None but a holy being could die the *just* for the unjust. To a spiritual Christian, the investigation of this theme is one of the most wonderful of all, leading to the highest praise and worship, as he apprehends the moral glory of Jesus. One reason why so many types are given us is to bring out this moral glory. All figures being imperfect, there is danger of man's pressing them so as to make a blemish in the sinless man.

How wonderful is the perfection of Christ. Coming to do the Father's will, never for one moment does he falter. In every desire, look, word, and act, we see the Father's will as the spring and source of all. When tempted of the devil, men have said, there would have been no wrong in his satisfying hunger by an exercise of his miraculous powers; but that is to lose sight of the great end of his life:

"I come to do thy will."

Christ's long fast of forty days was not such a fast as fallen humanity would have endured without

divine help. Being holy, there was no necessity of death; and hence we have no reason to believe that he underwent any suffering during the forty days. The words indicate the reverse:

"And when he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was *afterward* an hungered."

This hunger was not so much the result of his voluntary will, but of the Father's will cheerfully submitted to. Hence, the force of the temptation to make bread of the stones. If it was the Father's will that he should hunger, he will submit.

"Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."

It is thus that his temptations manifest the perfection of his life.

How wonderful the perfection of Christ! For eighteen centuries men have been seeking faults in the character of Jesus; and where they have been claimed, it has been because of failure to apprehend the truth as to his person.

Thus in the garden, in the agony he endured, some see a shrinking from mere physical pain, and thus proclaim a blemish. But that which to the natural man seems like shrinking, to the eye of faith but serves to bring out his perfection. It can not be said that Jesus was willing "to be made sin," even though it was without criminality. That would have in it a shade of wrong—a blemish. But if it is the Father's will he will drain the cup to the very dregs. See how carefully the Bible guards the sinlessness of Jesus. The meaning of

the agony in the garden, with its despairing cry, is thus the shrinking of Jesus from bearing sin and taking the sinner's place. It could not be otherwise with a holy being. Yet the perfection appears as he triumphantly exclaims:

"Nevertheless thy will, not mine be done."

The wonderful perfection of Christ is seen in his life, it shines out in his death. Always, everywhere, he is "without blemish."

"*He shall offer it of his own voluntary will.*"

The Revised Version is clearer:

"He shall offer it at the door of the tent of meeting, that he may be accepted before the Lord."

This is never said of any offering but the burnt-offering. Of the sin and trespass offerings it says:

"And the priest shall make atonement for him, and it shall be forgiven him."

This is a distinction we must recognize, as it is of deep interest. While it is certain that Jesus must bear our sins to save us, we can not regard God as delighting in this blood shedding or sin bearing. Yet this has been the thought of many; and this imperfect conception of Christ's work has led, by its very grossness, to serious difficulties in the minds of earnest thinkers.

Christ's obedience was unto death; he perfectly carried out the Father's will, and by his finished work provided salvation for men. From this *completed work* that so fully glorifies God, there goes up a rare incense, a "sweet savor." This is the

burnt or incense offering; and it is *this* that is "accepted for him."

"*And he shall put his hand upon the head* of the burnt-offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him."

The laying on of hands has a very prominent place in the ceremonies of Judaism. In the sixth of Hebrews it is classed among the fundamental principles held by the Jews. They had the doctrine of Christ in type, or figure, "the word of the beginning of Christ." So the margin reads, and of this Paul was writing.

Perfection is the theme of the Epistle; perfection *in Christ*, in contrast to the imperfection under Judaism.

"The law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope *did*."

Perfect access, a perfect priest, a perfect sacrifice, and a perfect cleansing, "once for all." This is what we have in Christ, as Paul shows in contrast to the imperfection of all under Judaism. Leave then (says Paul), the imperfect—the beginning of the word of Christ—the fundamental doctrines of Judaism—and go on to the perfection to be found in Christ. Every thing that is mentioned by Paul as elementary, is the Jewish form of the doctrine, while that which is elementary to Christianity—Jesus and the resurrection—has no place.

"The laying on of hands" is among the doctrines thus pointed out. It had, therefore, an important place in the teaching of the Jew. It was the sign



of identity, by which the worshiper identified himself with the victim, designated it as his. It was this oneness, or identity, that secured for the offerer the benefits of the offering he presented. The offering itself was a sweet savor, and all that the offering of which it was a type meant, was thus bestowed upon the offerer, "accepted for him," as the sacrificial substitute of him who offered it.

This laying on of hands points, as a type, to the act of faith by which Christ is appropriated and the believer by one Spirit is "baptized into Christ."

The flaying, the cutting into pieces, all, as types, were but tests to show that the victim was really "without blemish." Perfect as a whole and perfect in every part. The structure of the frame, the joints and sinews must all be laid bare, showing its perfection in every part.

The burnt-offering was peculiarly God's. The entire body was burnt upon the altar, none being partaken of by the priest. The *skin* alone was preserved, and this belonged to the priest who made the offering. It was the skin of the *burnt*-offering, not of the *sin*-offering; showing most beautifully in type, the source and character of that righteousness God provided when he made for man a "coat of skins."

Man connects this righteousness with the sin-offering—a penal righteousness, or law keeping. God's word connects it with the burnt-offering, in which, as doing the Father's will, Jesus glorified God.

It was all burnt, *all* consumed. It is God who delights, and into this delight in its fullness no created intelligence can enter. None but the infinite God can ever apprehend the infinite value of Christ's work, and therefore one offering is given to bring this out.

In the Gospels we have Christ presented from many stand-points. Thus he is the King of the Jews in Matthew, a servant in Mark, the Son of man in Luke, and the Son of God in John. This is only one of many keys. We find another in the offerings. As meat-offering he is seen in all, especially in John, because the burnt-offering is linked with it more than any other. Matthew gives Christ as trespass-offering. Mark as sin-offering. Hence, it is only in these Gospels that we have the record of the hiding of the Father's face. In Luke he is the peace-offering; and how, as peace-offering, he adds to the beauty of his life! Here, only, have we the story of the prodigal son, of the good Samaritan; and here only, the words, "forgive them," on the cross. In John we have Christ as burnt-offering. The truth that runs all through John is that of doing the Father's will, glorifying God. In John only, he cries, "it is finished." Reading the Gospels in the light of the offerings, and the offerings in the light of the Gospels, we find a harmony and a beauty that magnifies the work of Christ.

SECTION II.—*The Peace-Offering.*

The peace-offering is also a sweet savor offering, and hence, does not bring out directly the thought

of sin bearing. Of course, the work of Christ is so one, that in all the offerings the question of sin and atonement is brought out; but in this analysis we are showing the stand-point from which each offering presents the work of Christ.

The peace-offering gives us communion. It presents Christ's work from the same stand-point as the burnt-offering, with this difference: that in the burnt-offering all was consumed, while in the peace-offering *a part* was reserved for the priestly family. We have one distinct offering to bring out God's delight in the work of his Son. It is this offering that is accepted for us. We are not accepted according to our appreciation of Christ's work, but *according to God's estimate of it.* Our standing is not measured by our feelings, faith, or knowledge, but by the measure of God's satisfaction and delight in the finished work of Christ. How foolish to be occupied with self instead of Christ!

In the peace-offering, we enter into this thought, and have communion with God in his delight in the work of his Son. The breast and the shoulder (affection and power), are reserved to be eaten by the priestly family, in communion with God and each other.

No peace until the blood is shed—the blood being the ground of peace and the basis of communion. But no sooner is the blood shed than God and the worshipers dwell together in happy communion.

Some interesting features are brought out in the law of the peace-offering.

It must be eaten the same day that the blood was

shed, showing how close is the connection between communion and the blood.

The person who should eat of the peace-offering while ceremonially unclean, was to be cut off. As this great lesson is elaborated in the chapter on "Feet Washing," we pass it by here.

The Latin "communion," and the old Anglo-Saxon "fellowship," both translate the Greek κοινωνία (*koinoonia*), and have the same idea of something in common. But what is it we feed upon in common, or in communion with God? Surely not the sin bearing. It can only be in his delight in the result of the completed work of Christ. *Here* we have communion and peace, and here only do we find *abiding* peace. When a Christian is constantly looking at his sins, continually asking for a fresh application of the blood to be made, he is on Jewish ground and fails to appreciate the perfection of Christ's work. The perfect cleansing (Heb. x.), the "no condemnation" (Rom. viii.), have never been seen, so that God's thought has never been shared in communion.

It is a blessed thought that while the head may be wrong, having the old Jewish thought of a sacrifice to be repeated with every sin, the heart often gives instinctively a fuller value to Christ's work, so bringing practically into communion, and the blessed enjoyment of the peace-offering.

SECTION III.—*The Sin-Offering.*

We come now to an examination of the offerings that give us the death of Christ from a stand-point

where they are not "sweet savor" offerings. The sweet savor offerings represent the delight of his love in the finished work of Christ; the sin and trespass offerings the display of his holiness in the judgment of sin, but from two different directions.

It is always true of sin that it separates, but we must discriminate the character of this separation.

Sin as nature, separates absolutely and of inevitable necessity. This separation lasts as long as the depravity.

Sin as transgression, separates judicially. It arouses the divine jealousy and enkindles the divine wrath, so that "God is angry every day," has his face turned away, and needs to be propitiated. This separation ceases when propitiation has been made.

Sin in the believer separates; so that the Father's face is hidden, and communion is interrupted. God's remedy for this is not the blood, but confession. (See "Feet Washing.")

The distinction between the sin and trespass offerings may, therefore, be briefly stated as:

The sin-offering has respect to the divine *nature.* The trespass-offering to the demands of the divine *government.* This is indicated in the words used ("sin" and "trespass"), and is pointed out in what is said of each. One represents Christ as *propitiating* God, the other as making *restitution.*

The features special to the sin-offering are:

First. The blood of the sin-offering was sprinkled seven times before "*the veil of the sanctuary.*"

The veil hanging between the Holy and the Holiest told, in type, that God was not propitiated, that God was "angry every day." The sprinkling of the blood proclaimed the only ground upon which we can come into the presence of God.

So, now, when the veil has been rent, when God has been propitiated, when all barriers have been swept away, it is on the ground of the blood alone that we come into the holiest.

"Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us." —Heb. x. 19, 20.

This last is literally "newly slain" (*πρόςφατος*, *prosphatos*), or as it might be rendered—

"By the blood of Jesus, the new and living way."

It is the blood that brings us nigh. It was because God's claims had been met, that the veil was rent; so in the sin-offering we find the sprinkling of the blood before the veil.

Second. In the sin-offering the body was consumed, or burnt *outside the* camp; and that not upon an altar, but upon the ground. All indicates truth of great importance. "The altar sanctifies the gift," but the altar belongs to the burnt-offering, and not the sin-offering. The divinity gave to the completed work its value. The absence of the altar in the burning of the sin-offering shows that the idea of infinite suffering has no place in the Bible type.

The offering was the burning of the body, or a part of it; not the presentation of the blood, which is fatal to Bushnell's theory of sacrifice.

"The priest shall burn all on the altar, to *be* a burnt sacrifice, an *offering made by fire*, of a sweet savor unto the Lord."—Lev. i. 9.

In the meat-offering *there was no blood*, yet it was an offering made by fire. The burning of the sin-offering, on the ground; outside the camp, is, therefore, deeply interesting.

Divinity can not be linked with sin, but connects itself with the person. No altar for the sin-offering exhibits the holiness of God and the demerit of sin.

The place is also suggestive—"outside the camp." It was the place where the leper was banished, where the scape-goat was led, and tells vividly, in type, the place that Jesus must take in order to atonement.

"For the bodies of those beasts whose blood is brought into the sanctuary by the high-priest for sin are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate."

Third. The blood of the sin-offering was the only blood carried into the holy of holies. The bodies burnt "without the camp" were of "those beasts whose blood is brought into the sanctuary."

Before leaving the sin-offering, we refer to the laying on of hands once more. This was always a sign of identity; but very different the thought in

the sin and burnt offerings. The burnt-offering gave to the offerer all the merit the offering possessed; in the sin-offering, the offering was looked upon and treated according to what the offerer was. Thus the offering dealt with according to the demerit of the offerer, burnt without the camp, shows what Christ was made for us, not what he is in himself. For this reason there was no flaying, no "cutting into his pieces," in the sin-offering.

SECTION V.—*The Trespass-Offering.*

The great truth of the trespass-offering is that of restitution. It is the governmental side of the cross. A partial view, but not a complete one.

Depravity separating from God, so that the "outer darkness" is the necessary portion of the sinner, carries with it the thought that sin, as transgression, has this same separating character; and *as* transgression merits, and will receive, the punishment that God's holiness demands. This is seen in the sin-offering. But in the punishment of the wicked, the many or the few stripes present the governmental awards of the great white throne.

Restitution is the great thought; and this has to be estimated by the priest in silver, the ram of the offering being itself a part of the repayment. But in every case the *one fifth more* has to be added. Christ's work goes beyond the restoration of what Adam forfeited, God and man alike being gainers by it. God's government receives a glory from the work of Christ that far outweighs the dishonor done

to it by man's sin and rebellion; while man, whose sin forfeited an earthly paradise, receives the glory and the blessedness of heaven.

The trespass-offerings were of two kinds; for trespass against God and man. If it was against God, the offering must first be made, then restitution. If against man, restitution first.

"First go and be reconciled to thy brother, *then* come and offer thy gift."

Speaking of restitution from its manward outlook, one writer presents an almost forgotten truth, and yet one that ought to be taught everywhere. He says:

"Man, as well as God, is a positive gainer by the cross. The believer can say, as he gazes upon that cross, Well, it matters not how I have been wronged —how I have been transgressed against—how I have been deceived—what wrongs have been done me—I am a gainer by the cross. I have not merely received back all that was lost, but much more besides.

"Thus, whether we think of the injured or the injurer, in any given case, we are equally struck with the glorious triumph of redemption, and the mighty practical results which flow from that gospel which fills the soul with the happy assurance that 'all trespasses' are 'forgiven,' and that the root from whence those trespasses have sprung, has been judged. 'The gospel of the glory of the blessed God' is that which alone can send forth a man into the midst of a scene which has been a witness to his sins, his trespasses, and his injurious ways—can send him back to all who in anywise have been sufferers by his evil doings, furnished with grace, not

only to repair the wrongs, but far more, to allow the full tide of practical benevolence to flow forth in all his ways—yea, to love his enemies, to do good to them that hate him, and to pray for them that despitefully use him and persecute him. Such is the precious grace of God that acts in connection with our great Trespass-offering! Such are its rich, rare, and refreshing fruits!

"What a triumphant answer to the caviler who would say, 'Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?' Grace not merely cuts up sin by the roots, but transforms the sinner from a curse into a blessing, from a moral plague into a channel of divine mercy, from an emissary of Satan into a messenger of God, from a child of darkness into a self-denying lover of God, from a slave of vile, selfish lusts into a willing-hearted servant of Christ, from a cold, narrow-hearted miser, into a benevolent minister to the need of his fellow-men. Away, then, with the oft-repeated taunts, 'Are we to do nothing?' 'that is a marvelously easy way to be saved,' 'according to this gospel, we may live as we list.' Let all who utter such language behold yonder thief transformed into a liberal donor, and let them be silent forever (Eph. iv. 28). They know not what grace means; they have never felt its sanctifying and elevating influences. They forget that, while the blood of the trespass-offering cleanses the conscience, the law of that offering sends the trespasser back to the one he has wronged, with the 'principal' and the 'fifth' in his hand. Noble testimony this, both to the grace and righteousness of the God of Israel! Beautiful exhibition of the results of that marvelous scheme of redemption, whereby the injurer is forgiven, and the injured becomes an actual gainer! If the conscience has been set to rights, by the blood of the cross, in reference to the claims of God, the conduct must be set to rights, by

the holiness of the cross, in reference to the claims of practical righteousness. These things must never be separated; God has joined them together, and let not man put them asunder. The hallowed union will never be dissolved by any mind which is governed by pure gospel morality. Alas! it is easy to profess the principles of grace, while the practice and power thereof are completely denied; it is easy to talk of resting in the blood of the Trespass-offering, while the 'principal' and the 'fifth' are not forthcoming."

How grand in its different lights is the governmental aspect of the cross, when compared with the "governmental theories" of men.

Before we close this chapter on the offerings, we will point out the offerings as they are presented in the Psalms. The four principal Messianic Psalms answer to the four offerings.

First. *The sin-offering*.—Psalm xxii.

In the first verse we have the key to this psalm, in the language used by Christ on the cross:

"Why hast thou forsaken me?"

The burden of the psalm is the peculiar character of the suffering that this cry indicates. Speaking prophetically, the psalm shows that great as were the sufferings Christ endured at the hands of men, others had suffered in the same way. But when they had trusted in God, he had never forsaken them, and deliverance had come.

In this "Psalm of atonement," this is the great feature—the Righteous One forsaken of God.

"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? far from helping me, from the words of my roaring? O my God, I cry in the daytime, and thou hearest not, and in the night season, and am not silent!"

This being forsaken was so different from any thing that had been experienced by a righteous man before, that it is pointed out as thus distinguished.

"Our fathers trusted in thee; *they* trusted, and thou didst deliver *them;* they looked unto thee, and were delivered; they trusted in thee, and were *not* confounded. But *I* am a worm and no man."

In the sinlessness of his character, this hiding of the Father's face meant far more to Christ than to any other. We can never fathom it or measure the intensity of the cry as he asks, "*Why* hast thou forsaken *Me?*"

This special hiding of the Father's face, a thing so unique in his dealings with the righteous, points to the vicarious character of the sufferings he endured as our great sin-offering.

For this reason, when the work is done, we find him at once surrounded by the "brethren."

Second. *The burnt-offering.*—Psalm xl.

The leading thought of this psalm is expressed in the words:

"Lo I come to do thy will."

And the fact is set forth that by doing this will, the types and shadows—the sacrifices of Judaism—come to an end. It is Christ as burnt-offering that we see in every line of this psalm. Christ doing

the Father's will, suffering, getting into the horrible pit, delivered and made to rejoice.

Third. *The trespass-offering.*—Psalm lxix.

The whole psalm speaks of the suffering of Christ but in their governmental aspect. "Sin," in verse five, should be "trespasses;" while the language in verse four:

"I restored that which I took not away,"

points to his work of restitution; and this restitution made for others, and not for himself.

Fourth. *The peace-offering.*—Psalm cii.

Here, the feature connected with the sufferings of Christ that is specially pointed out, is their result as bringing a people into fellowship with himself, a congregation to worship him at Jerusalem.

We have not given any full, elaborate exposition of these psalms, designing only to point out their distinctive features. Our readers must open up this vein of truth for themselves.

If we read these psalms in the light of the offerings, we shall find a beauty that we otherwise would overlook. From the psalms themselves we get further light on the offering. Thus God's word becomes resplendent in the light of its own truth, its glory being the cross, and that cross a vicarious sacrifice. As burnt-offering, peace-offering, sin-offering, trespass-offering, he meets the needs of men and glorifies God, and yet his work is one.

"By *one* offering he *hath perfected forever* them that are sanctified."—Heb. x. 14.

CHAPTER IX.

THE BLOOD.

Before we leave the subject of sacrifice, we may properly examine some offerings that give us further light.

SECTION I.—*Abel's Sacrifice.*

While we believe that Adam offered a sacrifice in the garden, as indicated by the coat of skins, which could only have been provided by the shedding of the blood of a victim, Abel's is the first recorded sacrifice. We may, therefore, expect that the leading features will be forcibly brought out, especially in the light of the New Testament. The record is:

"In process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering to the Lord.

And Abel, he also brought of the firstling of his flock and of *the fat thereof.* And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering."—Gen. iv. 4, 5.

Both Cain and Abel were born after the expulsion from Eden. Both were the children of fallen Adam, both were depraved, and both needed a savior. There was "no difference" as to this. It was entirely in the sacrifice they offered that they were so widely apart, that one was accepted and the other rejected.

"By *faith* Abel offered a *more* excellent sacrifice than Cain."

What was this difference? Cain, we are told, "brought of the fruit of the ground"—that ground that God had cursed. He had been taught, equally with Abel, of the evil of sin and the consequent exposure to death and "*after* death the judgment." No doubt he had heard of the glorious promise of a Savior and of his father's faith in that promise, but in the pride of his heart he fails to believe; fails to take the sinner's place, and dares, an unforgiven sinner, to bring the fruit of his hands as an offering to the Lord. He manifests no faith in the Savior and comes with an unbloody sacrifice, bringing life, not death; forgetting, or disbelieving, that

"Without shedding of blood is no remission."

Abel offers, by faith, a more excellent sacrifice. He takes the place of a sinner and claims the promise of a Savior, bringing the blood of a victim; and on the ground of that blood, he is accepted of God. God testifying, or bearing witness, "of his gifts," as the ground of his being righteous.

God's answer to Cain points this out as the ground of Abel's acceptance.

"If thou doest well"—this is rendered in the Septuagint by ὀρθως προσενέγχῃς (*orthoos proseneg-kees*), "if thou offer correctly shalt thou not be accepted." On the other hand, "if thou doest not well, a sin-offering lieth at the door." Where there is sin, God has made provision for the acceptance

of the offerer—a sin-offering waits at the door. If, therefore, Cain was not accepted, it was because of his failure to avail himself of this provision. The blood of Abel's sacrifice was accepted for him, but we look to—

"The blood of sprinkling that speaketh better things than that of Abel."

SECTION II.—*The Offering of Isaac.*

The offering of Isaac by Abraham, while a trial of Abraham's faith, evidently represents Isaac as a type of Christ. A careful examination of the allegory, in Galatians, and of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, will show this. Isaac, "the child of promise," offered by Abraham, points on to the promised "seed," and, as a type, shows features not found elsewhere.

First. The command to offer Isaac was the command for a *human* sacrifice. Of course God never intended that Isaac should die, having provided a ram as a substitute; but it was a lifting, in some measure, of the veil, showing what the true thought of sacrifice is—a man dying in the place of man. It is the seed of the woman with bruised heel that we here catch a glimpse of.

Second. The language used points on to Christ: "Take now thy son, thy only begotten son."

Third. This leads to still another thought, that which is its great typical lesson—that this is the only offering where God's love in the gift of his Son is shown: "take now thy son"—this son of thy love, the child around whom your affection

clings—take him, and offer him upon the altar. In the ready, unmurmuring response of Abraham, we have a type of God's love in the gift of his Son.

"God *so* loved the world that he *gave* his only begotten Son."

This aspect of sacrifice is continually emphasized in the Bible. "The gift of God," who "spared not" his own Son, but *freely gave him* to die, is the theme everywhere. While we honor the Son and sing of his "dying love," we must remember the Father's love in *the gift* of that Son. This should vivify the praise and adoration of his people.

Mark the words of Abraham in response to the questions of Isaac—"God will provide *a lamb* for the burnt-offering." As it was a "ram" that was caught in the thicket, this evidently looks forward, prophetically, to that Lamb that in the "fullness of time" God was to provide for the sins of the people. "God will provide." It is not man's provision, but God's; not what man does for himself, but what God does for him, by the gift of his Son.

Fourth. The perfect submission of Isaac to the will of his Father, even permitting himself to be bound to the altar—"obedient unto death." How it all points to Christ! The Father's love in giving his Son, and the perfect obedience of that Son, are both illustrated in the type.

SECTION III.—*The Blood.*

As all types meet in the person of Christ, all sacrifices point to him, each bringing into view some new aspect of the cross. But in every sacrifice we

have prominence given to *the blood.* The blood meets us at every stage of the world's history, and the importance of the blood is insisted on in every dispensation.

"For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is *the blood* that maketh an atonement for the soul."—Lev. xvii. 11.

"*In* whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins."—Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14.

"Without *shedding of blood* is no remission."—Heb. ix. 22.

"The *blood* of Jesus Christ, his Son, cleanseth us from all sin."—1 John i. 7.

"And have washed their robes, and made them white *in the blood* of the Lamb."—Rev. vii. 14.

Such verses might be multiplied; showing that everywhere the Old Testament declares that the blood makes atonement, while the New proclaims no remission without the blood.

What does the blood mean? What was accomplished by it?

The popular method of dealing with such texts as the above, by those who reject a vicarious atonement, is to speak of them as figurative. This is followed by the assumption that if they are figurative, they may be interpreted in any way the fancy, or creed, of the interpreter may suggest.

The statement that they are figurative is too

sweeping and fails to discriminate between what is literal, figurative, and spiritual. The expression "shedding of blood" is figurative for the taking of the life. The life being "in the blood," when the blood is "shed," or "poured out," the life is taken, and the victim dies. The uniform Bible use of the expression is to point out literal death.

"Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed."—Gen. ix. 6.

This means, as all agree, the killing of a man, and indicates what the expression means in the Bible:

"The blood is the life."—Deut. xii. 23.

The shedding of the blood was the taking of the life; and where life had been taken, the guilt of the blood was said to rest.

"At the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man."—Gen. ix. 5.

"His *blood* will I require."—Ezek. iii. 18.

A careful examination of the many passages similar to these, speaking of the blood being required, the blood being upon their heads, the land being cleansed of the blood, washing the hands of the blood, etc., show that blood-shedding and life-taking are synonymous. Blood-shedding never means any thing else in the Bible. Until Scripture authority is given for any other meaning, sound interpretation leads to the acceptance of that which is expressed. This rests upon a Bible basis, all others upon the imaginations of men.

In the victims offered in sacrifice, the blood shedding was always the taking of the life, there being no example of blood shedding without it. As death—corporeal death—was the penalty of the law, we see that the death of the victim was in the place of the person who made the sacrifice, it being "accepted for him." This was *literally*, the substitution of the life of the victim for the forfeited life of the offerer. In the old Mosaic sacrifice, the death of the victim never meant more than this; for,

"It was not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins."—Heb. x. 4.

Christ's death, while literal, and, as such, a meeting of the penalty of the law, went beyond this; and this deeper meaning in the antitype is embodied in language taken from the type. But the one represented the other. If the one was vicarious, the other must be. The language would be misleading when used of Christ if it were not. If the Jewish sacrifice was a vicarious meeting of the claims of law, then Christ's death is a meeting of the demands of God in our stead. The blood of the victim on the gold of the mercy-seat told of law satisfied, so that mercy came to men. Logically, the blood of Jesus does the same, on a higher, broader scale.

"For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to *the purifying of the flesh;* how *much more* shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal

Spirit offered himself without spot to God, *purge your conscience* from dead works to serve the living God."—Heb. ix. 13, 14.

This is the deep spiritual meaning of the blood. The advocates of the Moral Influence theory, quoting Lev. xvii. 11—"the life is in the blood"—hold that as the blood is the "bearer of life," the blood being brought to the mercy-seat simply means that the life of the offerer is dedicated to God. We object to this—

First. While it was the offerer who killed the victim, it was the priest that put the blood on the horns of the altar, or wherever else it was placed. On the Day of Atonement it was the high-priest who killed the goat and carried its blood into the holiest. All this is out of harmony with any other than a vicarious death. The man offers the animal which is accepted for him, and *after* it is accepted—after, not before—he kills it, and the priest disposes of the blood.

Second. The uniform Bible use forces us to give to the blood shedding the meaning of life taking, the blood being the evidence—the memorial—that death had been inflicted.

Third. The *blood* makes atonement. Atonement is "to cover" over, this being always done when sin was in question, by an expiation. The theory denies that atonement "atones" for sin, giving to the word a meaning (at-one-ment) that is not warranted by Greek or Hebrew usage. Words in the Bible are always used in the sense they had when

the writers lived. If there are any exceptions to this rule, the fuller meaning or new application will *always* be indicated by the context. Even then the old meaning is the essential basis of the new application. Such new meanings are never to be accepted but on the clearest evidence. In the absence of such evidence, it is an assumption to give any new meaning. It is beyond controversy that the Hebrew word for atonement carried with it the idea of expiation, and that it was so used by the Jews. So with the Greek word for propitiation. Not one quotation can be given from either Greek or Jewish writers, where the words are used in connection with sin, in any other sense. All lexicons so define the words. The church has always so understood them. If, then, we take atonement in its true sense, the theory denies that the blood makes atonement; which is the very thing the Bible affirms.

Oehler, while holding a vicarious atonement, presents a theory inconsistent with it. It is indicated in the following quotation:

"The meaning of this use of the blood is given in Lev. xvii. 11, where the prohibition to use blood is based on the following declaration: 'For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you on the altar to atone for (properly to cover) your souls (לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם); for the blood expiates through the soul (בַּנֶּפֶשׁ),—that is, by means of, in virtue of the fact that the soul is in it. . . . . Now *in what sense* is the soul of

the animal presented in the blood to serve in the sacrifice as a covering for the soul of man? Generally speaking, by man's *placing the soul of the pure, innocent sacrificial animal between himself and God*, because he is unable to approach God immediately on account of his sinfulness and impurity . . . . it is not the act of slaughter by which the guilt is carried away, but the act of *presenting the blood* on the altar that is *designated as the act of atonement.*"

First. The translation, "the soul of the flesh is in the blood," is not given either in the Authorized or Revised Scriptures, nor do we regard it as defensible here. The Hebrew "*nephesh*," like the Greek "psuchee," is used with many meanings in the Bible. They both express a twofold sense of the word "life," being properly translated both "soul" and "life." Life being, in the Bible, a derived meaning from that of "soul." Other senses of the word "life" are expressed by other words.

Nephesh denotes *potential* life as when we say, "there is life in him;" and *phenomenal* life, as when we say, "he is full of life." In other words, the soul—an immaterial entity—is the potential life of the body. It is the unseen, hidden energy, that is the cause of the motion of the machine. On the other hand, the motion of the machine—the activities of the body—are but the phenomenal soul. In the first of these meanings, "soul" is the true translation, in the last "life." The blood being the vehicle of all vital action, it is evidently in the last sense that *nephesh* is used; and life, not soul, is its

appropriate translation. This is shown by comparing with parallel texts.

"For the life of all flesh is the blood thereof."—Lev. xvii. 14.

"The blood is the life."—Deut. xii. 23.

It is "nephesh" in both these texts, but it would hardly do to translate it "soul" here, as that would make the blood *to be* the soul—that would be the grossest materialism. The first of these quotations being in the same connection fixes the translation life as the true one.

Second. It is inconceivable *how* the soul of a pure animal can be put between a sinner and God. What meaning is to be attached to it?

Third. It is the *blood* and not the soul, or life, that makes atonement.

Fourth. In opposition to Oehler, we believe that it was the blood shedding, or rather what was accomplished by it, that made atonement. The victim was brought as an offering and presented to God, who accepted it *for* him *to make* atonement. After this presentation and acceptance, the victim was slain and the priest applied the blood. As to the presentation of the blood to God, *this was only done* in the sin-offering of the Day of Atonement.

The blood makes atonement; and after the death of the victim, the blood was the memorial of an accomplished sacrifice.

The blood belonged to God, and not to man; hence he says:

"I have *given* it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls."

It was there as God's gift to men, *telling to men* of propitiation and the Gift that saves.

In sacrifice the blood was *never put upon the people.* In the consecration of the priest, the blood was put on the ear, thumb, and great toe; but this, while beautiful and suggestive, was consecration, not atonement.

The only exception was in the case of the making of the covenant, when we read:

"Moses took the blood, and sprinkled it on the people, and said, Behold the blood of the covenant."

Moses and the seventy elders were called into the mount, but it was to worship "afar off;" for,

"They shall not come nigh."

God, "angry every day," was still separated from the people. Nowhere under law do we find the people brought nigh. In entering into a covenant with the people, we find that it is dedicated with blood.

Death being the penal sanction of the law, it was only on the ground of its claims being met and satisfied, that the covenant relation could be established or maintained. Under law, without law, or under grace, it is always the same—the blood is the only ground of blessing. Without the blood is no remission, and without remission there is no grace, no blessing.

With the glory of God on the mount as a "con-

suming fire," and sin and defilement in the camp, there could be no communion, no covenant, until the altar is erected, the blood shed, and atonement made. The blood sprinkled upon the people tells that they are the Lord's solely on the ground of the blood, and not personal merit.

CHAPTER X.

REDEMPTION.

We come now to a very important theme, one that presents the work of Christ from another standpoint, but in harmony with the distinctions we have insisted upon.

Redemption is of a twofold character, corresponding, as God's provision of grace, to sin as transgression, and as depravity.

The Old Testament furnishes us with many types of this twofold redemption.

SECTION I.—*The Year of Jubilee.*

Among the Jews, every seventh year was a Sabbath; but when seven of their Sabbatical periods had passed, the fiftieth year was a jubilee, a special provision for redemption.

The year of jubilee was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, which was sounded on the Day of Atonement, when all sin had been expiated. It is worthy of note how closely redemption by power is connected with the blood shedding. Israel's redemption from Egypt followed close upon the death of the Lamb and the appearance of the blood upon the door posts. The year of Jubilee is ushered in by the solemn work of the Day of Atonement.

The great feature of the jubilee was:

"And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim *liberty* throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man into his family."

This shows the blessing. Every Israelite who had sold himself on account of poverty became free, and every alienated inheritance was restored to its original owners. During the fifty years the slave might be redeemed by the payment of a ransom, the provision for this being indicated by law. But the year of jubilee set free without any payment.

So with the land. Being divided among the tribes and sub-divided among the families, it became their perpetual inheritance. If, however, it had in any way passed into alien possession, provision was made for the redemption by purchase; and the one whose right it was to redeem was indicated by law. An illustration of this is seen in the case of Boaz. The kinsman nearer than he had to renounce his right, before Boaz could redeem Ruth's inheritance.

The jubilee shows, therefore, a twofold redemption—by the payment of a price, or by power.

What a year! what blessings! When the notes of the silver trumpet rang out, sweet and clear, its echoes penetrated into every part of the land and gave liberty to the captive and untold blessing to the people. The exile returned to his home, the poor and the struggling entered again upon their possessions; the debtor was freed from his debts,

the man-slayer could return home in peace. The full tide of blessing flowed over the land! It was indeed a year of jubilee!

SECTION II.—*The Goel, or Redeemer.*

The idea of redemption being prominent in the Jewish theocracy, we find special provision for it in their laws, and we find one who was specially the Redeemer. As to the meaning:

The verb גָּאַל (*gaal*) means primarily "to redeem, to ransom;" and is translated "redeem," but never ransom, the Hebrew word for that being *kopher*, indicating that a ransom is that which "covers"—satisfies—the demand, and so liberates.

Other words are used to express the idea of redeeming, the principal one being פָּדָה (*padah*), "to cut, to cut in two;" hence, to "ransom or redeem," "to set free."

The difference between the two words is that *padah* simply expresses the idea of *setting free*, whereas *gaal* carries with it the thought of the manner in which this is done, either by *avenging* or by *repayment.*

Goel is the only word translated "Redeemer." It is sometimes translated "kinsman" (the word denoting a blood relation), and sometimes "avenger" or "revenger." The Goel was the kinsman, whose right it was to redeem when occasion demanded.

Under the Mosaic law, when a man died without children, it became the duty of the next of kin to marry the widow, so as to raise up children to pos-

sess the inheritance of the dead man, that it might be saved to the family.

When property had been alienated, it was the right of the next of kin to redeem it.

"There is a kinsman (*gaal*) nearer than I."

"And the kinsman said, I can not redeem it for myself, lest I mar mine own inheritance: redeem thou my right to thyself; for I can not redeem it." —Ruth iii. 12; iv. 6.

Again, when a murder had been committed, the next of kin was called upon to slay the murderer; the reason given being—

"So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land can not be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it."—Num. xxxv. 33.

The word "cleansed" is in the Hebrew *kapher* (atonement). *Atonement must be made for the wrong by the death of the man-slayer.* His only safety was to remain in the city of refuge, if the killing had been accidental; and it was specially prohibited that any "satisfaction" (*kaphar*) should be received of him (verses 31, 32). He could not make atonement himself.

The next of kin, whose duty it was to avenge the death, and thus cleanse, or redeem, the land from the curse, was the Goel, or Redeemer.

From this brief review it is seen that the Redeemer was a "kinsman," who redeemed by paying a price, or by avenging. This brings out once more the idea of a twofold redemption.

SECTION III.—*The firstling of an Ass*—Ex. xiii. 13.

Under the Mosaic economy we find a distinction made between clean and unclean animals. Of course this was to teach some great spiritual lesson. This is indicated in the vision granted to Peter.

"And saw heaven opened, and a certain vessel descending unto him, as it had been a great sheet knit at the four corners, and let down to the earth:

"Wherein were all manner of four-footed beasts of the earth, and wild beasts, and creeping things and fowls of the air.

"And there came a voice to him, Rise, Peter; kill and eat.

"But Peter said, Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten any thing that is common or unclean.

"And the voice spake unto him again the second time, What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common."—Acts x. 10–15.

"Ye know how that it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another nation; but God hath showed me that I should not call any man common or unclean." —Acts x. 28.

The Jew was clean, or holy; the Gentile was unclean. This distinction was largely *arbitrary*, being based upon natural birth alone. The *real* distinction indicated, is as between the saved and the lost, the believer and the unbeliever. (See 2 Cor. vi. 14–17, etc.)

The ass that had to be redeemed was an *unclean* animal, the lamb that redeemed it was clean. It was the substitution of the clean lamb in the place of the unclean ass.

But why did it need to be redeemed?

If we turn to the record we find that it is founded upon the same event as the passover. The first-born, both of man *and beast*, had perished among the Egyptians; but those of the Hebrews, sheltered by the blood, had been spared. On the ground of this, God claimed all "firstlings" as his.

"And it shall be when thy son asketh thee in the time to come, saying, What is this? that thou shalt say unto him, By strength of hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage.

"And it came to pass, when Pharaoh would hardly let us go, that the Lord slew all the first-born of man, and the first-born of beast: therefore I sacrifice to the Lord all that openeth the matrix, being males; but all the first-born of my children I redeem."—Ex. xiii. 14, 15.

As the first-born belonged to the Lord, it was not to do any work, it was to be eaten by the family when sacrificed—but only before the Lord. In the case of the unclean animal, as it could not be sacrificed, because God can not accept what is unclean, it must be redeemed, or slain.

"And every firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and if thou wilt not redeem it, then thou shalt break his neck: and all *the first-born of man among thy children thou shalt redeem.*"

Here we clearly have substitution, and its great application pointed out in the closing sentence. Man, like the ass, is unclean, and must, like it, be redeemed, or perish.

How vivid is this passage! What more worthless than a broken-necked ass? This is the great offense of the Bible; it gives man so low a place that it humbles his pride. Without redemption, he will be no better than a broken-necked ass. But what is more exalted than the Lamb? It is a Lamb that is seen in the midst of the throne. All heaven sings, "Worthy the Lamb." If, then, by nature, we are so low, by grace we may become most exalted. Grace makes the unclean clean, the worthless precious, and raises gulity sinners up into glory there to share it with the Lamb.

But it is only as a "lamb" is slain as a substitute. If he will not redeem it, its neck must be broken.

SECTION IV.—*Redemption by Purchase.*

Redemption by purchase is presented in many texts.

"Ye are bought with a price."—1 Cor. vi. 20.

"Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, ... but with the precious blood of Christ, *as of a lamb without blemish* and without spot."—1 Peter i. 18, 19.

The language here used links on to the Jewish sacrifice, showing the effect of those sacrifices to be

our redemption. But it is redemption by purchase that is so linked. From what are we redeemed? To whom was the price paid?

In the early days of the church, there was a widespread belief that this price, or ransom, was paid to Satan. This was natural, when we remember the custom of that day was to hold a captive for ransom. The right of the conqueror was almost universally recognized, captives even returning to captivity when liberated on parole to obtain this ransom, and being unable to do so. This right being so generally recognized, it was natural that Satan should be regarded as having a right of conquest in men; hence, the belief of many that the ransom was paid to Satan. But the Bible gives no countenance to this idea; as in no sense has the devil any valid claim that God would recognize. The Bible never teaches that we are redeemed from the power of the devil by a ransom. It shows that we are redeemed from *the curse of the law*, redeemed *from sin*, and, while it does not use the words, that we are redeemed from *the power of the devil.* But here comes in the distinction between redemption by purchase and power. Redemption from the curse of the law is by purchase; from sin and the power of the devil, by power. The first only, then, is vicarious. The others, in the nature of things, can not be.

"To redeem them that were under the law, that *we might* receive the adoption of sons."—Gal. iv. 5.

"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."—Gal. iii. 13.

Here the manner of the redemption is pointed out—"being made a curse *for* us." It was God who pronounced the curse of the law, and he will execute it. As the moral governor of the universe, he will enforce the sanctions of his law, and will "in no wise clear the guilty."

As the blood that was shed had to be redeemed by the Goel, because the law demanded "life for life," and was redeemed when the man-slayer was killed—the land being cleansed or atonement being made—so the demands against the sinner must be met; and when met, he is redeemed from the curse of the law.

The ass, because it was unclean, could not be accepted by the Lord, and was, therefore, doomed to destruction, unless redeemed by a lamb. The lamb was a ransom—a price paid—for its redemption; and shows *to whom* the price was paid, and *why*.

Christ meets the demand—pays the price—and thus he becomes our "ransom."

"And to give his life *a ransom* for many."—Matt. xx. 28.

"As Christ also loved the church and *gave himself* for it."—Eph. v. 25.

"Who *gave himself a ransom* for all."—1 Tim. ii. 6.

In looking at these passages the prepositions that are used have special force. They are ὑπέρ (*huper*) and ἀντί (*anti*).

The first is used in Ephesians, the last in Matthew and Mark, while both are used in Timothy.

Huper, "with the genitive, generally, but not always, carries the idea of substitution." It is the preposition used in John x. 15; Rom. v. 6–8; 2 Cor. v. 20; Gal iii. 13, etc.

Anti, better than any other Greek word, expresses the idea of substitution. (See Winer's Grammar of New Testament Greek.) It is used in the following texts:

"*In the room* (anti) of his father Herod."—Matt. ii. 22.

"An eye *for* (anti) an eye."—Matt. v. 38.

"Will he *for* a fish give him a stone."—Matt. xi. 11.

"Recompense to no man evil *for* evil."—Rom. xii. 17.

See also Matt. xvii. 27; Luke i. 20; xii. 3; xix. 44; John i. 16; Acts xii. 13; 1 Cor. xi. 15; Eph. v. 31; 1 Thess. v. 15; 2 Thess. ii. 10; Heb. xii. 2; xii. 16; James iv. 15; 1 Peter xiii. 9. These are all the texts where *anti* is used. "Gave himself a ransom *for* many," is, therefore, "in the room," or "place" of many.

In 1 Tim. ii. 6, both prepositions are used, so making one of the strongest possible statements of substitution. It could not have been presented more forcibly in Greek. It reads, ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτον ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων (who gave himself a substitutionary ransom for all).

The word λυτρον "ransom" is here αντίλυτρον, if we give any translation to the *anti* at all, as it is

followed by *huper*, it would express the idea of a substitutionary ransom for all.

Christ as our ransom redeems us from the curse of the law—death, and after death the judgment—then, for the believer these have no longer any terrors, as over us they have no longer any power.

SECTION V.—*Redemption by Power.*

The Bible teaches that we are redeemed from sin and the power of Satan, as well as from the curse of the law; this, however, can not be by a ransom.

The idea that God gave his Son as a ransom to Satan is preposterous. God can never recognize any right of Satan in man; otherwise, *obedience to Satan would be right.* The Master had a right to the service of his slave, and this right was recognized in the provision for the payment of a ransom. The devil has no right to the service of men; and the payment of a ransom, being a recognition of such right, is impossible. More, the devil himself is a rebel, to be overthrown and punished; and can have no right in his rebellion that God will own. The only way, then, is to redeem by power. The Egyptians held the Jews in bondage, but they had no right to do so; hence, God pays no ransom to the Egyptians, but delivers his people by the power of his own strong arm. God will never pay the devil a price; but the strong man armed will be overcome by the stronger than he, and dragged at the chariot wheels of his conqueror, and then cast into the lake of fire.

Neither did Jesus pay a price to sin. That would

be an absurdity. Redemption from sin can only be by the power of God.

Substitution here is, in the nature of things, impossible. Christ is, therefore, a ransom, only as meeting the demands of law.

Redemption from the curse of the law, by the payment of a ransom, so that we are delivered from that curse forever, gives us our *title* to heaven. Redemption from the power of Satan and of sin, by the greater power of God, as manifested in the impartation of life, the *power* of that life, and ultimately in the redemption of the body, gives us *fitness* for heaven. It is thus that Christ destroys the works of the devil, and completes his work.

If we would not have confused or erroneous views of the work of Christ, we must see and recognize this distinction.

Redemption by power, while distinct, is still closely connected with redemption by purchase.

SECTION VI.—*The Passover and the Sea.*

We have dealt largely with the types, because they are the pictures that God gives us of spiritual things; and in their light we reach a higher conception of the truth.

The Passover stands out in the forefront as among the types of the Old Testament, and has unusual interest for us because it is linked with the memorial supper in the upper room.

The Passover and the sea connect together and bring out in type, this twofold redemption. The

Passover reveals God as *Judge*, the Red Sea as *Deliverer.*

God was about to pass over the land in judgment, and every first-born must die. Special provision was, however, made for the salvation of his people. The Jew was told to take "a *lamb*" and kill it. There must be *death* in every house in Egypt that night. In the house of the Egyptian the death of the first-born. In the house of the Israelite the death of the lamb, slain in the place of the first-born, a type of the Lord Jesus slain in the sinner's place. This is plainly substitution—the lamb in the place of the first-born—so that the angel of judgment would *pass over.* This is what Christ is.

"For even Christ *our passover* is sacrificed for us."—1 Cor. v. 7.

After the death of the victim, the blood was to be sprinkled on the door-posts and on the lintel. *Not* upon the threshold, for the blood was too holy a thing to be trampled under foot. It is the unbeliever who thus places it under his feet as a common thing. Not under foot, but upon the door-posts, is the proper place for the blood. Then God says:

"And *the blood* shall be to you for a token upon the houses where ye are: and when I *see the blood*, I will pass over you, and the plague shall not be upon you to destroy you."—Ex. xii. 13.

It was the blood, and only the blood, that saved them.

The blood saved irrespective of *their personal character.* Moses needed the blood just as much as

the worst sinner in Israel; and the worst sinner was just as safe as Moses, if the blood was on the door-post.

It saved irrespective *of their feelings.* Whether they believed the testimony of God *about* the blood so as to enjoy perfect assurance, or whether that testimony was doubted, so that they were filled with alarms and fears, they were equally secure, if the blood was there.

It saved irrespective *of their faith.* Certainly, whatever may be said of the people, there was no faith on the part of the beasts. It is not our faith, but the blood, that saves. To trust in our faith, or our experiences, is just as unsafe as to trust in our works. It is Christ who saves. It is the blood that shelters. It shelters us when, looking away from self—emptied of self—we look away to Jesus, relying upon him for salvation.

The blood preserved from the judgment, *but they were still in Egypt.*

Moses brings them to the Red Sea, and there we see them with the waters in front and the Egyptians behind them.

It is not judgment at the sea—that is passed. It is not sin bearing. But the sea is the place where the whole power of evil is annulled, and deliverance obtained.

"Stand *still*, and see the *salvation* of the Lord." —Ex. xiv. 13.

Here we find a new word in the Bible—"salvation;" and here at the sea we find Israel delivered from Egypt and delivered forever. The waters never opened for Israel's return.

In the Passover and the sea we have distinct types of the twofold redemption—by purchase—by power.

In Paul's Epistle to the Romans we find it again beautifully unfolded. The first eight chapters give the work of Jesus, and these chapters divide into two parts in the midst of chapter five.

The first deals with the blood as meeting the claims of God, so that Jesus is set forth as our "mercy-seat," on the ground of which we are "justified by faith." It is the great truth of our being "justified *by his blood*" or redemption by purchase. The second part has to do with deliverance from sin itself. Deliverance in our experience, deliverance from its power, and ultimate deliverance from its presence, in "the redemption of the body." And this deliverance the outcome of the Spirit baptism, the result of being "baptized into his death."

The first part has to do with redemption from the penalty of sin as transgression, the second with redemption from the depravity itself. The one is by the *blood;* the other by the imparted *life.*

"If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, *much more*, being reconciled, we shall be saved (delivered) by his life." —Rom. v. 10.

Propitiation and substitution; redemption by purchase and by power; "justification by blood," and "justification of life," these are the themes that are presented in the two parts of the first eight chapters of Romans.

PART III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER XI.

ELECTION.

In considering the application of the atonement, we are led to examine the question of election, the great subject of controversy of the ages.

It is certain that the Bible teaches election, only we need to discriminate as to how it is taught. We must not fasten on to the name a doctrine foreign to the spirit and teaching of the Scriptures.

The Bible presents us with a *national* election to special privileges; an election to a special *office* or *work*, as in the case of Paul; and also an *individual* election to eternal life. In respect to this last, Calvinists teach that it is unconditional and from eternity.

"By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death."

"Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was

laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace."—*Westminster Confession of Faith.*

On the other hand, Arminians believe that the election is conditional, depending upon the faith *and faithfulness* of the believer. They teach, "that God, from all eternity, determined to bestow salvation on those whom he foresaw would persevere unto the end." Then a man may be assured of his salvation, but have no knowledge of his election; because he does not know that he will persevere to the end.

Both Calvinists and Arminians date the election from eternity, but the Calvinist makes it unconditional; the Arminian conditional. One bases it upon God's decrees, the other upon his foreknowledge. One makes it all of grace, the other partly of human merit.

The Calvinist holds that the individual will believe and persevere because he is one of the elect; the Arminian believes that he is one of the elect because this faith and perseverance were foreseen.

Is there a medium ground? Yes; that we are elect when united to Christ, and only *as united* to Christ.

The election being the result of union, is unconditional, the life being imparted on the condition of

faith; but the election being one of those blessings that follow the union.

It is thus entirely of grace, without any dependence on the merit or faithfulness of the believer.

Election on the ground of foreseen faith carries with it this difficulty: that a man is elect because of his faith before he exercises it. An effect preceding its cause. On the medium theory, they are not elect because it was foreseen that they would be in him, but elect in him—they are not elect out of him. When we come to the connection of baptism with election we will show this at length.

We have thus three positions:

First. An unconditional election, depending alone upon the sovereign good pleasure of God.

Second. A conditional election, depending upon a foreseen faith and faithfulness of the creature.

Third. An unconditional election of all who are *in* Christ, this union, and not the election, depending upon the faith being exercised.

In our investigation we will examine some of the texts relied on by Calvinists, and then show the connection of election and the baptism of the Holy Spirit.

SECTION I.—*Ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters of Romans.*

These form the citadel of the Calvinistic theory of election and are its strongest proof texts. A careful examination will therefore be in place. It is not by taking a verse here and a verse there that we can reach the truth, but by taking every verse,

in its connection, as part of Paul's argument. Only thus can we rightly divide the word. We must first determine the *theme* of the apostle, the proposition he is discussing. Then the true application of individual texts can be easily seen.

The Epistle to the Romans divides into four parts, these three chapters constituting the third division of the book. It presents God's dealings with Jew and Gentile, and God's promises made to the Jew are *reconciled with the incoming of the* Gentiles.

In the first part of the Epistle he showed both Jews and Gentiles to be sinners, and that the righteousness of God by faith was for both alike; but this does not touch the question of the promises. These being given to the Jew, he claimed an advantage over the Gentiles. How these promised blessings, that they had always regarded as specially their own, could be given to a Gentile it was hard for a Jew to understand; and hard, in fact, for any one. Paul is discussing this question, showing the right of the Gentiles to share the promises. This being his theme, special texts must be interpreted in harmony with it.

Paul begins his argument by telling of his great love for them. There is a parallel here with the conduct of Moses; who, when Israel was about to be cast off, said:

"Blot me out—only let Israel live."

Paul sees them not about to be, but actually, set aside, and the Gentiles grafted in; so in the spirit of Moses, he says, in the love he bore his people:

"I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsman according to the flesh."

By a comparison with the case of Moses, it is plain that Paul means he would be willing to be set aside, if Israel might remain. It is all *national.*

He then argues from God's sovereignty, as displayed in their own history, God's right to let the Gentiles in.

His argument is that they were not all Israel who were of Israel, because some of the descendants of Abraham and Isaac were not inheritors of the promises. Nor because they were the seed of Abraham were they all children. Otherwise the descendants of Ishmael and Esau would have shared the blessings of the Jews. In choosing Isaac and not Ishmael, Jacob and not Esau, God acted as sovereign, without respect to the merit of either, both being not yet born (ix. 11.). As he acted sovereignly then, so he could now in bringing in the Gentiles.

The choice of Isaac and Jacob, however, was not as individuals to eternal life, but as the fathers of the great nation and channel through which the Messiah, the promised seed, should come. Nor does the passing by of Ishmael and Esau in anywise imply that they were ordained to lose their souls. It was clearly *national* election, standing out in connection with God's separating a people from the nations to be his. This is plain from the history.

"*Two nations* are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels; and

the one people shall be stronger than the other; and the elder shall serve the younger." — Gen. xxv. 23.

This *national* election being of God's sovereignty, his bringing in of the Gentiles on the same ground, gave them an equal right to the promises. This being the theme, it is easy to make the application of the different illustrations.

The subject being national election to *temporal* blessings and privileges, God's sovereignty in this is illustrated by two events in their history; one of mercy extended, the other of judgment inflicted.

But are they examples of unconditional election and reprobation? We say, unhesitatingly, they are not. That is not Paul's theme, nor is there any thing in the illustrations to sustain it.

What was the occasion of God's saying to Moses "I will have mercy," etc., and why does Paul introduce it into his argument? If we turn to the record in Exodus it will be made clear. The Israelites, even before the mount where the fire and thunder told of God's presence, were guilty of idolatry. God was angry: He says:

"Go up hence, thou and the people . . . . into the land. . . . *I will not go up* in the midst of thee."

This was equivalent to casting off his people. Moses pleads with God with all the earnestness of his soul, and his intercession avails. God says:

"My presence *shall* go with thee."

He might justly have cast the people away; *they* had broken the covenant, and forfeited their posi-

tion by their sin; and he might, as sovereign, have chosen others to carry out his purposes. In fact, this was his proposition to Moses, to destroy the people, and make the promise to Abraham good through the descendants of Moses. Moses is unwilling to accept this blessing at the expense of his countrymen. Hence, when on the intercession of Moses God forgave the people, it was an act of sovereign mercy; hence he says to Moses:

"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy."

When Paul quotes this, he does it to remind them that as God's sovereignty alone led him to preserve them from ruin at Sinai, he had, on that ground, the right to bring in the Gentiles. The potter certainly had power over the clay. This exposition is in harmony with the theme of the epistle; the application to individuals now is not.

So with Pharaoh; by preserving him from the plagues, by his long-suffering and patience, God gave him ample time for repentance. But, as it is written:

"Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil."

So all this but hardens Pharaoh's heart. He grows bolder and more insolent, and God in his sovereignty permits it, until, his cup being full, his final overthrow makes Israel's deliverance more glorious. It all bore upon their call as a nation, and God's glory upon the earth. God, in delivering his people, acted as sovereign, thus again

showing his right to bring in the Gentiles. It has no *direct* reference to Pharaoh's *eternal* destiny; that was undoubtedly settled long before, upon the principles God has revealed to men.

The argument as to the potter and the clay is still in respect to Jew and Gentile, as the whole context shows. If the reader will study these chapters in the light of this exposition, this will be easily seen.

SECTION II.—*Predestination.*

"For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son."

That we may have a fair statement as to the controversy about foreknowledge (which is the key to the Calvinistic theory of predestination), we quote Dr. A. A. Hodge's definitions.

"Foreknowledge is an act of the infinite intelligence of God, knowing from all eternity, without change, the certain futurition of all events, of every class whatsoever, that ever will come to pass.

"Foreordination is an act of the infinitely intelligent, foreknowing, righteous, and benevolent will of God, from all eternity determining the certain futurition of all events of every class whatsoever that come to pass. Foreknowledge recognizes the certain futurition of events, while foreordination makes them certainly future."

"God foreknows all events as certainly future *because* he has decreed them and thus made them certainly future."

This is as clear as—Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." "Foreknowledge is an act." As acts are the result of volitions, it logically follows from this that God's foreknowledge is the product of his will, and therefore not a necessary attribute of the Deity. This is a denial of the omniscience of God. Or, if not a denial, it makes this attribute to be the product of will. If one attribute is, then all are; and we have a self-existent being who is his own creator.

Again, "Foreordination is an act of th . . . foreknowing . . . . will of God." Then his foreknowledge is back of his decrees. But "God foreknows . . . . *because* he has decreed." Here distinctly the foreknowledge is the result of the decrees. We thus have a vicious circle. Foreordination based upon foreknowledge, and foreknowledge upon the decrees.

We can see a reason for this. The real ground of Calvinistic predestination is in the last quotation from Hodge. But while this is essential to the creed, it leaves a fatal weakness in another direction. If he foreknows *because* he decrees, then logically he decrees without any foreknowledge, blindly and unintelligently; otherwise you have an effect preceding its cause.

Hodge's definitions are defective in another direction. "Foreknowledge is the act . . . . knowing (whatever that means — an act does not know, but intelligence does; to speak of 'an *act* of the intelligence' as knowing is to make of this act an intelligent entity) the certain futurition of all . . . . that . . . . *will* come to pass."

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Certainly, that which *will come* to pass must be future, and to say that it takes "an act of intelligence" to know this is saying but little. *Every* intelligence knows that what *will* come to pass is certainly future; and if this is foreknowledge, it belongs to men and angels as well as to God. So also with his definition of foreordination; it has to do with making events certainly future, instead of being causative of events.

From any stand-point, Calvinistic or otherwise, these definitions are very defective. We can only account for this on the supposition that the dogma of predestination, as held by Calvinists, necessitates the basing of foreknowledge upon the decrees; and as this brings in confusion, his definitions are the outcome of the fog. As the creed is false, the definitions must be unsound.

Foreknowledge is to know beforehand. Foreordination is to ordain or decree beforehand. To *know* and to *decree* are distinct operations, so separate from each other that they can never be confounded in sound reasoning.

What is the foreknowledge of God? Simply that he knows beforehand, before it comes to pass. This is all that the word means; but this gives rise to many questions as to the *nature* of this foreknowledge, the principal one being: Is this foreknowledge limited or unlimited? Does it extend to all events, or are there exceptions, things God does not know beforehand? Here we enter the domain of controversy. A vast majority of theologians hold that it is unlimited, extending to

all things, including the free volitions of all intelligences, so that nothing happens but what was known to God from all eternity; some adding that his foreknowledge extends "to all possible events as well as to those that are actual."

Others, while holding to the foreknowledge of God, deny that it is unlimited, teaching that certain classes of events (about which they are not agreed) are unknown to God before they come to pass. That is, while he knows them as possible, he does not know them as actual; most explaining that the reason of this is that he has willed not to know them—a self-evident contradiction.

We believe that nothing can be maintained but the unlimited foreknowledge of God. If his foreknowledge is not unlimited, we can never reason out the absolute perfection of God. All the attributes are blended in harmony; and so intimately are they connected that imperfection in one is imperfection in all. God's omniscience is an *essential* attribute; but he is not omniscient, if there is any thing unknown to him.

What is the foreordination of God? Simply that God ordains or decrees beforehand, what comes to pass. All believe in foreordination who believe in God. The logical alternative is atheism. But here again the question is raised, Do God's decrees extend to every thing, or are there things God did not decree?

Here an important distinction must not be lost sight of. Foreknowledge is included in an essential attribute of the Deity—omniscience. To decree be-

ing an exercise, or manifestation, of the divine will, is not essential to the divine nature—that is, to determine an event is no more essential to the divine nature than not to determine it. In the creation of men and angels God gave them the power of choice, leaving them free in the exercise of these volitions. Hence, while known beforehand to God, they are not decreed, because they are the *free* volitions of other intelligences.

Calvinism teaches that—

"God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."—*Westminster Confession of Faith.*

The first clause of this sentence contains a universal affirmation, the second introduces a modification which, however, is not an exception. It does not say these are not decreed, only, "yet so as," etc. The first and last clauses being contradictory, the proposition can not stand.

The volitions of creature intelligences are either necessitated by the will of God, or they are free. If they are necessitated, then God, not man, is the author of sin; there is no logical escape from this. So far as we know, no creed has ever made God the author of sin. Here, by common consent, is one thing that God did not decree. Hence, it must have originated in the volition of some intelligence

other than God. The existence of sin is the unanswerable argument for the freedom of the will, and shows that we can not say that God has decreed *all* things. What God permits he does not decree; for his decrees are always *causative*. To speak of a permissive decree is a contradiction in the terms.

To decree is to determine that it shall be; and when God determines a thing, it always is.

A better statement as to the decrees is:

"God, for the manifestation of his glory and goodness, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordained or determined what he himself would do, what he would require his intelligent creatures to do, and what should be the awards, respectively, of the obedient and the disobedient."—*Confession of Faith of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.*

The Calvinistic theory that God foreknows *because* he decrees, is the reverse of what the Bible teaches.

"For whom he did *foreknow*, he also did predestinate."

"Elect *according to* the foreknowledge of God the Father."

Foreknowledge, in the Bible, is the ground of predestination; and this is fatal to the Calvinistic interpretation of Romans viii.

The truth is that Calvinists overlook the Eternity of God. The time element has no place with God, and this is the reason of his foreknowledge, and not his decrees. Instead of saying, therefore, with Dr. Hodge, that he foreknows because he decrees, we

would say that foreknowledge is the necessary attribute of an Eternal Being. Not to foreknow implies limitation, limitation implies the finite, and the finite can not be God. It is more rational to posit the foreknowledge of God in his eternity than in his decrees. In revealing his will to us, as we can see only from the time stand-point, his decrees rest upon his foreknowledge.

SECTION III.—*Election and the Spirit Baptism.*

This gives us the key to the whole question of election, which is always "*in* Christ."

"According as he hath *chosen us in Him* before the foundation of the world."—Eph. i. 4.

Here the choice is "in Him," not out of or apart from him. But in no sense can it be said of an unrepentant sinner that he is "*in* Christ," so that no such sinner can be among the "chosen." The terms "elect" or "chosen" are never used in the Bible except when believers are addressed, and then of all believers. Every one in Christ is elect. No one is elect out of Christ. These statements are in harmony with Bible teaching.

"Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given to us *in Christ* before the world began."—2 Tim. i. 9.

Here again it is "*in* Christ." The believer's *oneness* with Christ is the foundation of every blessing.

"Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, and to seeds, as of many, but as of *one*, and to thy seed which is Christ."—Gal. iii. 16.

The seed not being plural, the promise is to Christ, and to Christ alone. It is not made to a believer, it is not a promise conditioned upon faith. Consequent upon faith it no doubt is, but not conditioned. Our union with Christ depends upon our faith; but the blessings that he gives to those who are thus united are the manifestation of his love bestowed freely and of grace.

"And *if ye be* Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise."

"If ye be Christ's;" this can not be a sinner, as it is only "*after* ye believed" that the Spirit is given. Without the Spirit a man is "*none of his.*" Christ himself, and Christ alone, is the seed of Abraham. If we are one with him, if we are in him, what he is we are, because of this oneness. Thus, and thus only—as one with him—we become the seed (not seeds) of Abraham. These promises are not made to us on the condition that we have faith, but they become ours in Christ, because they are his. Christ himself is God's elect; the chosen one, chosen before the world was made. So again, if we are *one* with him, we are chosen, we are the elect. We are not elect because of our faith, but we are elect in him; our union with him being the only ground of this election. If Christ's election was unconditional, ours must have the same char-

acter. It is all in him. From this stand-point no man is, in any sense, elect or chosen, who is not a Christian. But, blessed be his name! every man in Christ is elect, and as his election is from eternity, theirs is, also, the moment they share it.

"For as many of you as have been baptized *into* Christ, have *put on* Christ."—Gal. iii. 27.

The blessed Spirit, given to us the moment we believe, baptizes us into Christ; and thus we are baptized into his death and also into his resurrection. Union with Christ is the ground of all our blessings.

By natural birth we are born of Adam; and this old man — born of Adam — is dead. This old man — this dead man — is in no sense elect. It is only the new man—the new creation, born of God —that is alive. This *new* man, "born of the Spirit," is the elect man.

This is the key to the whole subject. A bankrupt race, we have *nothing* of ourselves, or apart from Christ. But when baptized into Christ, we have *all* things in him.

How are we put into Christ?

"For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ."

The last clause is linked with the first. As believers, when we believe, the Spirit is given; we are by this Spirit baptized into Christ, and so put on Christ. Putting on Christ, we become what Christ is. He is a Son, so we become God's sons

in him. It is in harmony with this that Paul writes:

"Because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation *through* sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."—2 Thess. ii. 13.

Election is *through* "sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Sanctification of the Spirit, linking us to Christ and thus imparting the divine nature, so that we can say, "*Now* are we the sons of God." The "belief of the truth," the ground upon which we are thus united to Christ.

We have thus shown the true ground of election. An election that is ours when in Christ. An election that becomes ours the moment we are born again. An election that is entirely of grace.

This is in harmony with God's sovereignty on the one hand, and the freedom of the creature on the other.

Theologically, it is medium ground. It honors the sovereignty of God, without degrading that sovereignty to a strict necessity; as if God could not be sovereign if man were free. On the other hand, it makes provision for the volition of the creature, so that God acts in harmony with man's constitution; and yet it does not give glory to the creature; leaving our blessings as all of grace.

It presents election in such a way that the sinner can not use it as an excuse for his rejection of Christ, and yet it enables the believer to know with a blessed assurance that he is one of the elect.

CHAPTER XII.

DIVINE INFLUENCE.

The difference between the old and new school in the Presbyterian church is in brief this: The old school believe in a limited atonement, that Christ died *only* for the elect, and that those for whom he died, and none others, will be saved, the non-elect being foreordained to be lost.

New school Presbyterians believe that Christ died for all men (but not in the sense advocated in this book), and that all men may be saved if they will believe. But both old and new school teach that, in the application of the atonement, *none will believe* except they be regenerated. Both believe that, in regenerating one and passing by another, God acts sovereignly, electing some to eternal life. The new school, however, deny eternal reprobation, holding that all may come *if they will.*

The Medium Theology differs from both; affirming that faith is the condition of regeneration, and precedes it in every case. Instead of the regeneration producing the faith, the faith is the procuring cause of the regeneration.

This leads to an examination of the whole subject of divine influence as it stands connected with the faith that saves.

Equally with Calvinists, we repudiate the idea of salvation by works, and, equally with them, believe it to be entirely of grace. They, however, by grace mean that it is entirely of God's power, who does the whole work apart from any faith exercised by man, faith being the first exercise of a regenerated, new-born soul.

By grace we understand that salvation is from God, that it is a free gift, irrespective of any *work* or *merit* of the creature. But we do not believe that faith is a work, or in any sense meritorious in itself. Whenever we make a work of our faith, trusting in it rather than in Christ, it becomes a legal faith that can not save. Receiving is not meriting, and faith is receiving. Grace does not exclude the act of faith, but includes it.

"Therefore it is of faith, that it *might be* by grace."—Rom. iv. 16.

"As many as received him, to them gave he *power to become* the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name."—John i. 12.

SECTION I.—*Inability:*

The Calvinistic position as to this is set forth by Dr. A. A. Hodge, clearly and forcibly, as follows:

"The orthodox doctrine does *not* teach, first, that man by the fall has lost any of his constitutional faculties necessary to constitute him a responsible moral agent. These are (*a*) reason, (*b*) conscience, and (*c*) free will. Man possesses all of these in excise. He has power to know the truth; he recognizes and feels moral distinctions and obligations;

his affections and tendencies and habits of action are spontaneous; in all his volitions he chooses and refuses freely as he pleases. Therefore he is responsible. Nor, second, that man has not power to feel and to do many things which are good and amiable, benevolent and just, in the relations he sustains to his fellow-men.

"But the orthodox doctrine *does* teach, first, that the inability of man since the fall concerns things which involve our relation as spiritual beings to God — the apprehension and love of spiritual excellence and action in conformity therewith. These matters are designated in the Confessions 'things of God,' 'things of the Spirit,' 'things which pertain to salvation.' Second, that man since the fall is utterly unable to know, or to feel, or to act in correspondence with these things. A natural man may be *intellectually* illuminated, but he is *spiritually* blind. He may possess natural affections, but his heart is *dead* toward God, and invincibly averse to his person and law. He may obey the letter, but he can not obey in spirit and in truth."

This we may accept as a statement of man's inability, and hence of his need of "divine influence," in order to salvation. Thus far, we are in full accord with him. But Dr. Hodge goes farther, and then we have to part company. He says:

"It is *absolute* in the proper sense of that term. No unregenerate man has power either directly or indirectly to do what is required of him in this respect; nor to change his own nature so as to increase his power; nor to *prepare* himself for grace, nor in *the first instance* to co-operate with grace, until in the act of regeneration God changes his nature and gives him through grace gracious ability to act graciously in constant dependence upon grace."

This conflicts with his statement in the first quotation we made from him, where he distinctly recognizes the possession of the "power" that he here denies, unless he uses the word in a different sense.

We hold that all men have lost the ability to render acceptable service to God. This is the inevitable result of depravity. Depravity must be total, in the sense that it affects *the entire man*, so that his emotions and sensibilities, his thoughts, feelings, affection, judgment, and will are all alike perverted. Thus every act of worship must be affected by this corruption, and, apart from the work of Christ, be utterly unacceptable to God.

Again, a man is utterly unable to regenerate himself. Regeneration is absolutely the work of God.

So far we agree; but when we are told that man can not believe until he is regenerated, we dissent.

Edwards makes a distinction between *natural* and *moral* ability; and while Dr. Hodge objects to it, he has practically made the same distinction in the first extract given above, although he blots it out in the second.

Natural ability means that man has possession of all those faculties necessary to enable him to do the will of God. He possesses affection, and hence the natural ability to love; he has will, and thus the natural ability to choose; and because he has this natural ability he is responsible.

Moral ability is the *disposition* to use these faculties as God demands. This is certainly all that the Bible teaches. We have the power, or ability,

to exercise faith, but we have not the will, or disposition; hence the complaint, "Ye *will not* come."

This is in harmony with our experience. The normal condition of the sinner is one of indifference, if not opposition, to the offer of salvation. While this indifference remains, the sinner never will come to Christ, and never will be saved. This is the result of depravity. If men are saved, provision must be made to remove it. It is for this reason we recognize the necessity for divine influence. But we differ *in toto* from the Calvinist as to the nature of this influence. He maintains that God regenerates, and therefore the man believes. We, that the Holy Spirit *convinces*, thus arousing interest where there was indifference, thus making salvation possible. This work of the Holy Spirit is common to the race, and of such a character that it may be resisted and made of no avail. So we find men urged not to "resist the Holy Ghost." When thus "awakened," men are left to exercise their "natural ability," the powers they already possess, and "trust in Christ," and those who thus trust are regenerated and saved.

God's Spirit acts sovereignly, according to his will, in thus convicting. But God's Spirit *will always act* in answer to prayer, whether of the sinner or of the church.

SECTION II.—*Saving Faith.*

Much of the controversy as to the nature of faith arises from considering the meaning of the word apart from its object.

In the Greek, the noun πίστις (*pistis*), translated "faith," and the verb πιστεύω (*pisteuoo*), translated "believe," are both derived from the verb πειθω (*peithoo*), generally translated "persuade," but sometimes incorrectly "obey." The root meaning is "to persuade," from which we get belief—a firm persuasion—of the truth.

Faith may be defined as "belief of the truth"—"the belief of the testimony"—when the word *has for its object a statement or a fact.*

This faith, or belief, is the direct product of the evidence, and does not depend upon the will. If a man who has a reputation for circulating falsehoods states a fact, we are in doubt as to its reality, because the testimony is insufficient. But if a number of reputable citizens agree in the testimony, all doubt is impossible. This belief is necessitated when the evidence is sufficient, and depends upon the evidence. A man can not be responsible for his belief in this sense of the word. He may be responsible for failure to investigate the evidence, and in that case the refusal to believe is a refusal to investigate. If saving faith was only the "belief of testimony," it could not be properly a subject of command, as it would be entirely a question of the sufficiency of the evidence.

Faith may be defined as confidence, or trust, *when its object is a person.*

The evidence as to a man's character may be such as to inspire confidence, or trust. We then say that we have faith—that is, confidence—in the man.

The New Testament meets us with a person; and

we are commanded to believe, to have faith, in this person. Over one hundred times it is the person that is presented as the object of faith, only twice his work. It is not the belief of certain dogmas or facts, which depends upon evidence, but faith in a person that the Bible demands. This faith can be exercised, whatever the amount of knowledge that is possessed, by the most simple as well as the most profound.

In defining saving faith we need always to remember that in the Greek the preposition εν (*en*) in, is never used; but always εις (*eis*) or επι (*epi*). Even when it says, "Ye believe in God believe also in me," it is not "*in*" in the Greek.

The prepositions used are important factors in determining what that faith is that saves.

Eis denotes "motion toward." It carries the subject toward its object, whether to penetrate, or otherwise, being indicated by the context. It indicates the personal appropriation of Christ. It is the response to the invitation "come," leading the sinner on until he is in Christ.

Epi (upon) denotes the idea of building, resting, or relying, upon Christ.

Yonder is an Israelite, bitten by a serpent. He is told of the brazen serpent set up by divine grace. He believes the fact—believes the testimony—but stays in his tent. That would do him no good. He must go and look. *Eis* indicates this action. It points out that the faith carries us to Christ, that it is therefore active—a living faith. The same thing is taught in Romans x.

"Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How shall they call on him whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?"

This is the divine order. God calls the preacher, who then proclaims the message. The sinner hears, he believes—that is, he believes the facts, believes the testimony. Still he is not saved. Every one in a Christian land has reached this point, has this belief, if he is not an infidel.

He believes in—that is, he believes about—the Lord Jesus. He believes that what the Bible teaches is true. Yet for salvation one step more is needed; he must "call upon the name of the Lord." This does not mean that he must pray, for the word is never used in that sense in the New Testament. The Greek word is ἐπικαλέομαι (*epikaleomai*), and is the word used when Paul says, "I *appeal* unto Cæsar."

Believing all about Christ, we must rely upon him for salvation. We must *appeal* to the name of the Lord.

"Just as I am, without one plea,
But that thy blood was shed for me."

"Nothing in my hand I bring,
Simply to thy cross I cling."

We believe the testimony about the physician, but we receive no benefit until *we put the case into*

his hands. So, as ruined, helpless, lost sinners, we believe the testimony, and coming to the only One who is able to help us, we trust him to do the work. Faith is the committal of the soul and its salvation into the hands of Jesus. As Paul says:

"I know *whom* I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day."—2 Tim. i. 12.

Faith requires action, not passive waiting; and we are held responsible, therefore, to believe; and on the ground of this faith we are saved.

We are commanded to believe, which clearly implies that the act *is ours.* We are condemned for not believing, which could not be if faith had not been possible. If faith be the fruit of regeneration, we can not conceive any just ground of condemnation for unbelief. Faith must, then, be an act of God's, and not the sinner's.

On the other hand, provision must be made to neutralize the indifference and lack of disposition to believe. This is done by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit in conviction. This influence is exerted upon all men, so that all can be saved. This is indicated by the words of the Savior when speaking of the coming of the Holy Ghost.

"And when he is come, he will reprove (convince) the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment."—John xvi. 8.

The "world" includes all. Thus by producing a sense of need, by leading to serious thoughts and

impressions, and by revealing Christ, God's Spiri overcomes the natural indifference of the heart—neutralizes the effect of the depravity for which they are not responsible—leaving men *free* to choose life or death.

The convincing work of the Holy Spirit must not be confounded with *the feeling*, the emotion that it produces. This feeling is the result of his work, and not the work itself, differing in individuals according to their temperament, their surroundings, the influences brought to bear upon them, and the nature of the *methods of work* employed. It is of moment that men should be reminded of this, as too many are waiting for overpowering feelings, and in their absence, soothe conscience with the idea that it is something beyond their control, and they are, therefore, not responsible for immediate action.

It is because of this divine work that we have such texts as—

"No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me *draw* him; and I will raise him up at the last day."

But conviction is not regeneration; this last follows, but never precedes faith. This is shown by the following facts:

First. Life is always conditioned upon faith, never faith upon the life.

"Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life."

"He that believeth on me hath everlasting life."

Calvinism reverses this. As the new birth is the beginning of this life, it must follow the faith upon which it is conditioned.

Second. The Bible declares that without faith no one can have life.

"He that believeth not *shall not* see life."

Unless a man can be regenerated without life, this shows that a man can not be regenerated without faith. To do so God's word would have to be set aside.

Third. The responsibility and condemnation for not believing show that regeneration follows the faith, and that in exercising faith men are free. We know it is said that a man may be justly condemned for his unbelief because he has the *natural* ability to believe, and that God's regenerating one, and not another, does no harm to the last, nor lessens his responsibility.

But in thus reasoning, it is forgotten that men are born depraved; *without any choice of their own;* and that they are not responsible for the depraved nature and its dispositions.

Then the provision made is for fallen men; for men known to be depraved when the provision was made; and the condemnation is for rejection under such surroundings as these. Unless there be a *real* provision, one made in good faith, one that was within the reach of those who reject it, condemnation for unbelief would be unjust.

We come into being without any volition of our own; we are born depraved without any wrong for

which we are personally responsible, and can never believe it would be right that we should be consigned to endless despair infallibly, and apart from any choice that we may make.

The terrible inheritance of corruption can never be reconciled with the goodness of God only as provision is made, as wide as the race, for its removal and man's salvation.

That fallen men are justly condemned for their sins is true; but only because they have been free not to do the wrong. If the sin had been necessitated by the evil nature, punishment would be unjust. To add to this other punishment because of the rejection of a remedy, if in its rejection they had no *real* choice, would be unjust; as it would make that which was intended as a blessing to the saved, a curse to the unsaved; without any possibility of avoidance on their part.

To argue the right of God to choose some and pass by others, is one thing; to condemn those passed by for being so, is quite another.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE NEW BIRTH.

The theory of regeneration presented in these pages is the logical sequence of the Medium Theory of the Atonement, and inseparable from it. The key is found in John iii.

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

Nicodemus, a Jewish teacher, came to Jesus by night as an earnest inquirer after truth. He is met with the startling statement—

"Except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God."

Although a religious teacher, he is entirely ignorant of the great truth, found everywhere in the Old Testament, of a spiritual birth. Zealous of circumcision, he knew nothing of that circumcision of the heart that the Old Testament writers proclaimed, and seems to have overlooked the need for a change of heart, as set forth by Ezekiel and others. The words of the Savior are unmeaning to him, and thinking only of a literal birth, he says:

"How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born?"

To understand the words of the Savior that follow, we must remember that Jesus is explaining his words in the third verse, and explaining with *special reference* to the difficulty of a material birth in the mind of Nicodemus. "How can a man be born when he is old?" This shows what was in the mind, and what Jesus had to remove by his explanation. To utterly ignore this is to fail to comprehend the entire argument. What does Jesus mean by saying, "Except a man be born again he can not *see* the kingdom of God?" Why, that a man must be spiritually enlightened by the new birth, to see the kingdom. The Jewish teacher had evidently been intellectually convinced that Jesus came from God. To see more, he must be born again, the things of God being spiritually discerned. All this, however, is a blank to Nicodemus; this is seen by his second question. So Jesus says:

"Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he can not enter the kingdom of God."

It is as if Jesus had said, a man must be born in the way you are thinking of—literally and corporeally—*by means of water*, and also in another and a totally different way—by means of the Holy Spirit. Two births and only two—one literal, by means of water; the other spiritual, by means of the Spirit. Then, further carrying out the ideas, he adds, that which is born of flesh—born of water—is flesh, etc.

The early identification of Spirit and water bap-

tism as one led to this, and other texts, being applied to baptism, *because they taught a spiritual birth.* Commentators, following in each other's track, have, therefore, largely regarded this verse as referring to water baptism, making two births where the early writers made but one.

While the words "born of water" express a physiological fact, that a natural birth is impossible except it be "by water," the very birth that was in the mind of Nicodemus; we believe they were used by the Savior to point out another truth beyond this.

Water, when used figuratively, always represents *the word*, as connected with the work of the Holy Spirit. "Living water," more, the Spirit; but always as connected with the word. (John vii. 37, 38.)

"Ye are clean through the word which I have spoken."—John xv. 3.

Thus the living water of the fourth chapter is a presentation to the woman of the same truth Christ gives to Nicodemus. So we find the same dullness of spiritual apprehension, the same ultimate presentation of himself as the object of faith. This figurative use of water was no doubt intended by the Savior; for we find Peter bringing the word and the flesh into contrast, just as Christ does the flesh and the Spirit.

That this new birth is not baptism is seen from the words:

"Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will

of the flesh, nor of *the will of man*, but of God."—John i. 13.

Baptism is pre-eminently of the "will of man," and depends upon that will for its accomplishment.

SECTION I.—*That which is born of the flesh is flesh.*

This is the sinful nature, or depravity, which comes by natural birth. This inherited sinful nature meets us in every part of the Bible.

"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?"—Job xiv. 4.

"How then can man be justified with God? or how can he be clean that is born of a woman?"—Job xxv. 4.

Verses might be multiplied showing that the Bible fully and constantly teaches the inheritance of a sinful nature. It was for this reason we find so large a part of the books of Moses occupied with those ceremonies that stood connected with the birth of a child, all, like those in the twelfth of Leviticus, proclaiming that man is by birth sinful. This sinful nature is called, in the Bible, by several names, thus:

First. Sin, in distinction to sins. Not that sin in the singular number always refers to the nature, but that the nature is so called. In the first Epistle of John, verse 8 of the first chapter refers to the nature, and verse 10 to sin as a transgression.

"No more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me."—Rom. vii. 21.

This must mean sin as nature, as transgression is something *done*, not something *within*.

Second. It is called *the flesh*.

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh."—John iii. 6.

"They that are in the flesh can not please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you."—Rom. viii. 9.

As Paul is writing to living men, who were in the body, "flesh" can not mean the body, and therefore must refer to the nature.

Third. It is called the old man.

"That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man."—Eph. iv. 22, etc.

The Bible teaches that the evil nature can not be changed, mended, or improved. Spirit is not flesh transformed into spirit. The idea of the flesh being changed is unknown to the Scriptures. It is "mortified," never "sanctified." The Bible teaches its utter ruin and hopeless condition.

"Because the mind of the flesh is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, *neither indeed can be*."—Rom. viii. 7.

"Flesh" and "carnal" translate the same Greek word, so we have used the marginal translation. "The carnal mind," the mind of this old man, is not subject to the law of God. Then with an emphasis that ought to settle the whole question, he adds, "*neither indeed can be*."

SECTION II.—*That which is born of the Spirit is spirit.*

Just as by natural birth a man inherits a sinful nature, so in the new birth he has *created* in him a new nature. Not a new faculty, or organ, but a new *nature.* How, will be shown presently.

"If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature" (Greek κτίσις, creation).—2 Cor. v. 17.

"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new *creation* (κτίσις)."—Gal. vi. 15.

Just as the old nature has its distinctive names, so this new creation, or new nature, has also.

First. It is called eternal life. Eternal life is presented under various aspects in the Bible. Thus Christ himself is *the* eternal life (1 John i. 2; v. 20, etc). It is eternal life we enter upon at death. So, also, the motions, emotions, and activities of the Christian—the new nature—is eternal life.

"He that believeth on me hath everlasting life."—John vi. 47.

Second. It is called Spirit.

"That which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

Third. It is called the "new man."

"That ye put on the *new man*, which after God is *created* in righteousness and true holiness."—Eph. iv. 24.

"And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him."—Col. iii. 10.

This new nature is created in the believer by the power of the Holy Spirit (John i. 13). As the "old man" can not be subject to the law of God, so this new man never sins.

"Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him and he *can not sin*, because he is born of God."—1 John iii. 9.

"Whosoever" means every one, so that what is here said is true of every Christian, and not of a special class. Of course, this does not mean that Christians, as such, do not sin; for such testimony has never been given of any one by *his fellow-men*, who are the only competent witnesses. Sin and death are joined together, and a sinless man could never die. "This do and *thou shalt live*," would forever keep him upon the earth, unless God took him, as he did the prophet of fire, in a chariot of fire: A man's own testimony is, of course, only a piece of conceit and valueless as testimony. A man may tell of his experience, feelings, or belief, but any claim as to a sinless life is of no value; that testimony must come from others, and has *never been given.* Hence, John's words have a special force and application.

"If *we say* we have no sin, we deceive *ourselves.*"

We do not deceive God, nor our neighbors; but we do deceive—and wofully—ourselves.

To understand John, we must remember that the old man, while *alive in our experience*, is looked upon as dead by the Lord.

To illustrate: During the Franco-Prussian war, a man was drafted for the army. A friend offered to go in his stead. Having a family to support, he accepted the offer. In the first battle this friend was shot and killed. Soon after the same man was drafted again; but instead of going, or sending another substitute, he wrote to the officials, "I am dead; I have lost my life in the service of my country; she has no further claim upon me." It was decided to be a valid plea. He had died in the person of his substitute, who, in the eyes of the law, stood in his place; so that what was done by the substitute was done by him legally. Just so is it with the believer; as Christ takes his place and dies for him, he can say with Paul,

"I was (Greek is in aorist tense) crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I (the old man) but Christ (the new man) liveth in me."—Gal. ii. 20.

"Ye *are dead*, and your life is hid with Christ in God."—Col. iii. 3.

As the old man is looked upon as dead—"dead with Christ"—it is only the new man of whom John is speaking, and this new man—"born of God," not of Adam—*does not*, and *can not* sin.

More, as still further carrying out this idea. As by natural birth we are united to Adam, and by spiritual birth to Christ, the union with the old Adam nature is not broken until death; hence, we are not fully brought into the son's place until the resurrection.

"Waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body."

SECTION III.—*The two natures in conflict.*

By natural birth we are born of Adam, inheriting the Adam nature—"that which is born of the flesh is flesh." By spiritual birth we are born of God, being made partakers of the divine nature, by our union with Christ—"that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." The result is that we have both the Adam and the Christ nature in us as believers. One sinful, the other sinless; one fallen and depraved, the other holy and impeccable. Between these two natures there is conflict—the warfare of the Christian life.

"The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye can not do the things that ye would."—Gal. v. 17.

We have another strong picture of this conflict in Romans vii.

Before we consider it, it may be said that while it is the experience of a saved man, it is not *true* Christian experience. It is a believer, with the two natures in conflict, but without knowing experimentally the "deliverance" of which Paul speaks.

There are two features to this deliverance.

First. In the seventh, it is a man groaning under *law;* in the eighth, it is a man "groaning" still, but under *grace.*

This groaning under law is the result of not seeing the true relation of the believer to the law. This, again, comes from a failure to distinguish the dispensational character of *the law.*

Some theologians distinguish between what they call the moral and the ceremonial law. But the Bible never so discriminates. It is a pure invention. It was one law—*the* law—with its moral precepts and ceremonial requirements.

From Adam to Moses men were without law—the law of which Paul was speaking—but they were not without moral precepts. The difficulties come from giving to the law a meaning and an application it was never intended to have.

Moral precepts are the same in every age, under law, or "*without law.*" Right and wrong are eternal and unchangeable; and being "without law," gave no liberty to steal; so, being "free from the law" does not mean license.

All Christians agree that we are not "justified by the deeds of the law;" but, if we are under law, we can be justified only by the law. It is only because we are "dead with Christ," and hence, "dead to the law," that salvation is possible on any other ground. (See Rom. vii. 1–4.)

"Ye are not under law, but under grace."—Rom. vi. 7.

"Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."—Rom. x. 4.

Many theologians teach that while we are free from the law in part, so that it is not the ground

upon which we are to be justified, it is still the believer's *rule of life.* But this is logically untenable. The law threatens certain penalties for disobedience. What of these? To say that we are free from its curse, free from its penalties, but not free from its rule, is a contradiction.

The strongest passage quoted by those who teach that the law is a rule of life, is Matt. v. 17–19:

"Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven," etc.

This is from the Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus is unfolding the true meaning and requirements of *the law.* It is addressed to Jews, while *the dispensation of law was still in force.* This sermon does not touch the question of grace at all. It says nothing of the blood, of faith, or of the gospel. In the words quoted above, Jesus is teaching what a legal righteousness means, and in the application says:

"Except *your righteousness* shall exceed," etc.—Matt. v. 19, 20.

The law stands forever, hence we must die to be delivered from it; but when by death we are thus free, it is no longer a rule of life, it no longer curses.

If the law is not our rule of life, what is? Thank God! the Bible answer is full and complete. Of the scores of texts, take the following, which need no comment:

"To me to live is *Christ*."—Phil. i. 21.

"Be ye, therefore, *followers of God*, as dear children."—Eph. v. 1.

"Ought himself also so to walk, *even as he walked*."—1 John ii. 6.

"Purifieth himself, *even as he is pure*."—1 John iii. 3.

"If any man serve me, let him *follow me*."—John xii. 26.

"Leaving us an example, that ye should *follow his steps*."—1 Peter ii. 22.

"As many as walk *according to this rule*."—Gal. vi. 15, 16.

These scriptures might be multiplied, it being the one consistent testimony of the New Testament that Christ himself, and not the law, is the believer's rule of life by which his *walk* is to be ordered.

What advantage is there in this?

(*a*) It gives a higher standard because the requirements of grace are more than those of law.

(*b*) It gives a living model in the place of a dead rule.

(*c*) It delivers from the terrors inseparable from law.

(*d*) It fixes the eye upon Christ, taking it from the law and from self.

"But," says an objector, "if we are not under the law as a rule of life, then we are not prohibited from stealing."

We ask in reply, did Christ steal? If not, as he is our rule, then we can not steal.

The law was given at Sinai, amid thunder and lightning, voices, fire, clouds, and earthquakes. The terror is inseparable from the law; and it is only when we realize full deliverance that we lose our fears. We must get out from under old Sinai's frowning shadow, and then we can enter into the first element of deliverance—the "no condemnation to them that are in Christ."

Second. The next element of deliverance is found in the words—

"The law of the Spirit *of life in Christ Jesus*, hath set me *free* from the *law* of sin and death."

We need to examine this closely, so as to guard against a false interpretation. There is a real deliverance taught here, but this has been so distorted that it has done more than any thing else to prejudice people against the truth itself.

Does the Bible teach that this old nature is ever destroyed or made holy during the life of the believer? Most certainly not. The flesh is never sanctified, but always needs to be mortified. If the flesh was destroyed, men would not *die*, and sin would be eternally impossible; but many of those who profess sanctification backslide, showing that the flesh is still there.

On the other hand, are we to be always in the

condition indicated in Romans vii.? Is the old man to be continually controlling? By no means. We may have present freedom from the *dominion* of sin, though not from its presence. "Free" does not mean "exempt from," as if the old man had been destroyed, but free, in opposition to bondage—the bondage indicated in Romans vii.

Let our readers underline the words "I," "me," and "my," in the last half of the seventh chapter, and he will not find it hard to see how a man obtains deliverance. The regenerate man is in himself just as weak as the unregenerate. Hence, we have in the seventh the *will* right, but *power* lacking. In the eighth this power is found, and deliverance obtained.

A man, after conversion, resolves to do better, to live right, and makes an honest effort to do so, but he finds that his resolutions are just as worthless as ever. His trouble is that he has not realized his weakness; that "without me ye can no nothing." When this is realized, he looks out of himself for power, and finds this in the indwelling Spirit. When by faith he relies upon this Spirit—walks in the Spirit—deliverance is found; power, not his own, but Christ's, sets him free from the law of sin.

Keeping this in mind, let us examine Rom. vii. as to the conflict of the two natures.

"For I know that in me—that is, *in my flesh*—there dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not . . . . now if I do that I would not it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me."

Here Paul attributes failure to the old man—the flesh—that still dwells in him.

Then he shows the conflict.

"I delight in the law of God after the *inward man.*"

The new man, the sinless man, is all right, and *delights* in the law of God, but—

"I see *another* law in my members (the flesh) warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the *law of sin* which is in *my members.*"

"So then with the mind *I myself* serve the law of God; but with *the flesh* the law of sin."

In the beginning he identifies himself with the old man ("in *me*—that is, in *my flesh*"). In the close he links himself with the new man ("I myself, ... but with the flesh"). Another key to the deliverance itself.

SECTION IV.—*The Nature of the Change.*

The verses just examined help us to understand the nature of the change—"the law of sin which is *in my members.*"

All through the Bible man is represented as a triune being, possessing body, soul, and spirit.

"Your whole spirit, and soul, and body."—1 Thess. v. 23.

This gives us the distinction between man and the brute. An animal, according to the Scriptures, has a soul (not soul in the popular sense, not an

immortal soul, but a soul in the Bible sense of that word).

"Every creature in which there *is life.*"—Gen. i. 30.

This is, in the Hebrew, "living soul." This, with other texts, plainly affirms the possession of a soul—a *nephesh*—by the animal. It never affirms that it has a spirit. Ecclesiastes iii. 21, may seem an exception, but is not really so. The book is man's voice, not God's. It is an *inspired* picture of what Solomon's "wisdom" taught him, but it is not a revelation from God (see i. 17). In Ecclesiastes spirit is used in its primary sense of *breath.*

A plant has *life;* but in harmony with the law of the Conditioned, an animal has all that the plant has, and something added. What is this? The Bible answers, *a soul.* The instinct, intelligence, memory, affection, and will of the brute, is certainly not the result of its material organization, however intimate the connection of the body with their expression. They are the phenomena of soul. Man has all that the brute has, and something added. What is this? *An immortal spirit.*

The soul is the seat of the affections, appetites, and desires. The spirit, of the judgment and reason. This last the brute has not.

In the fall, every part of the man became depraved. Hence, the body became "corrupt," the soul "sensual," the spirit "devilish."

Man has been likened to the old tabernacle. The body the outer court, the soul the holy place, the

spirit the holy of holies. It was in this holiest—that in the tabernacle, God had his dwelling place; and in the holiest in man, God ought to dwell. As the sad result of the fall, God was dethroned, and the devil usurped his place. Reigning there, he blinds the mind, darkens the understanding, and, as the God of this world, leads men captive at his will. For this reason the unsaved man is a "child of the devil," while his spirit is defiled, polluted,—"devilish."

In regeneration there is no change in the body or the soul (these combined form the flesh), it being the spirit that is quickened. The unclean spirit goes out of the man. This alone, however, does not save. God's Spirit enters, so that God has resumed his place in the inner holy, dwelling there as the abiding Comforter.

In the new birth, the spirit is regenerated and made as pure as God is pure, the very moment the man believes. But the body is unchanged; hence, "the law of sin" is in "my members."

We know the intimate connection between a man's body and his desires, lusts, etc. The body being unchanged, these remain, even in the believer; he is a "man of like passions" as others. Not only natural, but acquired appetite remains. Take, for example, intemperance — the appetite that controls so many. Drunkenness is as much a physical disease as consumption, and the diseased organs remain diseased after conversion, so that the appetite is there. Grace, by "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ," gives *power* to overcome, when this

is relied upon by faith, so that none need fall. But the appetite being there, where there is self-reliance the man *may* fall, even after being regenerated. Hence, Paul says:

"I keep under *my body* and bring it into subjection."

"Mortify *your members* which are upon the earth."

This conflict endures during life. If we *feed* the "old man," it becomes strong *in our experience*, and our religious life is feeble. To starve the old, and feed the new, is the secret of all Christian living. To neglect the new, and live only to gratify the old, is the way to failure and shame.

It is plain that fitness for heaven can only come by full deliverance from sin; hence, we must get rid of the flesh; and so Paul points to the "redemption of the body" as the final work that brings fully into the Son's place by destroying the flesh.

At death, the spirit being pure, being the temple of the Holy Ghost, goes at once to be with Christ. In the resurrection, the power of this Spirit extends to the body, which is "changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Then, a redeemed spirit united to a redeemed body, the last vestige of sin will be forever swept away; and redeemed, delivered, saved *from sin* as well as from its curse, we will be presented "faultless" before the presence of his glory.

Any scheme of salvation which does not make

provision for deliverance from sin as well as its curse, falls short of God's thought and God's plan.

Redemption from the curse of the law, through the death and sufferings of Jesus. Redemption from the power of the devil, when he is driven out from the temple, and God's Spirit and God's glory fill the house. Redemption from sin by the work of the Spirit *in* us and the intercession of Jesus *for* us. And final, full, complete deliverance, in the redemption of the body.

CHAPTER XIV.

FEET WASHING.

All through the Bible runs the "scarlet line," but side by side with the truth as to the blood, we find the water. The one is as important as the other; but, alas! the water has been sadly misplaced in the teaching of Christendom, and confusion has come in, to the ruin of souls and to the discouragement of believers.

SECTION I. — "*That he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word.*" —Eph. v. 26.

This gives us a key to unfold the spiritual meaning of the water.

Remember, it is the church, not the sinner, that is thus cleansed, that it may be presented a glorious church without "spot or wrinkle." It stands, then, as God's provision for the cleansing of the church, being connected with the great truth of our redemption *from sin.*

The verse literally reads, "with the *laver* of water *in* the word" (*τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι*). It being *λουτρον* (*loutron*), and not *λουω* (*louoo*), it is, as we have given it, a laver or bath. Of what laver is he here speaking? We find but one in the

Scriptures, that which stood in the court of the tabernacle, and in which the feet of the priests were washed *every time* they went into the Holy Place.

Entering the court of the tabernacle, the inclosure within which stood the tabernacle proper, the first thing encountered was the "brazen altar." Here the sacrifice was offered, here the burnt-offering was burnt, here we meet with the blood that was shed for the remission of sins. At the altar the question of sin was settled, and atonement was made. Passing by the altar, the next thing encountered was the laver with its water.

At the altar we have the blood making atonement; at the laver, water for the cleansing *of the feet.* Paul says, this laver is now "*in* the word," water being a symbol of the word. What was done in the type by the water, is done spiritually by the word in the antitype.

SECTION II.—*The thirteenth chapter of John.*

The place of this scripture in the teaching of the New Testament has been largely overlooked. We read that Jesus—

"Poured water into a basin, and began to wash the disciples' feet."

This was a common act of hospitality, done usually by a servant. Where sandals were worn, the feet became hot and dusty in traveling, so that washing the feet was simply ministering to the comfort of the guest. So common was it, that the

Pharisee was justly reproached for neglecting it, when the woman supplied his lack of service by her tears.

"Then cometh he to Simon Peter; and Peter saith unto him, Lord, dost thou wash my feet?"

It was a matter of astonishment to Peter that the Lord Jesus should take a servant's place and come to minister to his necessity. It was something he could not understand.

"Jesus answered and said unto him, What I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter."

This answer of the Lord Jesus merits close inspection. If it was to teach a lesson of humility to his disciples, Peter could, and did, understand it. If it was simply the local custom, or the institution of an ordinance, Peter could, and would, have understood. The Savior's words imply a spiritual meaning, not discerned by Peter at the time. On the day of Pentecost, when they should all be "filled with the Holy Spirit," all things would be brought to their minds; and then, with minds spiritually illumined, the meaning would be understood. Peter, with characteristic impulsiveness, says:

"Thou shalt never wash *my* feet."

Like many a Christian to-day, Peter has no thought of the Lord's will, but simply what he himself thinks is right. Jesus answers him:

"If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me."

Notice this language. Whatever the spiritual import of the washing, Peter's part with Christ depended upon its being done. Not his part *in* Christ, but "*with*." The Greek preposition here used implies fellowship, association.

The believer's part *in* Christ—in the benefits of this great atoning sacrifice—depends upon his faith. His part *with* Christ—his fellowship, communion, religious joy—depends upon his obedience. This he may lose at any time. Salvation, and the joy of salvation, are separate and distinct from each other. The one depends upon the faithfulness of Christ, the other upon our own faithfulness. Thus we may lose the one without losing the other. David prays, "restore unto me"—not my salvation, he had not lost that—but the "joy of my salvation."

To maintain our part *with* Christ, we must let him wash our feet—that is, our *walk*, our life, our ways.

Peter, like many a Christian to-day, wants to go to the other extreme:

"Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head."

This coming to be washed all over again—to be reconverted—is to ignore what has been done already, and thus to undervalue Christ's work, and cast a doubt upon its efficiency. It also is a failure to appreciate the nature of the need—why the feet must be washed. Jesus answers:

"He that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit; and ye are clean,

but not all. For he knew who should betray him; therefore said he, ye are not all clean."

This does not mean that Judas was unclean physically, but that he was not regenerated—not spiritually clean. This is the only exposition that gives any force to the "therefore." The betrayal of Christ could only be evidence of spiritual uncleanness.

The illustration is a simple one. "He that is *bathed.*" On the way from the bath to the house, a man would soil his feet through contact with the earth. He would not return to bathe again; that would keep him all the time going to and fro. No, he "*needeth not* save to wash his feet." And even when he needs to have his feet washed, he is still "*clean every whit.*" What a precious thought to the believer. Amid all our failures and short-comings, whatever our actual condition, we are *in Christ*—not in ourselves—"clean every whit."

We must remember that there is a difference between our standing and state.

Our *standing* is what we are in Christ, what the work of the Lord Jesus has made us in God's sight —"clean every whit."

Our *state* is what we are in our *actual experience* as individuals. In this life, because of the workings of the "flesh," our standing and state do not correspond, but after the redemption of the body they will. For this reason, because we find sin in heart and life, while clean every whit, we need to have our feet, our *walk*, cleansed from the daily sin and uncleanness.

Notice this lan... ATONEMENT
import of the w... "every whit"—that is, our standing, the
pended upon ... cleansing by means of the blood.
Christ, but ... the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us
used im... from all sin."

The ... There is no modification of that word "*all.*"
this ... And, thank God, it is true of *all believers*, and *al-*
fr... ways true. Some of the advocates of the *dogma* of
sinless perfection give to this verse a meaning that
robs believers of their birthright, and forces it into
conflict with what follows.

They make it a cleansing from "inbred corruption," so that they reach a state in which they never sin. This confounds what Christ does *for* us, with what the Spirit does *in* us, hence, there is utter failure to understand what is meant by cleansing with, or by, the blood. The blood was shed to atone for sin *actually* committed; it was the meeting of the claims of God against us. This blood was not applied to the people, but presented to God; and on the ground of the value of that blood, sin is remitted, blotted out, removed as far as the east from the west. The blood covers—hides—the sin, so that we are, in God's sight, "clean every whit." The cleansing is in the *sight of the Lord* judicial—and not that we are clean *in ourselves*, for the next verse says:

"If we say we *have no sin*, we deceive ourselves."

The tense shows that the cleansing is a perfected one, and always and at all times true of the believer. "From all sin"—that is, from *every sin of*

the entire life. If there is one sin Christ did not atone for, either Christ must die again or the soul must be lost.

The work of the blood is never repeated; it is done "once for all."

"The worshipers *once* purged should have *no more* conscience of sins."

"By the which will we *are* sanctified *through* the offering of the body of Jesus Christ *once for all.*"

"For by one offering *he hath* perfected *forever* them that are sanctified."—Heb. x. 14.

The whole argument of Hebrews x. is the perfection of the cleansing, in opposition to the imperfect cleansing of Judaism.

Believers ought never to lose sight of this truth. At all times, under every circumstance, whatever the character of the life or of the feelings, it is always true of the believer that he is "clean every whit." Even when we are the most out of communion, and spiritual declension has brought "leanness" to the soul, it is still true that we are "clean every whit." There ought to be no sin on *the conscience*, because that the worshipers *once purged* should have *no more* conscience of sins.

But while there is no sin *on* the conscience, while we are "clean every whit," while the blood perfectly cleanses, there is sin *in the flesh.* For this reason we need to have our feet—our walk, our life—cleansed from this sin.

"*Every* branch in me that beareth fruit, he

purgeth (cleanseth) it that it may bring forth more fruit."—John xv. 3.

How is this cleansing accomplished?

"Ye are clean through the word."

"Wherewithal shall a young man cleanse his way (feet), by taking heed thereto, according to thy word."—Ps. cxix. 9.

"Sanctify them through thy word."—John xvii. 17.

This cleansing by the word is constant. How does Jesus wash his disciples' feet? Here is a young convert; in the ardor of his first love he says, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" The Lord places the Bible in his hands, as "the man of his counsel," the guide of his life. He begins to study the Scriptures; as he reads, he sees that his life is not in harmony with this or that precept. The moment he discerns this, or has it impressed upon his conscience—as he thus sees the wrong in his life—it is Christ coming to wash his feet. If he lets Christ wash his feet (his walk) by putting away the wrong—by yielding obedience to the truth—his part *with* Christ remains. But if he fails to obey, fails to do what the word requires—refuses to let Christ wash his feet—his part with Christ is lost, the joy of his salvation is gone.

SECTION III.—*Confession.*

But perhaps many are asking, if a believer loses his part *with Christ*, how is he to be restored? In reply, we say that God's remedy is *confession.*

"If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness."—1 John i. 9.

There is a great difference between praying for forgiveness and confessing the sin. Of course prayer may carry with it confession, and so amount to the same thing; but confession is the remedy. But why confession? Because it is the true expression of that state which God requires. It is as sons that the Father's face is hidden from us, and communion interrupted. It is much harder for a child to confess a wrong than to ask forgiveness. To ask forgiveness does not always imply a just appreciation of the wrong, and simply shows sorrow for the loss of communion and a desire for its restoration. Confession goes beyond this. The essence of confession is the *self-judgment* that it necessitates. We must see it to be a sin, drag it into the light and judge it as a sin, before we confess it. Confession involves self-judgment, and this is God's remedy where communion has been lost.

Reader, are you in the gloom, living without spiritual joy? Then the moment the sin is confessed that brought the cloud between you and the Father, that moment the intercession of Jesus avails, and all is forgiven. The hand of love brushes away the clouds.

As Christ washes our feet, so we ought to wash one another's.

"If any man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such a one in the spirit of

meekness, considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted."—Gal. vi. 1.

If we see wrong in a brother, the law of Christ obligates us to wash his feet. We must not come in the spirit of censure, but of love. Neither must we wash his feet with *our opinions*, but with the word. Our opinions may be wrong; we have no right to judge another by these. We must bring the word to bear, and if this is plain, and we do it in love, it will do its work.

If he lets us wash his feet, we are drawn close to each other; but if he refuses, a cloud comes between *us*, and fellowship is interrupted.

Then, confession alone can restore the fellowship.

May we be found ever washing each other's feet; but above all, willing and eager to have Christ wash our feet, that we may not only have part in him, but always, and at all times, an unclouded part *with* him.

CHAPTER XV.

SONSHIP.

In this part of our book we are discussing the application of the atonement. This embraces more than the extent. Hence, it will be in place to consider the question of Sonship, in its bearing upon the salvation of the soul, and standing of the Christian.

SECTION I.—*Who are Sons?*

It is not a Bible thought that God is the Father of all men, and therefore that all men are brethren. An unconverted man is never, in any sense, God's son. It is strange, when we remember what the relation implies, that this truth is not more generally understood.

The only text that can be quoted as teaching the sonship of a sinner is Acts xvii. 28. But here, Paul is quoting from *a heathen poet*, not to prove the Fatherhood of God, but as an argument drawn from their own writings to enforce the personality and spirituality of God.

For an unconverted man to look up and say, "My Father," is to claim a relationship to which he has no title.

When the Jews came to Jesus upon one occasion, they said:

"We have one Father, even God."—John viii. 41.

Did Jesus recognize the relationship? No; for he at once repudiates it—

"If God *were* your Father, ye would love me; . . . . ye are of your father, the devil."

He thus assigns them a different paternity. Sonship is one of the distinctive blessings that come to us through Christ.

"When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that are under the law, *that we might receive* the adoption of sons."—Gal. iv. 4, 5.

"The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God."—Rom. viii. 16.

The Spirit does not bear witness with the spirit of the sinner, that *he is a son.*

Many "isms" build their arguments upon the universal Fatherhood of God. These arguments are of no force in the face of the fact that a sinner is not a son. But John certainly places the whole matter beyond dispute, so far as the Bible may be proof, when he says:

"In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil."—1 John iii. 10.

He here divides men into *two* classes, only one of which are God's children. We repeat it, therefore, with emphasis, the Bible does not teach that the sinner is a son.

Let us try and see the force and beauty of this relationship, and the privileges it carries with it. And while we endeavor thus to do, may the Holy Spirit illuminate our understanding, that we may see the wondrous glory, the inestimable blessing of sonship. In Paul's writings a son is contrasted with a servant, and this contrast helps to bring out the value of sonship.

SECTION II.—*Sonship is an eternal relation, a Servant's is temporary.*

"The servant abideth not in the house forever: but the Son abideth ever."—John viii. 35.

Servants may come and go, but the son remains. A servant may cease to be a servant, but a son can not give up his sonship. "Once a son always a son." Being born, we can not be unborn; and as the relationship is founded, not upon the service rendered, but upon the *birth*, it can not be dissolved. It is permanent, inalienable; "the son abideth ever." A boy may be a disobedient son, he is still a son. Being sick does not change a sheep into a goat. Being willful does not change a son into a servant, or cause the relationship to cease.

"Once a son always a son." Nothing can change this or altar it. How different with a servant! When he ceases to be of service, or to render a return for his wages, he can be dismissed at the will of his master at any time. There is no such permanency in the relation, that it can not be broken. But, we are "no more servants, but sons."

SECTION III.—*The Son enjoys his place and privileges in the Father's house because of his birth; a Servant because of his service.*

It is because we have been born again, that we enjoy the blessings of the gospel. It is not on the ground of any merit in us, or of any good that we do, in whole *or in part*, that we have "a title clear to mansions in the skies." Neither is it because we have been faithful that we enter heaven at last. On any such ground, none of us could be saved. It is simply because of union with Christ, because born again, that they are ours.

When God appeared unto Moses in the burning bush, he told him to put *off his shoes;* but when the prodigal comes home, the first thing is *to put shoes on* his feet. Why? In oriental countries a servant must remove his shoes when coming into the presence of his master; so that Moses, the representative of law, puts off his shoes. The law gives us a servant's place, making our blessing conditional upon our obedience—the reward for service rendered. But grace brings into a son's place; so that while the law puts off the shoes, grace *puts them on.*

A son is properly required to be obedient; but he is a son, not because of this obedience, but because of his birth. He is obedient because he is a son, living in the enjoyment of the blessings that a loving father constantly bestows. How important to our peace to remember this!

If obedience be a condition of salvation, none

can be saved; for all fail in their obedience. If a condition, the least failure forfeits the title, as there is no yielding in a condition. In case of failure, we are left without hope, because the blood can not avail. If the blood avails, then the obedience ceases to be a condition. A condition is something that *must* be complied with to secure the salvation; and failure works ruin to the soul. But all *have* failed; so that if obedience is the condition of salvation, all are lost.

Obedience as a condition of salvation, the Bible never teaches, but obedience as *the evidence and fruit* of the faith, the Bible always proclaims. There may be degrees in fruit, but no such degrees are possible in a condition.

How strange that men do not see that it is not because we are faithful, but because of the efficacy of Christ's work, that we are saved! As none are faithful, all being "unprofitable servants," on any such ground how could we have peace in believing, or enjoy the assurance of faith? The word does not say, Believe, and if you prove faithful you shall be saved. But, "Believe, and *thou shalt* be saved." No perhaps, but a blessed certainty! For one to believe and be lost would be for God's word to prove untrue. No! In all the songs of the redeemed in glory, not one is singing "worthy am I," but "worthy the Lamb!" *All* the glory being ascribed to him.

A son is required to be obedient; and his favor with the father, his influence in the family and with the neighbors, his own happiness and rewards, all

depend upon that obedience. Still, this does not make him a son, that comes from his birth alone.

Men seem to think that unless heaven is the prize of obedience, there is no motive to right living. As a dear brother said recently, "If a man is saved once for all, then he can do as he pleases; live whatever kind of life he wishes." Our reply was, "Most certainly, he is left to the enjoyment of Christian liberty; but you mistake in supposing he will *please* to do wrong. That would be to make the new birth of no value, and to ignore the grandest motives in the world."

If one truth is more emphatic than another, it is that the tree must be *made good* to produce good fruit. But after the tree has been made good, the good fruit is the inevitable result. If a man is born again, the tree has been made good; and the good fruit follows. To believe that a child of God will freely and voluntarily choose an evil life, is a dishonor to Christ's work, making it of no value. If his affection and will have been changed, so that he is a new creature, the certain result will be good fruit.

"Hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments."—1 John ii. 3.

"As many as are *led by* the Spirit of God, *they* are the sons of God."—Rom. viii. 14.

So *certain* is this, that to do otherwise is an evidence of an unregenerate heart.

"They went out from us, but they *were not of us*, for if they had been of us *they would* no doubt have continued with us."—1 John ii. 19.

The words "no doubt" are supplied by the translators. The original reads, "they would have continued."

It is for this cause that obedience, being the fruit of the faith, is an evidence of sonship.

He can do as he pleases, so far as his title to salvation is concerned, that is true; but he will please to do his Master's will.

"If a man love me he will keep my words."—John xiv. 23.

Not he *must*, but he *will*.

Then again, this objection ignores the strongest of all motives. The gospel appeals to love as the motive to obedience.

A man has a mortgage on another man's property. He requires this man to do something, and threatens, in case of failure, to foreclose the mortgage. The man being thus in his power, may do what is required of him; but he acts reluctantly, his *heart is not in the service*. So, if we obey simply to escape the consequences of our sins, it is only formal; the heart is not enlisted, and God, who desires heart service, sees no value in it.

Again, a man offers a certain sum of money for a service he desires. Here the service is rendered, not from love, but for gain. A servant gives no more, as a rule. This is not the obedience that God desires.

But here is a man who saved the life of another, and in so doing lost an arm. He desires a service; and as the man looks at the armless sleeve, he

thinks, "he lost that arm for me." How it stirs his heart! how gladly he renders the service! It is heart service, the best of all. So the Lord Jesus comes to his people and says, "I have saved you; that question is settled; now, if ye love me, keep my commandments!" The believer remembers Gethsemane and Calvary. He believes in the full salvation bought by such a price. He feels that Jesus is precious—O how precious! He says, "I love him, because he first loved me;" and with his heart overflowing with love and gratitude, gladly, eagerly consecrates himself to do the Lord's will. What stronger motive can we find than this? Love has a thousand hands and feet; is eager to serve the loved one; finds its highest joy in the favor of its Lord. Away with the thought that a Christian will please to do wrong unless Jesus stands over him with a whip! Such thought fails to understand that faith which works *by love*.

Why can not we stand in the sunshine, coming out from the shadows of Sinai? Why not stand in the full assurance of the "no condemnation," and then, because we love him, consecrate heart and life to him?

Under the law, at certain seasons, the slaves became free; but there was a provision that the slave who "loved his master" might go before the judges, and having his ear pierced with an awl at the doorpost of his master's house, thus give himself to perpetual servitude. If the Lord has given liberty to the captive, we do not want that liberty that we may do wrong; but, loving our Master would bring

ourselves to have our ears pierced, that we may be the Lord's forever. Such is the service—the obedience of love—of the Christian.

SECTION IV.—*A Son is dear to the Father, a Servant's relation implies no such affection.*

How proud a father is of his boy! how he delights in him! what affection he lavishes upon him! The Christian is the recipient of just such love.

"He that toucheth you toucheth the apple of his eye."—Zech. ii. 8.

The Father's love flows out with a tenderness and a fullness, beyond all expression.

You have seen a father watching his child in its early efforts to walk. See how carefully he guards it! How his heart thrills as it takes a few tottering steps! Even so our heavenly Father is watching the efforts of his feeble little ones here. And blessed be his name, his hands are ever near us—the hands of the mighty God of Jacob—to keep us from harm.

With a father's heart and a father's hands so near, safe is the Christian.

The child's walk is very imperfect. His gait is unsteady. Yet, there is something very attractive to the watcher, and that stirs his heart strangely. The father does not think of the failures; he looks at the child's weakness, and rejoices at the *success* that is made. The honest efforts, the small victories, these are precious in God's sight.

SECTION V.—*A Son is an heir, a Servant is not.*

The glory that awaits the believer can not be told in words. It is by being made a son that he becomes an heir. A servant can never, by his work, become an heir. Service entitles to wages, but these are always the equivalent of the work done. What work of man could ever merit or win heaven? Is it not preposterous that men should dream of heaven as the reward of obedience? It either exalts men, or belittles heaven. Heaven is never promised, never obtained, on such terms. A servant's place entitles to a servant's wage, but nothing more.

Birth—sonship—constitutes us heirs. This is the only Bible ground for the possession of the inheritance. "If children, *then* heirs," but never if servants, then heirs.

The inheritance is to be enjoyed only by God's children; and to be a child we must be born into the family.

This inheritance, this glory, is *the hope* of the Christian. We do not hope for salvation, we have that; and what is ours in present possession is not an object of hope. We have salvation, we hope for the glory.

This heirship not only gives comfort and strength to the believer, it makes us the subjects of peculiar care on the Father's part.

"To an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you (or 'for *us*'), who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation."—1 Peter i. 4, 5.

It was the custom to keep the heir in a strong fortress until the time he entered upon his inheritance. The word here used refers to this custom. "Kept," as in a fortress, showing him to be guarded by the safeguards the father's love provides.

"Kept," not by our faithfulness, but *by the power of God;* and surely that is adequate and sufficient for the work. If he can not keep, he can not save, as the keeping is implied in the saving.

CHAPTER XVI.

PRESERVATION OF THE SAINTS.

The baptism of the Holy Spirit, as we have shown, is the foundation of the Medium Theology. In this chapter we wish to show its connection with the grand truth of the believer's security in Christ.

Two positions are taken in the Christian world. One that a man is saved when he believes, the other that a man may trust in Christ, and yet fall away and be lost.

We hold that if a man trusts in Christ *he is saved*, which is not true if there is any danger of his being *lost*. Hence, if a believer should lose his soul, either the promises of the Bible never were his, or else they are not true. It says, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and *thou shalt* be saved." No perhaps, no other condition, but an absolute promise; believe, and "*thou shalt* be saved."

We find, however, that a Christian, by the power of "the flesh," may fall into sin. How far he may backslide we dare not say, as no one can draw the line. But we do claim that if the man is truly regenerate, even when he is farthest from Christ, faith still lingers in the soul and Christ still is precious. He is not happy or contented in his wanderings, and sooner or later the prodigal will come

back home. The unclean raven went out of the ark never to return, but the gentle dove came back again to the old ark, because their natures were different; and here is the difference between the regenerate man and the hypocrite, or the self-deceived. As the word of God so plainly teaches, "they went out" because they were not of us.

A believer may sin, and not be lost. David and Peter both fell into grievous sin, but they *did not lose their souls*, for they are both in heaven, singing the praises of Jesus, and rejoicing in the value of the blood.

It is not our purpose to enter into a *full* discussion of the doctrine, but simply to present it in such a way as to show the value of Christ's work to the believer.

SECTION I.—*Some Arminian texts examined.*

We will examine a few of the texts relied upon by the advocates of apostasy, and have selected what are regarded as the strongest. When properly understood, it will be found that, so far from teaching apostasy, they present the very opposite—truth.

First. "When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished. Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there; and the last state of that man is worse than the first. Even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation."—Matt. xii. 43–45.

It is claimed that the unclean spirit going out is conversion, and its return is apostasy. In reply, we say that there is no Bible authority for such an assumption, and that it introduces numerous contradictions into the passage, all out of harmony with apostasy. The unclean spirit *goes* out, is not driven out: indicating that such may be at any time. No doubt the spasmodic periods of reformation in a wicked man's life may be due, in some measure, to this; and it is clear that when the Holy Spirit is doing his work in convincing of sin, this would be true. That it is not conversion, is seen from the application to this "*wicked* generation." The unclean spirit's return would make *their* last state worse than the first.

Then it is the unclean spirit who says, "I will return;" this would be to make the apostasy depend, not upon the man, but the *will* of the devil. There is nothing to indicate sin on the part of the man, but the reverse; for when the unclean spirit returns, he finds the house *clean* — "swept and garnished." None of the facts will fit in with the theory of apostasy; hence we must look elsewhere for a solution. The key to the subject is the "*empty*" house. What if the devil leaves the man for a season? If the house is left *empty*, the devil will return. There was no opening of the door and letting Christ in, for then the Holy Spirit would have taken up his abode in the house; not as a transient guest, but to "abide with you forever."—John xiv. 16.

Second. "But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway."—1 Cor. ix. 27.

The word translated "castaway" is ἀδόκιμος (*adokimos*), which means "unable to stand test, rejected, refuse, worthless." In the races, it was a word used to designate one who failed *to win a prize*. In the race of which Paul is speaking, he was running in order to obtain an "incorruptible crown." But what is this incorruptible crown? Is it salvation? Did Paul by this language express a fear that after all he might be lost? Such an explanation would be in conflict with his uniform testimony elsewhere. What, then, was Paul fearful of? Why, that he might fail of the "prize," the reward for which he was running that race.

In the Bible we find four kinds of crowns given to four different classes as rewards for service. "A crown of *life*," to those who are faithful unto death. Life is one thing, a crown of life is quite another. Life is ours *when* we believe, and only because we believe: "He that believeth on the Son *hath* everlasting life." A crown of life is *future*, and becomes ours if we are faithful. (Rev. ii. 10.)

"A crown of *glory*," that "fadeth not away" (an incorruptible crown), given to *the elders* who are faithful in overseeing the flock. (1 Peter v. 4.)

A "crown of *rejoicing*," given to those who win souls for Christ. (1 Thess. ii. 19.)

A "crown of *righteousness*," given to those who "love his appearing." (1 Tim. iv. 8.)

These crowns they *wear* in heaven, so that they do not represent heaven; and John pictures the saints in glory as "casting their crowns" at the Savior's feet. It was a "crown" for which Paul was running the race—a reward or prize—and not salvation, which is always *a gift*, and not a reward. Very plainly the doctrine of rewards is taught.

"If any *man's work* abide which he hath built thereupon (that is, on the foundation Christ), he shall receive a *reward.* If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer *loss;* but *he himself shall be saved;* yet so as by fire."—1 Cor. xiv. 15.

This is easy to understand. If *we* build upon the foundation Christ, good material, we will receive a "reward." If, while building upon Christ, we use poor material, we will "suffer loss" (whatever that may mean), but we ourselves will be saved. Thus there are rewards to be won, treasures to lay up in heaven; and as Christians we are running the race for these prizes; and it was this that Paul was afraid he might lose, because its possession depended upon his own faithfulness.

Third. "Therefore leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on to perfection; not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works, of faith toward God, of the doctrine of baptisms, and of laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment. And this will we do if God permit. For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to

come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh and put him to an open shame."—Heb. vi. 1–6.

If this is apostasy, in the Arminian sense, then there is no recovery, no restoration. There is but *one* new birth. But what is the true exposition of this passage?

It was written to the Jews, of whom one writer has said:

"They *were Hebrews* by birth, brought up in the Jews' religion, but had embraced Christianity and come within its privileged circle; for Christianity does confer privileges on those who stand within her pale, even though the privileged persons may ever remain strangers to salvation and eternal life."

"Leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ," or more literally "leaving the word of the beginning of the Christ" (*Διὸ ἀφέντες τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον*). The Jews had, in type and shadow, the beginning of the word of Christ, and to these Paul refers. In the list enumerated, it will be seen that it is the Jewish, not the Christian, form of the doctrine that is given. Now, leaving this word of the beginning of Christ, "let us go on to perfection." What perfection? Certainly not individual perfection—perfection in self—that being unknown to the Scriptures. But the perfection of which he was speaking—*perfection in Christ.*

The epistle has perfection for its great theme, but not man's perfection. It is the contrast between law and the gospel that the writer is making.

The law made *nothing perfect*, but the bringing in of a better hope *did*."

This is the key to the whole epistle. If we follow the apostle in his argument, we find, after a review of the glories and the perfections of Christ, that he goes on to contrast the imperfections of Judaism with the perfection of every thing in Christ.

Under the law there was imperfect access to God's presence; only the high-priest could enter the Holiest, and he only once a year. Now, the veil has been rent, and all may come at all times.

Under the law there was an imperfect sacrifice; under the gospel, a perfect sacrifice.

Under the law, an imperfect priesthood; under the gospel, perfection. Having presented all this vividly, the epistle leads us in the tenth chapter to the grand result in the perfection of the results of this sacrifice. Would that men could see this, so that, instead of standing on Jewish ground, and degrading the blood of Jesus to the level of that of bulls and goats, they might stand in the assurance of a Christian's standing.

"The law . . . . . can never, with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually, make the comers thereunto perfect. For then they would *have ceased to be offered* [margin].

"Because that the worshipers *once* purged should have had no more conscience of sins."—Heb. x. 1, 2.

The repetition of sacrifice was an evidence of imperfect cleansing, and the whole argument is founded upon this. If so, *then*, the *non*-repetition

of Christ's sacrifice was proof that it perfectly cleansed from *all* sin. Every thing is perfect. It was *this* perfection they were to go on to, as the whole epistle shows. Leaving the imperfection of every thing under law, laying aside their Jewish ideas—go on to the perfection of the gospel.

"For it is impossible." For whom? A regenerated man, a believer? No; not one word of this in the whole passage. If our readers will read carefully, they will see that there is nothing here mentioned but what applies to a Jew who had professed Christianity. All that is enumerated might be true, and yet the man be unsaved. In fact, the writer teaches this when he says:

"We are persuaded better things of you, *and things that accompany salvation.*"

Showing that these things did not.

"Who were once enlightened." Thousands around us are living in the light of Christianity, believing what the Bible teaches, who are not saved.

"And tasted of the heavenly gift." The calling of the Jew was *earthly*, that of this dispensation is *heavenly*, so that all the privileges of Christianity are heavenly, in contrast to those of the Jews, which were earthly. All living in a Christian land have *tasted* of the heavenly gift.

"And made partakers of the Holy Ghost." This does not mean that they were sealed, for then they would be safe; neither does it mean that they possessed the "earnest," for then their right to the inheritance could never be destroyed. What then

does it mean? They lived in an age when the gift of the Holy Ghost was conferred on all professors, by the laying on of hands, by the apostles. All having these miraculous powers were partakers of the Holy Ghost. Unregenerate men may thus be partakers, as was Baalam; for we read,

"Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works?"—Matt. vii. 22.

To do this they must have been partakers of the Holy Ghost; yet Jesus says, "I *never* knew you." Not, I do not know you now, but, I *never* knew you. As he knows his sheep, they therefore never were his sheep.

"And tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the *coming age*" (literally). We have a picture of this in the stony ground hearer. They hear the word and immediately *with joy* receive it, but as there is no root—not a little, but *none*—it withers and dies.

So that there is nothing in this verse to point out a saved man. It was a Jewish professor, sharing some of the privileges of Christianity, but needing to go on to the perfection in Christ.

Such a one, having fallen away, and returning to Judaism, would crucify Christ afresh, because he would have to deny and pronounce him accursed, before he could be restored to his position as a Jew. But let not such a one be deceived. There was once the renewal of repentance, in the law; but

now that kind of renewal was impossible. No doubt the returning Jew would again take his sin-offering, and, laying on his hands, expect to be renewed again, laying again the same old foundation. Such renewal was impossible.

The question of apostasy can only be settled by the word. Experience can never be regarded as proof. Our feelings deceive us, the hearts of others can never be known, and the *only* test is that of the word of God.

The objection that it leads to immorality we have already considered in our last chapter. The gospel makes men new creatures in Christ; and therefore they will never act as this objection suggests. A sow may return to its wallow, and a dog to his vomit, because their *nature* has remained unchanged. A sheep may fall into the mud, but it will not remain there; a sow will wallow in it. You may cover a sow with a sheep's fleece, but that does not make it a sheep; and its wallowing in the mire manifests *its nature*, and shows that it is not a sheep, but a sow.

SECTION II.—*Spirit baptism and perseverance.*

When we come to examine the testimony of the Bible as to the security of the believer, full and strong are its assurances.

"I give unto them *eternal* life; and they shall *never* perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand."—John x. 28.

"Kept by the power of God."—1 Peter i. 5.

"Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it" (or *finish* it) "until the day of Jesus Christ."

"He that believeth on me *hath everlasting* life."

All these and others are positive and unmistakable. The ground of this assurance is brought out in the words,

"Because I live, ye shall live also."

By one Spirit we are joined to the one body—the body of Christ. The life of Christ is the life of the body. The life of the vine is that of the branch. But we are united to Christ, not by his incarnation, but as risen from the dead. This life never ends, never can end. This life can not sin, can not fail. The life is Christ himself, for Christ is "the eternal life." If it was our own life, then it might end; but being Christ's, it can never end; it is everlasting life, and this is ours.

The one Spirit unites us to Christ, hence we have the Spirit dwelling in us—a Paraclete or Comforter. By this Spirit we are linked to the *other* Comforter or Paraclete—the Lord Jesus Christ himself.

The intercession of Christ *for* us and the work of the Spirit *in* us, is the ground of the believer's final salvation being made secure.

"If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, *much more*, being reconciled, we shall be saved *by his life.*"—Rom. v. 10.

Not by our faithfulness, but "*by his life.*" It is

not that Jesus pays ninety cents on the dollar, leaving us to pay the rest, but that Jesus pays it all.

His intercession, not our faithfulness, secures our safety.

"Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come to God by him, seeing he *ever liveth to make intercession* for them."—Heb. vii. 25.

His intercession never fails; by it our eternal salvation is secured, and through him our safety is obtained. So we can, with Paul, give utterance to that grand triumphal challenge,

"Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth.

"Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea, rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.

"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword?

"As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.

"Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us.

"For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come,

"Nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."—Rom. viii. 33–39.

PART IV.

REVIEW OF BURNEY ON SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER XVII.

BURNEY ON LAW.

Dr. Burney's book on Soteriology sets forth what we have called the Supernatural Moral Influence Theory. It is by far the ablest presentation of the arguments against substitution we have met, and as against Calvinism simply unanswerable. In his recoil from Calvinism, he has done what hundreds have before—gone to the other extreme, and thrown a vicarious atonement overboard.

Logically strong, his book is yet exegetically weak.

We have tried to analyze his theory so as to deal with each factor separately.

The foundation of his argument is to be found in what he says about law and penalty. If he is right in this, we concede that salvation by substitution is impossible; and while we would still object to his theory, we should agree that moral means alone are needed for man's redemption.

In Part I. of this book we have shown at some length the distinction between a penalty and a consequence, and failure to do this is the fatal flaw in both the Calvinistic and Burney theories. Calvinism, with its double imputation, practically sets aside redemption by power; Burney overlooks redemption by purchase.

The first part of Dr. Burney's book is occupied with an historical review of Christian Soteriology. His interpretations of the Fathers are strained, unnatural, and imperfect. Only one point will be considered here. In our introduction we give a quotation from the Epistle to Diognetus. Burney quotes this as from Irenæus, adding the following comment:

Burney.—"1. That it of itself teaches nothing distinctively as to the nature of Christ's sufferings, whether they satisfied the claims of God or Satan. If Irenæus was consistent with himself he meant the latter.

"2. What it does teach is that men are saved by Christ's righteousness, acquired by satisfying the claims of Satan to whom he believed men owed some sort of allegiance."—Page 29.

He then quotes from Irenæus as proof that he held the doctrine that Christ's death was a ransom to Satan:

"The word of God [the Logos] omnipotent and not wanting in justice even against the apostasy or kingdom of evil itself [apostasian], redeeming from it [*ab ea*] that which was his own originally, not by using violence, as did the devil in the beginning;

but by persuasion [secundum sandelum], as it became God, so that neither justice should be infringed upon, nor the original creation of God perish."

Dr. Burney, commenting on this, says:

"Here we have a distinct recognition of the rights of Satan."—Page 28.

Comment.—1. Numerous extracts can be given from Irenæus to show that he repudiated the claims of Satan, holding redemption by power, saying, "when Satan *is bound*, man is set free." The extract given by Burney is the only ground for his assertion, and that it may be rightly understood we give the quotation more at length (we quote from the Anti-Nicene library, published in Edinburgh):

"The mighty Word, and very man, who, redeeming us by his own blood in a manner consonant to reason, gave himself as a redemption for those who had been led into captivity. And since the apostasy tyrannized *over us unjustly*, and, though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples, the Word of God, powerful in all things, and not defective with regard *to his own* justice, did righteously turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it his own property, not by violent means, as the (apostasy) had obtained dominion over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not its own, but by persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain what he desires; so that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to destruction. Since the Lord *thus* has redeemed us *through his own blood*,

giving his soul for our souls, and his flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit." (Against Heresies, Book V., Chapter I., Section I.)

Our readers can judge if this affords sufficient ground for the statement as to his belief. Is not Burney mistaken?

2. The Epistle to Diognetus has never been attributed to Irenæus, so that at any rate Burney's criticism has no force. When first published, Justin Martyr's name was attached to it. Since then, it has been placed among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, some attributing it to Clement, others to Apollos. It is now generally conceded that the author is unknown. He speaks of the doctrines of Christ as "*new*," and says of himself, "but having been a disciple of the apostles, I am become a teacher of the Gentiles."

In Chapter V., Dr. Burney contrasts the Anselmic and the Grotian Soteriology, and as we have his views on law partly brought out, we will here review him on law.

Burney.—"1. Anselm posits the law in the divine nature so that God being what he is the law necessarily is as it is. Grotius makes the law the product of the divine will. In this Grotius is right and Anselm wrong."—Page 47.

Comment.—Is God influenced by motives when he wills? If not, as an act of will without motive is inconceivable, being simply the action of blind

force, God and fate would be synonymous. If God is influenced by motives, do they arise from that which is within or from without himself? Surely if he is the absolute Creator of all things, his ultimate motive must be within himself, and must have been "the exercise of his attributes, and in their exercise the manifestation of their excellence." God wills nothing in conflict with his own attributes. God is holy, he could not will to be unholy. God is love, he can not be conceived of as choosing to be vindictive, and retaining this character of love. But love is essential to a perfect being, and perfection is necessitated in the idea of God. Hence, we may say, God *can not will that* which is vindictive. We do not mean that the acts of God's will are necessitated by his nature—that would deprive God's will of freedom. But we mean that the acts of his will are always in harmony with his nature. They are never in conflict with it.

God's existence can not be conceived of, apart from the divine attributes. These form the glory and perfection of God. They are made manifest to us partly through his works, fully by revelation. We know the nature of God by what he has taught us.

The divine intelligence, not the divine will, is the judge of right; hence, the will is guided in its volitions by intelligence. The divine intelligence is influenced in its judgments by the divine character, so that without any fatalistic theory, it may be regarded as evident that God will not (not can not) will, only in harmony with his nature.

To refer every thing to the will of God without reference to his nature would be to make God's holiness, benevolence, truth, and justice, either the products of his will, or to exist as attributes, but without any channel for their exercise and manifestation. If the will is the ultimate and final standard, and the acts of his will are not the manifestation of his nature, a change of will would, in a moment, blot out all sin and transform virtue into vice.

Burney.—"2. Anselm makes the law unabrogable, and even unrelaxable. Grotius makes it relaxable, and even abrogable, if God should will either. In this Anselm is right, and Grotius is wrong, as we may see.

"3. According to Anselm's notion of law, its abrogation would be the destruction of the Deity, and its relaxation a modification of his nature, just as the destruction of any of the primary properties of matter would be the destruction of matter itself, as a change of the properties of matter would be a modification of matter itself.

"But according to Grotius' idea of the law, its abrogation would be an exemption of all obligation, and its relaxation a partial exemption."—Page 48.

Comment.—1. If the divine will alone, apart from the divine nature, is the source of law, then the position of Grotius is true. If God's will alone makes it right, all obligation arises from the fact that God wills it; if God changes his will, then obligation certainly ceases also. This is self-evident. How Burney can consistently deny that law

is relaxable and posit it in the divine will we can not see. His reason, as given in our next quotation, is insufficient; for if the abrogation did involve the destruction of the created mind, God could so will. Law being posited in the divine will, Burney can not fall back upon the divine nature for proof of its immutability. Hence, if the law is not abrogable, on his theory it is made so by a creature existence. God is, then, controlled from without, and not from within, and a creature existence destroys the freedom of the divine will. This is a far more objectionable scheme of fatality than that which he assails.

2. Burney's statement as to Anselm's position and the illustration given is not satisfactory. A change in the divine character does not necessitate the destruction of the Divine Essence, any more than a good man's becoming a bad one would involve his destruction. Adam's sin did not destroy him, but it did destroy his innocence. To abrogate the law, according to Anselm, would destroy the divine perfection, not the divine essence. Both relaxation and abrogation would necessitate a change in the Deity.

Burney.—"But according to the true conception of the law, its abrogation would be the destruction of the created mind itself, and its relaxation a modification of the nature of the mind. For the law is a concreation of the mind—is written upon the heart—and as such is as truly a product of the divine will as is the mind itself. Hence, an abrogation of the law would involve the destruction of the mind and its relaxation an essential change of the mind,

just as the abrogation or modification of the essential properties of matter would involve its destruction or modification. Hence, while divine ordinances or laws of expediency, which are only objective and are only servitors of the great moral law, may be abrogated or relaxed, no concreated and subjective law can be so dealt with without disastrous consequences.

Anselm is fatally at fault when he makes the law indigenous to the divine nature and independent of the divine will. Grotius is equally at fault when he fails to make the law indigenous to the human mind, or *subjective* as well as objective, and asserts it to be abrogable and relaxable."—Page 48.

Comment.—1. Underlying this is the materialistic conception that there is an analogy between mind and matter as to the nature of their properties and their relation to the substances in which they inhere. This is purely an assumption. To know, feel, and will, are the attributes of spirit. But as all experience shows, they differ essentially, both in nature and relation, from the properties of matter.

2. Burney misinterprets Anselm. He gives to Anselm's statements the meaning *they would have* if Burney's definition of law had been held by Anselm. This is a grave fault all through Dr. Burney's book. He gives his own meaning or definitions to the words of others, and then interprets them from this stand-point. By "the law indigenous to the human mind," Burney means what he calls "subjective law." When he says Anselm is at fault in making it "indigenous to the divine nature," we can only

suppose that he means that Anselm taught "subjective law" in the Deity.

Anselm was the first to present the ontological argument for the existence of God, and whatever our estimate of its value, none have given it with more force. In the unfolding of this argument, he says that things—

"Are called good in a variety of ways and degrees. This would be impossible if there were not some absolute standard, some good in itself, in which all relative goods participate. Similarly with such predicates as great, just, they involve a certain greatness and justice. The very existence of things is impossible without some Being, by whom they are. This absolute Being, this goodness, justice, greatness, is God."

If this is read in the light of the ontological method of reasoning it is plain. But it is totally different from Burney's idea of subjective law, or law indigenous to the divine nature.

3. No analysis of mind will give us such a conception of law as that which Burney advocates. If his theory is correct, we must divide the mind into intellect, sensibility, will, and "subjective law." But in that case it would be a contradiction to speak of it *as law.* The properties of matter are not laws, but the combined properties constitute, or manifest, the nature of the substance we call matter. If this is the relation of "subjective law" to mind, *then all obedience is necessitated.*

4. But in the above extract, while making this "subjective law" to inhere in the mind so that its

abrogation is the destruction of mind, he at the same time makes it distinct; this subjective law "is as truly a product of the divine will *as is the mind itself.*" If it is separate, its abrogation would be but the destruction of itself.

To bring out fully Dr. Burney's theory as to law, we give one more quotation, this time from "Atonement and Law Reviewed," page 63:

Burney.—"Science and the Bible are in full accord in affirming the existence of subjective moral law as an essential characteristic of human nature. Paul is the metaphysician of the New Testament. He says (Rom. ii. 12–15): '. . . . in that they shew the work of the law *written in their hearts*, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them.' This is so plain that comment can scarcely make it plainer.

"(1) Paul here affirms the existence of the revealed or written law, or law in commandment; and also a law written in the hearts of the Gentiles. . . . . In this verse (12) we are plainly taught that those that have not objective law in commandment may sin; sin is a transgression of the law; what law do they transgress? Not the law in commandment, for they have no such law. Then it is, of necessity, this subjective law written in the heart.

. . . . . .

"(3) That sin is not imputed where there is no written law. The exact meaning of the word impute in this text is of importance. The verb *allogeo* is not the verb generally translated *impute*. It is used but twice in the New Testament, here and in Philemon xviii. 5. It can not mean (in this place) that sin did not actually exist as sin. . . . . It must mean, then, that sin is not known,



or recognized, or apprehended as sin; or in its true character when there is no law in commandment to define or characterize it. The sinner is, of course, conscious of his mental state, of his unrest, and of fearful apprehensions of evil; but is unable to understand the reason of all this abnormalty in his mental state."

Comment.—1. Dr. Burney misinterprets both science and the Bible. "Paul here affirms . . . . a law written in the hearts of the Gentiles." But with all respect to Dr. Burney, this is just what Paul does *not* do. It is the *work* of the law that is written, and *not* the law. (*τό ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτόν—to ergon tou nomou grapton.*) Paul was too good a metaphysician to make such a statement as Burney attributes to him.

2. "Sin is the transgression of law; what law do they transgress? . . . . it is of necessity the subjective law." This definition of sin will not stand. "The transgression of the law," is a translation (or rather an *interpretation*), of the Greek word for law with the particle of privation prefixed. *Ἄνομος* (*anomos*), is literally law-less. Sin is lawlessness.

3. Burney assumes that because they were without law they had no knowledge of right, and no rule of action, unless it came from "subjective law." In this he forgets the reason why the law was given, and the special character of the dispensation from Adam to Moses. God revealed his will, gave commandments, and was in direct communication with men. The command not to kill, being an example. Six lives linked Moses and the

garden of Eden together. In that age truth was communicated directly to men, and by oral tradition from them to all nations, so that in some measure the intellect was instructed and the conscience could act. The theory of oral tradition is a better explanation than "subjective" law, because, while it accounts for those beliefs that are universal—common to all religions—it better accounts for their manifold perversion.

4. The theory of "subjective law" is in direct conflict with Paul, who distinctly states that when those nations "which have *no* law, practice by nature the things of the law, these, having *no law* (*ουτοι νομον μη εχοντες*) are a law to themselves." No law excludes every law, either objective or subjective. Burney has to insert, no "written" law.

5. The great mistake of Dr. Burney is that he confounds the "moral sense" in man with law. Having dragged in the word law, he then makes *the* law "objective law," thus linking them together in the minds of his readers. He then boldly proclaims their identity as "*one law.*" Of course, if this be true, it is only a step to the identification of penalty with "subjective law," and in this way he lays the foundation for his non-penal theory.

The moral sense every man has; and without this moral sense or faculty, which includes conscience and those primary intuitions that are common to the race (such as the idea of God, immortality, etc.), law would have no force, whether it be subjective or objective. It is the possession of this moral sense that makes us moral agents, and lays

the foundation for all moral government. It is this that Burney seems to mean when he speaks of subjective law; for he says that "sin is not known . . . . when there is no law in commandment." His error is in calling it subjective law, and then making it one law with that in commandment, and then setting aside entirely all objective law, and reasoning from the "subjective" alone.

Burney's theory requires no law in commandment, and in admitting the insufficiency of subjective law, he commits logical suicide.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BURNEY ON PENALTY.

In commenting upon the distinction made by Dr. Hodge as to *Reatus culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*, Burney says:

Burney.—"Certainly there is an appreciable distinction between criminality and penalty, between moral corruption and punishment, and we may indicate this difference by the technical forms, *reatus culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*, if we choose. But it must be remembered that, though they are logically distinct, they are both logically and chronally inseparable. Criminality involves liability to punishment, and punishment presupposes criminality."—Page 112.

Comment.—Burney here, as elsewhere, deals unfairly with the positions of substitutionists. It seems to be done unconsciously, because his own definitions are vividly before his mind, and thus used to define the meaning of substitutionists. What is the distinction made by Burney in the above extract? Simply between criminality and penalty. We place Hodge's distinction over against Burney's rendering of it. He says:

"The word *guilt* . . . . . expresses *the relation* which sin bears to justice, or, as the older theologians said, *to* the penalty of the law. The relation, however, is twofold.

"First, that which is expressed by criminality and ill-desert, or demerit. This is inseparable from sin. It can belong to no one who is not personally a sinner, and it permanently attaches to all who have sinned. It is not removed by justification, much less by pardon. It can not be transferred from one person to another.

"But, secondly, guilt means the obligation to satisfy justice. This may be removed by the satisfaction of justice personally or vicariously."

This is insisted on by all substitutionists. Not a distinction between criminality and penalty, but between criminality, or *demerit*, and *the liability to* a penalty; or, as Hodge expresses it, "the obligation to satisfy justice." The word *guilt* is used in both senses, but never as synonymous with penalty.

Burney distorts Hodge in another way: "There is an appreciable distinction between criminality and penalty, between *moral corruption and punishment.*" We doubt if Hodge would have accepted this identification of criminality and depravity. We reject it *in toto.* But this seems to be Burney's logical method. He gives *his own* definitions to his adversaries' statements, and then proceeds to annihilate them at will. By this logical juggling it is easy to avoid the necessity for proof. By making criminality to be corruption, liability to a penalty to be the same as penalty, and then by making this penalty a consequence, he can assume as self-evident and not needing proof, that depravity and its consequences are "logically and chronally inseparable." If Dr. Burney is satisfied with this, substitutionists can afford to be.

Burney.—"As to the *order* of relation between crime and penalty, it seems superfluous to say that they are related as cause and effect, or as antecedent and consequent, and that crime is the antecedent, and punishment the consequence."—Page 113.

"The penalties of human law are purely arbitrary—are fixed by judicial authority, and have no necessary connection with the crime. The punishment, if it comes at all, comes from without, and through the agency of other minds. Hence, the penalty for the same offense is now this, and now that—in one State one thing, and in another something different, according to the judgments or whims of the lawgivers.

"But it is not so in divine law. Criminality and penalty, as I have often said, are causally connected, the latter growing naturally out of the former, and is determined by it as the stream comes from the fountain, by which its character is determined. God has immutably fixed this relation between criminality and penalty, and no power short of omnipotence can separate them. But God does not ordain laws in the realms of matter or mind to revoke or modify them on occasion. Hence, the only possible method of escape from penalty is to get rid of the criminality that produces it."—Page 115.

Comment.—1. The distinction between human and divine law is only *partially* true, as we have shown in these pages. God's moral government is exercised upon the earth; it regulates the conduct of man to man. Human laws are founded upon the divine; and if Burney's exposition of penalty is true, all punishment by law would be unjust.

2. Depravity and its consequences, as we have shown, have the relation of cause and effect. Sin, as transgression, and penalty have not. Penalties are not consequences, having, as Burney admits of those connected with human laws, "no *necessary* connection with the crime."

3. As we are "by nature the children of wrath," if consequence and penalty are the same, we are made to suffer the penalty of another's sin before actual sin has been committed. Depravity and its consequences may be propagated, *but law and its penalties never.*

4. If the theory be true, there is no such thing as the "long-suffering" of God. The penalties being always executed, he does not bear with the sinner at all.

5. There can be no remission. The theory is that we are saved from the penalty by being delivered from the sin. When sin—the cause—ceases, penalty—the effect—ceases also. Then there is no remission, simply deliverance from sin. Past sins have been punished; and, as punishment is neither remission nor pardon, there is no remission of these; and the words "for the remission of sins that are past" are unmeaning.

6. It logically leads to the doctrine of progressive regeneration.

7. It necessitates the idea of punishment after pardon, or else that pardon is unattainable in this life.

8. In the whole range of human experience there is no example of a legal command with a self-in-

flicting penalty. It is an impossibility. Therefore the theory must deny all legal relations to the law of God.

9. There is no place for a judgment. If sin merits punishment, and that punishment is future, the reason for a judgment is readily apprehended. God must *render* to every man according to *his deeds*. But if sin is always followed by its penalty, as effect follows cause, what need is there for a judgment?

10. If Burney is right, we should find no such inequality in the lives of wicked men as now. As cause and effect are always the same, there would be uniformity in the way penalty followed sin. But it is the most certain of truths that no such uniformity exists in this life. The theory is out of harmony with the facts.

11. If the theory is true, hell is not a place, but a "mental state;" and to be cast into hell is synonymous with being turned into one's self. If there is a hell, a place prepared for the devil and his angels, if the sinner is to hear the fearful word "depart," then there is in the future a governmental award, and that distinct from the consequences of depravity.

12. It necessitates eternal sin as the ground of eternal punishment. To argue that the sin might cease and the penalty go on would be fatal to the theory from every stand-point.

If the penalty does not cease with the sin, the intervention of divine power is necessary to save when we believe. If this future punishment would

be justly inflicted, the question would come, can God justly withhold it, and, if so, on what grounds? Then the whole force of the argument against substitution would be gone. More, if almighty power steps in and saves from future suffering when sin ceases in the believer, why not in the unbeliever? The distinction we have made between depravity and its consequences and transgression and penalty gives an answer from our stand-point, but not from Burney's. Eternal transgression we believe to be out of harmony with the final triumph of right, and to have no countenance in the word of God.

13. The theory is in conflict with the Scriptures. This has been shown in the chapter on "Restitution or Retribution;" and here once again we may say that the demand for restitution has no place, if retribution has already been inflicted.

In Part II., in his preliminary statements, he lays down the following as true:

Burney.—"The invariable characteristics of the divine law are:

"1. It requires personal obedience. '*Thou shalt* love,' etc."—Page 136.

Comment.—We believe this is true, and that no one will dispute it.

Burney.—"2. Its penalties are coincident with its transgressions: '*In the day* thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.'"—Page 136.

Comment.—1. This identifies the divine law and the command given to Adam, which must be proved.

2. It is a begging of the question, assuming as true the very thing that is in dispute.

3. We have already considered this penalty in discussing the subject of death. If what Burney here says means any thing, it is a denial of future punishment.

Burney.—"3. It excludes the possibility of substitutionary obedience. 'The soul that sinneth *it* shall die.'"—Page 136.

Comment.—1. This text has reference to physical death as the penalty of the law, "soul" here meaning person.

"If the wicked will turn from all his sins which he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die. All his transgression that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him. . . . .

"But when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, ... all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die."—Ezek. xviii. 21–24.

A careful comparison of the chapter will show that the entire argument is as to the penalty of law under Judaism. If we make it apply to the eternal issues, it teaches salvation by works and the possibility of apostasy, things that are unknown to the Bible.

2. No one, not even a substitutionist, affirms that penalty is threatened against any one but the

evil doer. If this were not true, substitution would be forever impossible. Proof that the penalty is threatened against the offender is not proof that substitution is impossible. "The man that gets drunk shall pay a fine of five dollars," does not exclude the vicarious payment of the fine.

Burney.—"4. It excludes the commutation of one penalty for another. 'Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.' "—Page 136.

Comment.—In dealing with the New Birth we have shown that there are two natures in the believer. Paul, in Galatians, is writing to Christians of the conflict between them—"the flesh lusteth against the Spirit." In the sixth chapter he is still following out this thought of the two natures —the flesh and the Spirit—and this is the true meaning and application of the words that Burney quotes, as the next verse shows.

While salvation is of grace alone, it is not a matter of indifference how we walk. If we are "carnal"—fleshly—even babes in Christ (1 Cor. iii. 1), "walking as men," we will experience that "*from*" (ἐκ) the flesh there comes nothing but corruption. No life, no vitality, no power to overcome when we are tempted. But if we "walk in the Spirit" we shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh. "The law of the Spirit *of life*" gives power, and *from* (ἐκ) the Spirit we reap everlasting life.

This is a different thing from the governmental awards for the transgression of the sinner.

CHAPTER XIX.

BURNEY ON ATONEMENTS.

Burney.—"SECTION I.—*Natural or Human Atonement.*"—Page 145.

Comment.—This is certainly unique.

Burney.—"Evidently the *sinner* is in a strait, not *God.* The sinner needs a change, not God. The sinner needs reconciling to God, not God to the sinner. God, though angry with the wicked, so loved the world that he gave his Son to save it." —Page 145.

Comment.—1. That "the sinner is in a strait, not God," is a statement that no one, not even a substitutionist, will deny. The anger of God does not injure or in any way affect the divine perfection or glory, *because it is right.* The trouble with the sinner is that though God's love would save him, he is in such an attitude that God can not justly do it without an atonement being made.

2. Dr. Burney admits that God is angry and must be propitiated. This is all that any substitutionist would claim. He, however, makes a distinction between reconciliation and propitiation. God is propitiated, the sinner is reconciled. This is simply a question of words, because by teaching that

God must be propitiated, he holds exactly what the substitutionist does. Why God needs to be propitiated is the question. Burney does not answer this directly. We gather from his theory that it is because of sin. In this all agree. God's anger is a demand for the punishment of sin. This Burney can not deny. He holds that this punishment is always inflicted when the sin is committed. We deny. He makes it a consequence. We deny this as to transgression, holding its penalty to be future. How is God propitiated? We say when the demand for punishment has been satisfied. And when God has been propitiated salvation is possible. Burney's answer we will consider in its place.

Burney.—"In the light of such facts it is easy to see that some plan or expedient is necessary to relieve men of their abnormal enmity against God, and thus restore them to the state of loving obedience to God—obedience to God, to law is the only possible immunity against God's anger, as revealed in the stern retributions of his law. The change needed is not the adjustment of the divine attributes, but of man's sinful state; not the removal of his *reatus poenæ* by a substitute, but *reatus culpæ*. If this is so, then the remedy must be primarily moral in character, for moral forces alone are capable of producing moral changes in free moral beings."—Page 145.

"The real issue is, Does Christ save us by suffering the punishment of our sins in our place, or by delivering us from our enmity against God and restoring us to a loving obedience?"—Page 146.

Comment.—We would put the issue thus: Are we saved by the Lord Jesus "delivering us from

our enmity against God, and restoring us to a loving obedience," or, does he save us from the penalty of the law by dying in our place, and from the consequences of corruption by delivering us from the depravity itself? In other words, is the remedy only moral, or is it *both* moral and legal? We affirm the last, Dr. Burney only the first. It is not a question *between reatus poenæ* and *reatus culpæ*, but the demand that *both* shall be removed. We hold the remedy is both moral and legal. Burney ignores the legal, Calvinism largely the moral.

Burney.—"It is possible to sin against our neighbor. . . . .

"These sins generate enmities and strifes which fill the world with needless woes.

"But is there no remedy for these ills? None—absolutely none—if there can be no pardon without punishment, as penalists persistently affirm; for if a man's sins against his neighbor can not be pardoned without being first punished, then pardon is utterly worthless."—Page 147.

Comment.—1. Either the illustration is not pertinent, or else his own theory is in fault. Every sin is punished when committed, according to Burney; then, if he has any pardon at all, sin pardoned is always punished. If when we sin against a neighbor punishment followed, as effect follows cause, you would have a parallel to Burney's theory. This not being true, the whole card house of natural atonements falls to the ground.

2. If it is made a universal affirmation, "no pardon without punishment," Burney's criticisms would

have force. But what substitutionist so believes? We do not like the expression, "no pardon without punishment," and define our own position to be, no pardon without satisfaction. Is not *this* universally true?

Burney.—"But there is a remedy for these ills which, if faithfully applied, would effectually prevent the miseries arising from sins against our neighbor; and common sense — perhaps I should say human instinct—suggests it. It is confession on the part of the offender, and forgiveness on the part of the offended.

"If I sin against you, I instinctively know that I ought to confess and ask pardon. I feel this to be due to myself, as well as to you, for nothing short of confession can relieve me of my mental unrest, my stings of conscience.

"You, on the contrary, instinctively know, when I have made confession and asked pardon, that you ought to forgive. You feel that you owe this to yourself, as well as to the offender; and not to forgive is to make yourself, as well as the other party, more or less unhappy, according to the circumstances. If confession is made and pardon granted, unhappiness is prevented. . . .

"This is atonement—propitiation and reconciliation—by moral means and for moral ends."—Page 147.

Comment.—1. Burney here makes the same mistake that he does as to law and penalty. The evils of strifes, sins against our neighbors, etc., are all subjective mental states, removed by confession and pardon. There seems to be a vein of idealism in the Doctor's philosophy. The evils are more than

mental states, they affect health, character, property, and even life itself. No mental change can alter these.

2. He makes no distinction between private and public offenses, or between offenses and crimes. Take some illustrations:

(*a*) You say something that makes your neighbor angry; you see this, and regret it. You go to him and offer an apology—ask his forgiveness. At once his anger is gone and the offense pardoned. This is a simple case. It is pardon without punishment, but it is not pardon without satisfaction. Your apology *covers over* the offense—atones for it—and pardon is the result.

(*b*) Your neighbor circulates an injurious report, which does you great harm and injures you with the people. Meeting you some time after, he says, "Neighbor, I have done you a wrong, and I ask your forgiveness." What would you do? What would "human instinct" dictate as right? You would demand that so far as possible, he should right the wrong he had done you—that he set you right before the people. If he did this, he would, to the extent of his ability, *atone* for his offense, and forgiveness would be his right. This is pardon with satisfaction. A man who pardoned without this satisfaction would simply show that he had no care for his own honor, no self-respect. Burney's position applied to this case would be that if he undid the wrong there could be no pardon, as the offense would no longer exist.

(*c*) A burglar enters your house and despoils you

of your goods. You succeed in catching the thief. He is sorry and begs to be forgiven. Burney says, if you forgive him, peace and harmony are restored —atonement has been made. But what of the stolen property? It belongs partly to you and partly to others. What would "human instinct" dictate as right? If you believed in the sincerity of the repentance and did not wish to invoke the law, what would you demand? Of course, the restoration of the property. The demand is in every case for restitution; and when this has been made, satisfaction has been rendered, and pardon accorded. In all cases the demand for satisfaction is primary, even if it be only for an apology; and if this is true as to the human, it is also of the divine.

(*d*) Take still another example. A scoundrel leads your son astray, or commits an outrage upon your daughter. A life is blasted. The offender, full of remorse for his awful crime, asks for forgiveness. According to Dr. Burney's theory, when forgiveness is accorded, harmony is restored—the mental states are all right. What do our readers think of this? Is it in harmony with their "human instincts?" Rather, is it not true, that they would demand that retribution be meted out?

There is a demand inseparable from moral being that right doing should be rewarded, and that wrong-doing shall be punished. This demand may partake of the elements of our fallen humanity and degenerate into mere revenge, but it must be met and satisfied.

There can be no harmony until this is done. If there is such a demand in men there must be in God. It is this that Dr. Burney's theory ignores. Tested by this example, its weakness can be seen by all.

3. If there is no demand on God's part for satisfaction, there can be nothing—absolutely nothing—in the way of the universal salvation of all men, but the pleasure of the Deity. *A limited atonement, or universal salvation, are the logical results of a denial of the demand for satisfaction.* Nothing but a demand for satisfaction growing out of the divine holiness itself can prevent the universal salvation of our race, unless God wills otherwise. To abandon this ground leaves no logical resting place other than extreme Calvinism or Universalism. God's omnipotence can at once remove all corruption by an act of the divine will, or by imparting life. If there is nothing in the nature of God in conflict with this, there can not possibly be any barrier outside of God; and if there is no *real* barrier, then all men will be redeemed and saved. As we shall see, Burney is forced to accept the principal of satisfaction when dealing with the atonement of Christ, to avoid these logical issues.

But in doing this he contradicts himself, for nothing is plainer in his theory than the denial of any real need for the death of Christ. The reason for this is obvious. If there is any real barrier, growing out of any demand of God against the sinner, that must be met by the death of Christ before life can be given or imparted, then, logically that death

must have been vicarious. Dr. Burney makes the death and resurrection of Christ necessary to the impartation of life, in the same way that the education and training of a physician fits him to cure disease. Then, those who lived before Christ were without salvation; or, the non-penal theory is open to the same objection Dr. Burney urges against substitution, namely, that it "is impossible because it conditions a past event upon a future event." If nothing but the removal of depravity is needed, this being by the power of God alone, we may justly expect that all men will be saved. As the depravity comes without any volition or fault of our own, it would certainly be just to remove it, if power only is needed. The non-penal theory can not escape, logically, from a limited atonement, or Universalism. That we do not misrepresent Dr. Burney when we say that his theory shows no real need for the death of Christ, is evident from his own language:

"His mediation, too, was just as real and as efficacious before his incarnation as it is now. He was always the 'light of the world,' 'the way, and the truth, and the life,' 'the resurrection and the life.' His incarnation, death, and resurrection *add nothing* to his life-giving, soul-saving power. They rather are the means by which he reveals himself to the world, and manifests his love to humanity, demonstrates his power over sin and death, and shows himself an all-sufficient Savior, able to save to the uttermost all that trust in him."—Page 10.

4. But underlying all human forgiveness, as taught in the Bible, is the glorious principle that

we are to forgive "even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you." Read this in the light of the trespass-offering, and it will be seen that, underlying all "natural atonements" (as Burney calls them), is, after all, the work of the Lord Jesus.

Burney.—"*The Bible usage of the word atonement.*"

"I hope to be pardoned for saying the very first thing necessary is to lay down the dictionaries, which reflect the vices as well as the virtues of theological authors of the last eight or ten centuries, and take up the Bible and test in the crucible of common sense the word as there used."—Page 162.

Comment.—1. It is always *prima facie* evidence of error when a writer is compelled to give to words new meanings, rejecting those recognized by the scholarship of the world. It *may* be true that the world has been mistaken, but the *presumption* is that the piety and scholarship of the world is right, and the new idea wrong. To speak of testing "in the crucible of common sense," or similar language, is always the method of new ideas put forth by strong minds. The wildest and most visionary theorists are those who use such language the most. Truth never needs to make such appeals, as the "true is always the clear."

In a living language, like the English, words are constantly acquiring new meanings. An English dictionary gives the meanings that words have in use when the dictionary is compiled. So it may reflect the vices of theological writers. But in a dead language it is different. The compiler goes

back to the time the word was in use, and from its usage *at that time*, defines its meaning. Burney assails either the honesty or ability of those who compiled our Hebrew and Greek Lexicons.

2. The admission that the dictionaries are against him as to the meaning of the words in controversy, is an admission that the scholarship of the world is against him.

Burney.—"You do not need to be informed that the Hebrew word *kaphar*, translated in our English Bibles *atonement*, means a literal covering, and is the name given to the top, or lid, of the ark of the covenant (Ex. xxv.) as a protection to its contents. Of course the word when used of men and their sins is taken, not in its literal, but in a tropical sense. . . . . The lid of the ark was intended to *protect* its contents from injury, rather than to *deliver* them from injury already existing. But the word is not generally used in this sense. Sin exists and a remedy is required. The remedy is found only in atonement. Thus far all agree. But in what does atonement consist, and how does it deliver from sin?"—Page 163.

Comment.—1. "Thus far all agree." That depends upon the application of the words. If it refers to *all* that goes before in the above extract, we think that none would agree. If it means that the remedy for sin is found in the atonement, then we agree.

2. Dr. Burney's statement as to kaphar we can not receive; and, after reading the above, no longer wonder that he rejects the dictionaries.

First. *Kaphar* is not the name given to the lid of the ark.

The verb כָּפַר (*kaphar*) means primarily "to cover."

The corresponding noun, כִּפֻּרִים (*kippurim*), means primarily a covering. This primary meaning, however, is not their Bible meaning, as they are *never* so translated. These are the only words translated "atonement," and neither is applied to the ark.

Second. The word כַּפֹּרֶת (*kapporeth*) is the word everywhere translated "mercy-seat," but never "atonement," never "lid" or "covering." It is a cognate word, but *not* the word for atonement. We might as readily say that baptize is the name given to a baptistery.

The idea that it was to "*protect*" the contents of the ark has no foundation whatever. Protect from what?

Third. Was the *kapporeth* the lid or covering of the ark? Two questions are embraced in this.

(*a*) Was the kapporeth *in fact* the lid or covering of the ark? We have examined many scores of writers, Jewish and Christian, and, while most of them say that it was, the *only* proof given is a reference to Ex. xxv. We conclude from this that it is simply an opinion from what is there said. After the instruction to make the ark follows the instruction to make the mercy-seat, or kapporeth; the narrative indicating that they were distinct and separate things.

"And thou shalt make *a mercy seat* of pure gold, ... and thou shalt make two cherubims . . . . in the two ends of the mercy-seat."—Verses 17, 18.

"And thou shalt put the mercy-seat *above upon the ark.*"—Verse 21.

Does this mean that the ark had no top, and that the mercy-seat when placed on the ark formed a top, or does it simply mean that the mercy-seat was placed on the ark?

The answer is only an opinion, as there is nothing to guide us but the verse thus quoted. Our readers can form an opinion for themselves.

(*b*) Does the name kapporeth *express this idea of a covering?* This we have no hesitation in answering in the negative.

"The term does not, as many modern critics understand, signify a lid in general; but being a derivative from Piël, כִּפֶּר, it is to be understood to mean *an instrument of atonement*, ... as the Septuagint correctly translates it, ἱλαστήριον."—*Oehler.*

Oehler, and many of the best critics, come to the very opposite conclusion to Burney, because *they* argue that the use of a derivative of *kaphar* indicates that it expresses atonement and not a covering Many reasons could be given in support of this

The use of hilasteerion in the Septuagint and in the New Testament to represent kapporeth fixes the meaning of it. Hilasteerion never means a covering. What is said of the "mercy-seat" shows that it designates something different to a lid. *Kaphar* and its derivatives, being applied to express atonement, are never used in their primary sense in the Bible. The words are set apart to ex-

press the higher meaning which is always connected with every use of the word. That kapporeth meant more than a mere lid is shown by its modern use. The Jews have a ceremony on the preparation for the Day of Atonement called "Kapporeth," in which the idea of substitution is forcibly brought out.

Last, but not least, when we leave the type and come to the Lord Jesus, he himself is the true kapporeth. "Whom God hath set forth." For what? "A propitiation" — Greek hilasteerion, Hebrew kapporeth—"through faith in his blood." Christ himself is the kapporeth, the place of mercy, the propitiatory—the mercy-seat. But the non-penal theory has no use for a mercy-seat, and so it becomes a lid, or covering.

3. As Dr. Burney rejects the lexicons, it is disappointing to find that this is his only attempt to explain the Hebrew word used. A very sorry attempt, at the best. We have a right to expect a clear-cut definition when the dictionaries are repudiated. But this Burney does not give, using the word in such a flexible way that it may mean almost any thing. We have looked through his book carefully, and the following extracts give the nearest approach to a definition that we have found:

Burney.—"Here we have atonement in its full sense, including reconciliation, propitiation, and pardon."—Page 156.

"This is atonement—propitiation and reconciliation."—Page 148.

"The atoning, or propitiating power."—Page 174.

"The atonement or propitiation."—Page 190.

Comment.—1. Why is pardon left out in the second, and pardon and reconciliation in the two last? If it includes all three, it is not synonymous with propitiation, because Burney insists upon the distinction between propitiation and reconciliation. God is propitiated, man is reconciled. As atonement is not made *to* men, but *for* men, how can it include reconciliation if God is not reconciled?

2. In the last two quotations he makes atonement and propitiation to be synonymous. This is true as to the original, as the Greek word translated "propitiation" everywhere translates the Hebrew for atonement in the Septuagint.

Burney.—"Here we have a real atonement, a deliverance from temporal death, by a turning away or appeasement of God's indignation."—Page 173.

Comment.—1. What is an unreal atonement?

2. Burney has been confounding condition and consequent so much when dealing with substitution that it comes back to plague him in his own argument. Atonement is never "deliverance from temporal death," but we may be (if that is threatened) delivered from temporal death by making atonement, or appeasing the anger.

Burney.—"These atonements consisted exclusively in turning away God's anger—that is, in making him merciful or propitious."—Page 188.

Comment.—1. "Making him merciful" is objectionable.

2. After comparing these extracts, it can be seen that Dr. Burney has no well-defined meaning for the word "atonement."

In connection with them read the definition of Gesenius, as given in our introduction. It is clear, scholarly, and unanswerable. Starting (as all true definitions must) with the root meaning of the word—"to cover"—Gesenius makes atonement to consist in appeasing the anger of God by a *covering over* of the offense. Whatever does this satisfies—expiates—and thus appeases. It is this idea of covering over by making satisfaction that Burney seems to reject. He ignores the root meaning of the word—ignores the covering of sin by an expiation—and makes atonement simply to mean the making God favorable. This is all we can gather from his book.

The idea "to cover" is primary and essential to the word *kaphar* in every use of it. Take as illustrations the two first instances of its use in the Bible.

(*a*) Gen. vi. 14: "*Pitch it* within and without with pitch."

This is as near its primary meaning as can be. It is like the words "paint it"—that is, cover it over, with pitch. The ark was a type of Christ (1 Peter iii. 21), the true ark, and hence the use of kaphar here is significant. As one writer says,

"The gopher wood, the material of the ark, I can say little of, but it speaks of death (the tree

cut down) as that by which alone death could be met for us. The "pitch" is kopher, ... probably a resin from the gopher wood itself, identical, too, with the word "atonement" in one of its forms. Here, it seems to me, is the first hint we find in Scripture of something beyond death which is implied in and needed for atonement. Not the gopher wood alone would have kept out the waters of judgment. Not death alone lay upon men, and for true substitution not death alone needed to be borne. . . . . The kaphar must pitch the seams of the ark of salvation, that it may bring its freight of living souls safely through the flood."

(*b*) Gen. xxxii.: "I will *appease* him with the present."

Jacob had wronged Esau, and fearing his anger he sought to appease (kaphar) that anger by the present that he sent. This present was to "cover" over his offense, and thus *appease*, or propitiate.

This present was an expiation—a satisfaction—and by it he sought to *atone* for his offense. But we have made sufficiently plain the meaning of atonement.

Dr. Burney next gives some Bible examples of the meaning of the word, as being out of harmony with the idea of substitution. As they all bring out substitution in the strongest light, we will examine his exegesis and endeavor to show their true meaning. The first example, Lev. xvi. 20, Atonement for the Holy Place, etc., we have already explained in the chapter on the Day of Atonement, so it only remains to examine the exposition of Dr. Burney.

Burney.—"The holy place had no sins to be punished, but God required it to be relieved of such uncleanness as comes of connection with the unclean; as the uncleanness that comes of contact with a dead body. But the same sacrificial blood that sanctifies to the purifying of the flesh of the worshiper is capable of sanctifying to the ritual purification of the altar and holy place (Heb. ix. 13, 21, 22). By the blood, the altar, etc., were sanctified—to sanctify is to make holy, to consecrate to God, and whatever is thus sanctified is acceptable, or well pleasing to him.

"But to make acceptable is to make atonement. . . .

"The penal theory requires us to believe that the sufferings of the kid were penal, and that these sufferings made atonement for the altar, or rendered it acceptable to God; and thus requires us to believe that God substitutionally punished the altar, in order to make it acceptable to him, or in order to reconcile himself to it. If this is credible, nothing is incredible."—Page 165.

Comment.—1. Dr. Burney sees nothing but "penal" sufferings everywhere. He has spiritual "color blindness." He can not see that truth is many-sided, that the work of Christ has many relations, and is therefore presented under many aspects. No substitutionist holds that there was a vicarious punishment of the holy place, nor is it the logical outcome of their theory.

2. It was rather a typical purification than a "ritual" (like that for a dead body). It is expressly said,

"It was *therefore* necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these;

but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these."—Heb. ix. 23.

This verse brings out several things of importance.

First. That the purification was typical of one made for the heavenly things themselves. Does Burney believe this last was "ritual" also? How will he apply the type?

Second. This purification was linked with the blood shed for the "remission of sins;" that is the force of the "therefore."

Third. The passage does not teach that heaven needed to be purified, but the "heavenly things." As Christians, we are made "to sit together in heavenly places," being "partakers of the heavenly calling." This is the result of union with Christ. We are regarded, in reference to our standing, as taken out of the world, as being in the heavenly place. But to bring us there, sin must be remitted; hence the typical atonement for the holy place. See exposition in full in "Day of Atonement."

Burney.—"*Poll tax atonement*" (Ex. xxx. 11–16). —Page 168.

Comment.—This title is taking, but misleading and unscriptural. It was not a poll-tax that made atonement (even if we call it a poll-tax), but the money was given "*for* atonement."

Burney.—"This atonement, as appears from the facts, was made not to secure a return of lost favor, but to prevent the loss of favor already in posses-

sion; just as by paying our taxes we prevent the fines and penalties which come from not paying them. In this regard this atonement is in exact accord with the lid or covering of the ark of the covenant.

It *protects* from injury rather than delivers from evils previously incurred.

No blood was shed . . . . and no sins were remitted, because there were none to remit.

This atonement was not made by a priest, because the particular sin to which it related, not having been committed, no mediator was necessary. Every man was his own atoner, just as any man, not guilty of any particular sin, may secure divine favor by avoiding that sin.

This atonement, called a *ransom* for the soul, consisting purely and exclusively of personal obedience to the perceptive requirements of the law. It was atonement by perfect obedience and by suffering of no kind, penal or otherwise. On this wise the unfallen angels, I suppose, make atonement, propitiate, satisfy justice, law, God, and conscience, and enjoy perfect and continuous blessedness."—Page 169.

Comment.—It is somewhat difficult to analyze Burney's positions, because he rejects the received meaning of the word atonement, and uses it so loosely. If atonement is to propitiate "by turning away God's anger," where is the atonement from the stand-point of Dr. Burney's exegesis? "It *protects* from injury," but does not deliver from evils previously incurred. Burney has to juggle with the word to get an atonement out of the "tax." He leaves out the idea of turning away the anger of God, and makes atonement to be a keeping away

of that anger, and then has the angels making atonement in heaven! This atonement does not deliver, although a "*ransom!*" It does not turn away anger, for no sin has been committed, yet it propitiates! On the positive side, he seems to make atonement and obedience to be synonymous—"this atonement consisted purely and exclusively of personal obedience." We should think that where there is personal obedience there could be no propitiation, unless God is angry because of what we might do, even if it never occurred.

The true exegesis of the passage is, that the money was given to the Lord, not as making atonement, but to "make an atonement." The use to which it was put points this out.

"Thou shalt take the atonement money of the children of Israel and shalt appoint it *for the service* of the tabernacle of the congregation, that *it may be* a memorial unto the children of Israel before the Lord, to make an atonement for your souls."—Lev. xxx. 16.

Here the reason for the "tax" is seen. If God was to take up his abode with his people, it could only be on the ground that gave them a standing before him. Hence, the tabernacle, its ritual, and its service. The blood was the ground of all, "for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." It was the tabernacle that God dwelt within. These things entailed expense, hence the gift; or, as Dr. Burney calls it, the "tax." It was that which was done with the money, when by its means the tabernacle was set up, that atonement was made.

Rich and poor must give alike, all are on common ground, as to atonement.

Burney.—"Atonement in relation to the golden calf."—Ex. xxxii. 31–33; Deut. ix. 18, 19.

"This is expressly called an atonement (verse 30)."—Page 170.

Comment.—1. This is "*expressly*" what it does not say. The words are "*peradventure* I shall make an atonement." In view of this "peradventure," Burney misses the force of the whole passage.

The Israelites had solemnly covenanted to keep the law. Three times they had made this covenant, "all that the Lord hath said will we do and be obedient." (Ex. xxiv. 3–8; xix. 8.) Before they had entered into this covenant their blessings had been on the ground of *grace*, so that we find no plague, no fiery serpents. But the history of the world is only that of man's failure and the ruin that sin entails, so we find them, within sight of the cloud and the fire, worshiping a golden calf. Moses breaks the tables of stone, commands that the penalty of the law be enforced, and "about three thousand are slain."

The next day Moses upbraids them with their sin and seeks the presence of God, leaving only a "peradventure" for the comfort of the people. Moses earnestly pleads for them, "blot me out," etc. What answer does God give? He answers according to the unbending principles of holy law. The one that has sinned, "*him* will I blot out."

The "peradventure" does not avail, "the soul that sinneth it shall die."

2. Burney quotes Deut. ix. 19, where Moses tells how he fasted and prayed for forty days and nights and the "Lord hearkened unto me at that time also," as proof that the intercession of Moses was expressly called an atonement. How does he link them together? Purely by assumption. Moses had fasted forty days when the law was given. When he went into the mount with a "peradventure," we are not told how long he stopped, but this was not the time referred to in Deuteronomy. The only answer God gave to Moses was, "I will visit their sin upon them." (Ex. xxxii. 35.) So we read, after Moses came down from the mountain, that the Lord plagued the people. Deut. ix. 19, has reference to the time when Moses went up a second time to receive the law, and when on his return his face shone, because God had revealed himself *in grace*, so that he had to cover his face with a veil. A veil that remains for the Jew even to this day.

The people mourn because of the plague, strip themselves of their ornaments (xxxiii. 6), and repent of their sins. Then Moses takes the tabernacle and pitches it "outside the camp," to indicate that God had withdrawn from his people. The eyes of all Israel are turned in that direction, and Moses passes in to seek the Lord in the tabernacle, and *there* grace is extended. Many in our day besides Burney are trying to find atonement at old Sinai. But no *grace* is found *on* Sinai, and Moses comes down

with atonement not made, and God's anger not appeased. But when he seeks him in the tabernacle, on the ground of the blood, how different! There, and there only, grace is found!

Burney.—"God was propitiated, atonement was made, and divine anger turned away, and the people spared, not because their sins were *expiated*, but for Moses' sake.

They were spared not for the sake of what Moses did, but for the sake of what he was, and he was what he was because of what he did, or because of his persistent fidelity and obedience to God and love for his people."—Page 171.

Comment.—Dr. Burney misplaces Deut. ix., so that much of what he says is not pertinent. But if they were pardoned because of the earnest prayers of Moses, it would be something he *did*, after all! Burney confounds Intercession with Atonement.

Burney.—"No typical beast is slain, or sacrificial blood is shed."—Page 171.

Comment.—What an assumption! If he had said that there was no record of a beast being slain, we would have assented. But when he says, dogmatically, no beast is slain, no blood is shed, we simply ask, How do you know? If there is any meaning or lesson in the fact that grace was found in the tabernacle and not on the Mount, it must have been that the law knows no mercy, while the tabernacle stood in the power of the blood. Why was the tabernacle set up? Why did the people look to it in their distress? Where is it recorded

that the daily sacrifice ceased? It is God's fixed law in every age "that without shedding of blood is no remission;" therefore, whether mentioned or not, the logical inference is that the blood was shed, for it is "the blood that maketh an atonement."

Neither exegetically nor typically can he get his non-penal theory out of this scripture.

Burney.—"Atonement for treason."—Num. xvi. 41–48.—Page 172.

"Here we have a real atonement, a deliverance from temporal death, by the turning away or appeasement of God's indignation. What saved the people was the prompt refusal of Moses and Aaron to get out of the way, and their self-sacrificing purpose to share the destiny of their people, to die with them, if they must die. This was obedience to one requirement of the divine law—*loving* their neighbor as themselves. This was heroic fidelity to their people.

But they were not less faithful to the other requirement of that law—loving the Lord their God with all their hearts. This love they demonstrated by their reverence and prostration on their faces and the burning of incense, which is the divinely appointed symbol of confession, prayer, and supplication."—Page 173.

Comment.—1. The conceit that by falling down, Moses and Aaron refused to get out of the way, necessitates a very materialistic idea of the Godhead, and the means by which the plague was inflicted. Dr. Burney seems to think they stood in the way, as if a masked battery was about to be fired. On that supposition, the falling down might have

been the best plan of getting out of the way! Moses and Aaron, by falling down, did not stop the plague, nor is there the slightest evidence that they wanted to share the doom of the people.

2. It is an utter assumption that to share their fate would be a fulfillment of the law of love. The death threatened was the just penalty of the law they had violated. If the law of love required that they should ask to share this penalty, when they are innocent of any part in the sin, then the same logic would require that we ask to *share the fate of the lost!* It might have shown their affection for their people, or their national pride, but not obedience to the law of love, the essence of which is submission to the will of God.

3. If, as Burney argues, it was a command to get *out* of the way, and they remained *in*, then it logically follows that God commanded something wrong, and was propitiated by disobedience! Burney admits the last, and in answer to the question, "How could disobedience please God?" says the command, like that to Abraham, "was a trial of their faith." But Abraham did *not* disobey, nor would it have been wrong to have slain Isaac. If to obey Moses and Aaron would be required to violate the law of love, then the command was wrong; and by giving it, God contradicted himself. Again, this exegesis holds out the idea that they showed more love than God did, and that the punishment was wrong. We have here a moral fog as to the law of love that bewilders us in innumerable absurdities.

4. That Moses and Aaron loved God with all

their hearts, he thinks is shown by their falling down, and by their burning incense. He can find "perfect obedience," whenever his theory requires it, in very little things. From these physical acts he reasons they loved God supremely. And that in the presence of an act of disobedience! At the most, in view of this disobedience (from Dr. Burney's stand-point), all that Burney could claim would be that they loved the people better than they did God.

Was the prostration voluntary, or involuntary? Was it an act of worship or *of fear?* Does it imply that they prostrated themselves as an act of worship, or that the fearful announcement so overcame them that they "fell upon their faces" from fear and horror? Which is the most natural? What would be the emotions aroused *at once* by such an announcement, worship or fear?

Again, Burney's exposition of the incense is out of all harmony with the teaching of the Bible, and is the cause of his failure to see a "real" atonement in this place. He makes the incense—"the *divinely appointed* symbol of confession, prayer, and supplication," *which it never is.* The only verse that links incense and prayer is Rev. viii. 3, which shows that it is not a symbol of prayer.

"And there was given unto him much incense, that he should offer it *with* the prayers of all saints upon the golden altar which was before the throne. And the smoke of the incense, which came *with the* prayers of the saints."

It was the incense that gave efficacy *to* the prayers, as the Greek more emphatically shows.

What is this incense that as a sweet smell goes up to God, and gives efficacy to the prayers of God's people?

In this connection we remember that the burnt-offering is, literally, the *incense*-offering, it being the same Hebrew word that is translated "burnt" and "incense." The brazen altar was literally the incense altar. We have shown the meaning of the burnt-offering in the chapter on the offerings. What was incense at the brazen altar was at the golden, also. The fire on the brazen altar never went out, night or day—the infinite value of Christ's work being ever before God. With the fire from this altar, the incense must be burnt, and the death of Aaron's sons shows the fearful result of burning "strange fire."

When on the Day of Atonement the high-priest went into the holiest with the blood, the incense must first be burnt, the cloud of smoke ascend, and the sweet smell penetrate into every part of the tabernacle. What is it that answers to all this? Nothing, absolutely nothing, but the merits of Christ's atoning sacrifice. This is a sweet smell before the Lord, this is the ground of approach, it is this that gives efficacy to the prayers of saints. To come with any other merit is to bring "strange fire." God grant that Burney's theory may not cause men to come with "strange fire," only to perish before the Lord.

With this exposition, how clear and how grand was the atonement made by Aaron! Bringing the censer with its burning incense, he swings it

between the Lord and the plague-stricken people; and as the sweet smell of the incense goes up, the all-atoning merit of Christ gives *to priestly intercession its power*, and the plague is stayed.

In the same way, this is what enabled the live coal from the altar to "*cleanse*" the "unclean lips" of the prophet (Isa. vi.).

Burney.—"Atonement for seduction (Num. xxv.)."—Page 174.

"This atonement may on first thought seem to be essentially different from all others mentioned in the Bible. But upon reflection we find that while it differs in external form from all others, it is in essence—in the mental states—generically like all others. Righteous indignation is the *obtrusive* form of feeling displayed.

"This, however, was the natural outgrowth of his zeal for his God, and jealousy for his honor, and this again was the natural and necessary psychological consequence of his love to God and love to his people.

"The same love and devotion to God and his people that prompted Moses to fast and pray forty days, and to ask to be blotted out of God's book, if his offending brethren should be destroyed, prompted Phinehas to vindicate the honor of God and avenge the insult offered to his people.

"This atonement, we can not fail to observe, was made *by a priest*, formally consecrated to the office of mediator. The same act performed by any one not recognized as a priest, it is presumed, would not have been an atonement at all."—Page 175.

Comment.—This is a clear case, and one involving a principle of great value as to atonement, showing, as it does, its connection with priesthood, but not from Burney's stand-point.

Grievous sin had made its appearance in the camp of Israel, and God's anger had been enkindled against them. This anger was primarily against those guilty of the wrong, who merited and *received* the death threatened by the divine law. The anger was also against the entire people (as in the case of Achan), because they *tolerated the evil in the camp.* This must be remembered in explaining the atonement. This anger could only be propitiated by the infliction of the penalty—the death of the offender. Hence, God said to Moses,

"Take all the heads of the people, and hang them up before the Lord, against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord *may be turned away* from Israel. And Moses said unto the judges of Israel, Slay ye every one his men that were joined unto Baal-peor."—Num. xxv. 4, 5.

If there is any meaning in this, it is that those who, by the allurements of the "daughters of Moab," had been led into *idolatry*, should be slain. This was done, and twenty-four thousand died. This execution of the penalty brought grief and mourning, and the people gathered before the tabernacle. At this critical moment, when waiting upon God in penitence, an Israelite brings a Midianitish woman in the sight of all. This was a public outrage. Before, they had failed to punish; now, Phinehas springs forward and at once slays the guilty couple. This zeal for the honor of God relieves Israel of the guilt of indifference, and God's anger is turned away.

First. It was not "atonement for seduction," but atonement for their indifference to the honor of God, in failing to carry out the penalty for adultery and idolatry—the last the more heinous sin.

Second. The guilty idolators were not saved by the zeal of Phinehas; they had already been slain. The action of Phinehas shows that they were no longer tolerant of wrong, that there was a quickened conscience. The prompt execution of the law, as in the case of Achan, appeased God, made an atonement for Israel. A very pointed lesson for the church.

Third. Phinehas *acquired* an "everlasting priesthood" by making this atonement. His atonement was made by the infliction of the penalty, Christ's by bearing it. Both thus acquired a priesthood, for the great lesson is that *priesthood rests upon atonement made.* Both Aaron and Phinehas received an everlasting priesthood; but with this difference: Aaron was called, Phinehas acquired it, and was afterward consecrated. Christ both acquired his priesthood and was called to it.

Much confusion exists generally as to priesthood; but mainly because of the theories of theologians of the Calvinistic school. Here is the great weakness of Dr. Burney's theory. He practically accepts the Calvinistic idea of the work of the priest, seeking only a different application of it. With such mistaken views of priesthood, it is small wonder that he should reject substitution.

(*a*) All through his book Burney builds arguments and frames objections upon the assumed fact

that *the priest must kill the victim.* For example, one section has this heading: "The priest becomes an executioner before he acts the part of a mediator." The whole section, italics and all, with its play upon "penal sacrifice," etc., is of no force in view of the fact that *the priestly work did not begin until after the victim was killed!* Both the non-penal theory and Calvinism rest upon this same misconception of the priest's work.

While the killing *may* be done by a priest—as on the Day of Atonement—it was generally done by the offerer himself. The offerer was distinct from the priest; and, while the same person might act as both, the offering was entirely distinct from the priestly work. If the killing had been priestly work, it could never have been done *but by a priest;* so that when done by others it enables us to distinguish between the offerer and the priest.

"If any man of you bring an offering, ... he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering; and *it* shall be *accepted for* him to make atonement for him. And *he* shall kill the bullock before the Lord; and the *priests*, Aaron's sons, *shall bring the blood.*"—Lev. i. 1–6.

"The elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock before the Lord; and the bullock shall be killed before the Lord."—Lev. iv. 15. See also i. 11, iii. 2, iii. 8, iii. 12, iv. 24, etc.

These texts show the law. The sinner *or his representative* brings the victim and presents it before the Lord. It is then "accepted *for* him."

After its acceptance, not before, it is slain *by the* offerer, whether it be the man or the priest acting as offerer. It was never slain by the priest unless the priest was the one who offered it. After the blood had been shed, the work of the priest began. This fact is of paramount importance in explaining the meaning of the blood, and is utterly out of harmony with the non-penal theory.

No offering, however, could be completed without a priest; because no sinner, as such, can come into the presence of God. But it was the blood, the memorial of accomplished sacrifice—telling of the result of that sacrifice—that *the priest presented to God.*

It is a common thought that Christ's priesthood is linked with sin bearing; but it is not the Bible statement.

(*b*) It will help us to understand the priestly work of Christ to remember that it is *exercised in the holy* place, and began only when he ascended into heaven.

"For if he were on earth, he should *not* be a priest."—Heb. viii. 4.

His work on earth qualified him for his priesthood, as the whole argument in Hebrews shows; but it is on the ground of atonement alone that his priesthood is exercised.

(*c*) Beside the work of presenting the blood to God, Christ's work as priest consists of intercession.

Christ's intercession is twofold. As priest, he intercedes with God; as advocate, with the Father. The one is *preventive*, the other is *restorative.*

His intercession as advocate is exercised when sin has been committed and the Father's face hidden from the child. Communion rests upon the blood, confession, and intercession. This is presented in John's Epistle, and links itself with the truth as to "Feet Washing."

His intercession as priest is distinct from this. Its great object is the prevention of apostasy, the securing of the eternal salvation of the believer. One is connected with standing, securing it always as divinely perfect; the other is connected with the walk. The priesthood of Aaron was exercised in connection with "the law of a carnal commandment;" that of Christ is "the *power* of an endless life."

"But this man, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood. *Wherefore* he is able to save to the uttermost (τὸ παντελὲς—*to panteles*—to the end of time) that come to God by him."—Heb. vii. 24; Rom. viii. 34.

(*d*) Christ's work as priest is exercised in making our *worship* acceptable to God.

"By (διὰ, *dia*, through) him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise to God continually."—Heb. xiii. 15.

"To offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God *by* Jesus Christ."

The incense must give efficacy to the prayers, the praise, the worship of God's people.

Priesthood *rests upon atonement made.*

CHAPTER XX.

BURNEY ON THE OFFERINGS.

Burney.—"But, if I have not greatly deceived myself, the facts connected with these tabernacle atonements are strongly adverse to the notion of penality."—Page 227.

Comment.—The words "tabernacle atonements" as designating the offerings, are objectionable. The word "offerings" is the one used in the Bible, and where we have Bible terms they should always be used. To substitute others, as in this case, is always to obscure the truth.

All the offerings were not sacrifices. The meat-offering is separate from the rest in that it did not require the death of a victim, hence it is never called a sacrifice. For the same reason no atonement was made by the meat-offering, and no sins were remitted. An offering was, therefore, more than atonement. Atonement as made by the tabernacle offerings would have been better, and left the truth unimpaired.

Burney then enumerates the facts connected with the offerings that are opposed to the idea of penalty. His statements as to how penalists explain them, we pass by. They are gravely put forth as the views of penalists—and doubtless he thinks

fairly, for he says "no penalist can object," yet we doubt if the most extreme substitutionist of the highest Calvinistic order would assent to them. Certainly we reject them, being a mere caricature of the views of penalists. If they embody his belief as to what substitution means, small wonder he rejects it! Who would not?

Burney.—"1. The sacrificial victim must be perfect of its kind—without fault or blemish.

2. In sacrifices for individuals the worshiper must bring the victim to the altar.

3. The hands of the worshiper must be laid upon the head of this victim.

4. The victim must be killed by the officiating priest.

5. Its blood must be sprinkled upon the altar, which sanctified it and made it acceptable to God, or propitiatory in the interest of the worshiper. On the great day of atonement, when the sacrifice was made for all the people indiscriminately, the blood must be sprinkled by the high-priest upon the ark of the covenant, or mercy-seat in the holy of holies (see Lev. xvi.)."—Page 227.

Comment.—Burney's facts are not all facts, not even a majority of them, which is unfortunate for the "non-penal theory." Of the five—so called—facts given above, only two, the first and the third, are such.

The worshiper brought the offering to "*the door of the tabernacle*," where it was accepted for him. After it was slain, the priest took the blood and such of the body as was burnt, and the priest brought them to the altar. In the sin-offering, the

body never came to the altar at all, being burnt "outside the camp."

Number four we have already examined. As we have shown, *the offerer* (whether worshiper or priest), not the priest, killed the victim. Burney's trouble is in not discriminating between the offerings. His theory has no use for so many.

Number five. The blood was put in different places in the different offerings, but *never on the ark.* The mercy-seat *was not* the ark.

In the burnt-offering, the blood was sprinkled "round about" the brazen altar. (Lev. i. 5.) If a bird was offered, the blood was "wrung out by the side of the altar." (Lev. i. 15.)

In the peace-offering, the blood was sprinkled "upon the altar round about." (Lev. iii. 2.)

In the trespass-offering, sprinkled upon the side, and poured, or *drained* out, at the bottom. (Lev. v. 9.)

In the sin-offering, the blood was not put upon the brazen altar at all. It was sprinkled before the veil of the sanctuary, poured out at the base of the brazen altar, and placed upon *the horns* of the *golden* altar. These are all-important distinctions, teaching great truths, and are utterly out of harmony with the non-penal theory.

That God was made favorable by the blood is true, for it is the blood that makes atonement; but that the blood was ever sanctified, or made acceptable to God, the Bible *never affirms.* This may be essential to the non-penal theory, but as the planks of its platform are all unsound, this one is also.

They were forbidden to eat blood. Why? "I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls." What God *gives* does not need to be sanctified. To be sanctified and to be holy is the same, the words translating the same Hebrew and Greek words. The idea that Christ's humanity needed to be sanctified is to deny his holiness—rank blasphemy. If our readers will look through the type to the antitype, they will see how repulsive to the best instincts of the Christian would be the thought of the blood being sanctified, read in the light of what it would mean. In his mad effort to destroy substitution, Dr. Burney will, if his positions are logically carried out to their ultimate analysis, destroy the glory of the person of the Lord Jesus himself.

The blood placed on the mercy-seat by the high-priest, was for the eye of God—the memorial of a finished sacrifice. But when the blood was placed upon the altar, it was for the eye of man, for God says, "I have given it to you upon the altar." How could the blood have been *on* the altar—which even the non-penal theory makes a representation of Christ's divinity—if not as God's gift? It turns our eyes to a divine Savior, dying *for* us, and tells that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." Our readers can readily see which exegesis is most in harmony with the facts.

Burney's facts being so shaky, we may believe that his whole house is unsafe; and it must be condemned as uninhabitable by all competent architects.

As to the two facts that are such, Burney gives the following reasons why they are not in harmony with substitution.

Burney.—"It makes the sacrificial kid represent two contradictory things at the same time, viz.: the holiness and innocence of Christ, and the unholiness and guilt of the sinful worshiper."—Page 229.

Comment.—The being "without blemish" is the necessary qualification for its being "accepted for him." The idea that the guilt ever becomes Christ's is Burney's, not ours. No substitutionist so believes. Dr. Burney can not see this, because of his views of the relation of sin and penalty. Rejecting these as in conflict with all the facts, being simply a "fiction" of a theologian, we have no such difficulty.

Burney.—"If the moral government is sufficiently pliable to allow a kid, incapable of guilt in any sense, to bear the sin of the offerer and to die in his stead, then we have a penal death without sin, and why might we not have sin without a penal death? The penalist, I think, can not answer."—Page 230.

Comment.—1. This means, if God's government admits of substitution. That, of course, is for God himself to say, and is the issue. What follows may be understood in several ways.

2. Dr. Burney holds that criminality and penalty have the relation of cause and effect; if his argument is from that stand-point, his "if" means nothing, he is simply playing with his readers.

3. If he means that a kid is "incapable of guilt in any sense," and, therefore, on the substitutionist's own theory the death has no connection with the sin, we say that he fails to understand the position of the substitutionist. Kent, the great legal authority, says, "a ship *incurs guilt* by the violation of a blockade." This shows a recognized meaning of the word "guilt"—that is, liability to penalty—which Dr. Burney constantly overlooks. In this sense of the word, which is perhaps its *primary* meaning, when the kid is "accepted *for* him," it becomes guilty—liable to the death penalty—and at once it is slain. This is only a type, but it shows that Burney's statement that it is "incapable of guilt in any sense," is not true.

4. Substitution being true, we have a penal death without criminality, and in *the same sense* criminality without a penal death. If the criminality is ours, and the suffering is Christ's, both must be true, as on no other ground is substitution possible. As the criminality does not become Christ's, if he died for us substitutionally, his death must have been "a penal death without sin." On the other hand, if we are saved at all, in any sense, from the "second death," which is *after* the judgment, we have "sin without a penal death." If Burney means more than this, his meaning is not plain. He runs "amuck" with his penalty and sin causally connected.

Burney.—"The generic import of the rite as used in the Old and New Testaments is benediction."

"Imposition of hands and lifting up of hands in prayer seem to be substantially the same thing, or are expressive of the same mental states."—Page 241.

Comment.—1. To this last we dissent, believing them to be "substantially" different, as any good concordance will show.

2. Laying on of hands was the sign of *identity*, and when a benediction was pronounced, as in the case of Jacob, it showed symbolically that the one on whose head the hands were laid was the one identified with the blessing. Thus it was possible to rob Esau of his blessing. That it is in conflict with substitution is so wild a statement that we can say the very opposite is true, and no substitution is possible without it. (See Spirit Baptism.)

Dr. Burney next considers the scape-goat. As we have given a full exposition of the Day of Atonement, and do not hold the theory of Dr. Hodge, we pass by what he says in review of Hodge. We confine ourselves to an examination of Burney's own exposition.

Burney.—"Two things are indispensable to salvation, viz.: first, atonement in the sense of propitiation; and secondly, atonement in the sense of reconciliation. The first pertains exclusively to God; the second to men. God is never reconciled, but is propitiated. Men are never propitiated, but are reconciled."—Page 253.

Comment.—1. As we have repeatedly shown, atonement and propitiation is the same thing in the Bible. "Atonement in the sense of reconciliation,"

would be the same as propitiation in the sense of reconciliation.

2. Burney applies every passage which speaks of reconciliation, to the sinner as being reconciled to God. Let us see:

"And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation, to wit: that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation.

"Now, then, we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech by us, we pray in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God."—2 Cor. v. 18–20.

That it is God, and not the sinner, who is here said to be reconciled, the following considerations will show:

First. The reconciliation is as universal as propitiation—"the *world.*" When was this done? When Christ was fulfilling his mission. Not God *is* in Christ, but "*was;*" showing that this reconciliation for the world was made at the cross. In exactly the same sense in which Christ is a propitiation for all, he reconciles all to God. We have fully shown this general view of the cross, which shows why Paul speaks of the reconciliation objectively rather than subjectively.

Secondly. The manner in which it is done. Certainly sinners are not reconciled to God by "not imputing their trespasses to them." But God reconciles the world *to himself* in that way. He can never

reconcile them "to himself," never deal with them in grace, never save, so long as sin stands between them and himself.

Third. The ministry committed is a "word of reconciliation," it is the message of "good-will" to men. God no longer angry. All barriers removed —the word of reconciliation.

Fourth. While God *has* reconciled the world unto himself, the sinner needs *to be* reconciled unto God. One tells of what has been done, the other of what has to be. The exhortation to be reconciled is unmeaning if the world has been reconciled to God. This it does not teach. "Reconciling the world unto himself," is not synonymous with the world being reconciled to God.

3. There is no instance in the Bible where the word *is applied to men*, where it means any thing else than propitiation. Jacob tried to "*appease*"—propitiate—Esau by the present. In the same way God is appeased—propitiated—by the work of his Son. The atonement discussed in these pages, is made to God, not to men. Nowhere can we find an illustration of an atonement with the double-barrelled action that Burney seems to give it, one aimed at God—propitiating; the other at men—reconciling.

Burney.—"*Mark this fact, that it was not the sacrificial goat, but the scape-goat that bore, or carried away sin.*"—Page 254.

Comment.—He repeats it so often that it is evident he believes it has tremendous force against

substitution. But we emphasize it as strongly as Dr. Burney does. It is the ground of our medium theory. But it is fatal to Burney's non-penal theory, as we will show when we come to examine him upon the atonement of Christ.

Burney.—"It is the living Christ, not the dead, that *justifies*, that *saves*. Hundreds of texts might be cited proving this fact. It is sufficient to refer to the following: Rom. iii. 25; iv. 35; 2 Cor. v. 17, 18; Isa. xliii. 25; Gal. vi. 14.

On the contrary, there are no texts that refer our salvation directly to what Christ, as a sacrifice for sin, did or suffered."—Page 255.

Comment.—1. No one disputes that it is the living Christ who saves. As Christ is alive in heaven, if he saves any one, they must be saved by a living Christ. But while this is what Dr. Burney says, this is not what he means; for farther on he says, "Who justifies and saves by imparting his own nature to those united to him by faith." In the light of this, it seems he is talking of *how* Christ saves, not *who*. In this he has shifted the ground somewhat.

2. That no text refers our salvation to what Christ did or suffered, is the very opposite of the truth. Not to burden the reader with texts, the following are sufficient to refute this:

"He was *wounded* for our transgressions."—Isa. liii. 5.

"Justified *by his blood*."—Rom. v. 9.

"Reconciled to God *by the death* of his Son."—Rom. v. 10.

3. Equally with Burney, we believe in the work of a living Christ imparting life to the believer; but unlike him, we believe the *death* as essential as the resurrection.

Burney.—" 'When thou shalt make his soul (life) an offering for sin.' His death was sacrificial and therefore not penal, for, as we have seen, a penal sacrifice is a contradiction in the adjective."—Page 261.

"*A penal sacrifice?* A monstrosity I venture to say the world never saw, and never will; because it is a contradiction in the adjective, and a thing in itself impossible.

All sacrifices are acts of religious worship. No penalties are or can be voluntary, as has been shown. Sacrifice is an act expressive of obedience, reverence, love to God. Penalty is an expression of God's displeasure against the disobedient. *A penal sacrifice!!* Think of it, and explain it, if you can. Shall we say it is an act of religious worship, which has the effect of a penalty? Then, the less worship, the less penalty. Or, shall we say it is a penalty which has the effect of religious worship? Then Satan and his hosts fare about as well as the worshiping angels."—Page 234.

Comment.—1. What a flight of fancy!! What does Burney mean here by worship? If he means what Jesus did when he speaks of the "true worshipers," who worship God in spirit and in truth, then we deny that sacrifice was an act of worship. If he means simply that it was part of the religious ceremonies of the Jews, we agree.

2. His definition of sacrifice—"an act expressive of obedience, reverence, love to God"—can not

be received. No dictionary so defines it; it can not be found in the words used. Take for example the one in Isaiah, which Burney gives: "Thy *sin-offering*" translates the Hebrew word אָשָׁם (*asham*). This word means, primarily, "*fault*, *blame*, *guilt*, which one contracts." And from this a sacrifice for fault or guilt—a *trespass*-offering. It is the same word in the Hebrew that is translated "sin" and "sin-offering." How can Burney get his definition from this, especially when we remember that the trespass-offering, like the sin-offering, was *not* a "sweet savor." Burney's definition is a pure assumption, for which he will never give any proof.

3. Burney fails to apprehend the true idea of a worshiper, and the true place of worship.

Sacrifice was *the basis* of all acceptable worship. The man must first be forgiven before he becomes a worshiper. How can we approach God acceptably, how can we enter the holiest as worshipers, unless the question of sin has been settled at the altar, and our feet have been washed at the laver? A strange medley, a very babel of confusion, would be the worship of Christendom on any such foundation. Alas, we have too much of babel, and not enough of Christ, already! Spiritual worship can never be rendered where the conscience has not been perfectly cleansed by the blood, and communion enjoyed in fullness by the soul. Sacrifice then, not as an act of worship, but as the true basis of worship. Without shedding of blood no remission, and without remission no true worship.

The whole system of Mosaic sacrifices is, how-

ever, utterly irreconcilable with the non-penal theory. No explanation, when applied to the antitype, will give us any rational conception of Christ's work.

Suppose we take Dr. Burney's own explanation, that it is the offering up of the *life*—the consecration of the life—to God. Then, logically, the sacrifice can only represent the sinner, which is in opposition to the Bible, that always represents Christ as the victim. If it represents the consecration of the life of the worshiper, how can this be done by the death of Christ, if not vicariously?

It is here that we find confusion in Dr. Burney's book. Making the same thing to represent the death of Christ and the offering of the life of the offerer. Dr. Burney finds it impossible to harmonize them, and so leaves his non-penal theory, as we shall find, in the fog.

The non-penal theory will never give a clear-cut explanation of the Mosaic sacrifices, that will be logical, self-consistent, and understood.

Dr. Burney's idea that God was worshiped by the countless sacrifices of Judaism, reduces the religion of the Jews to the level of heathenism. Skeptics speak of the savage butchery of these sacrifices as an objection to the teaching of the Old Testament. Dr. Burney enters a plea of guilty when he makes this wholesale slaughter an act of worship, "expressive of obedience, reverence, and love to God." He thus places the Mosaic sacrifices on ground that is indefensible by reason, because repugnant to the best instincts of the race.

CHAPTER XXI.

BURNEY ON THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST.

Having followed Dr. Burney in his examination of the types and found him so far at fault, it necessarily follows that his theory, in its application to the great antitype, will be also.

Burney.—"Section I.—The obedience of Christ—in what sense he obeyed the law."—Page 194.

Comment.—His theory reduces the obedience of Christ entirely to law-keeping. "Made under the law," he kept it in every jot and tittle, and this is the sum of what is meant by Christ's obedience, according to Burney. If this be true, we can never have a perfect standing until our life is perfect; or else Christ's law-keeping must be imputed to us for righteousness. Can Dr. Burney ever reconcile his theory with the perfect standing every believer has in Christ according to the Bible? "Ye *are* clean every whit" is *never* true from Burney's standpoint.

Burney.—"The law under which he was born is the great moral law, which is conservative of the harmony and happiness of the moral world."—Page 194.

Comment.—1. Then his obedience that led him to come *from* heaven was law keeping also.

2. The law only required love to a neighbor.

"It hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies."

This went beyond the requirement of law. Christ proclaimed a grander law of love. This must not be forgotten. We are apt to judge the morals of the Jew—the imprecations of the Psalms, the manner in which they treated their enemies, and the many similar facts in their history—by the standard of Christian ethics. This goes far beyond the law as a rule of action.

Burney.—"Paul says (Phil. ii. 8): 'Christ being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.'

"This teaches that Christ's death was an act of obedience to the law—the 'one act of righteousness (by which) the free gift came upon all men' (Rom. v. 18), or the one act of obedience by which he becomes the Redeemer of them that are under the law, not by fulfilling the law in their stead, but by making those that trust in him partakers of his own personal obedience, or righteousness."—Page 194.

Comment.—1. Phil. ii. 8, teaches that Christ's death was an act of obedience, but it does not teach that it was "obedience *to the law.*" This last is Burney's addition to the Bible. He came to do the Father's will, and his death was obedience to that will, but not to the law.

2. Christ's obedience was his death, yet Dr. Burney says we are made "partakers of his own personal

obedience," which is a sheer impossibility. How can we be made partakers of the personal obedience of another?

3. He makes Christ's death "the one act of obedience," "the one act of righteousness." In the last he follows the New Translation. The old reads, "by the righteousness of one." We have examined some six translations besides, and the revised is the only one that so renders it. The Greek reads, *ὡὐτω καὶ δὲ ἑνὸς δικαιώματος, εἰς πάντας ανθρώπους, εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωης.*

"Even so by one righteousness toward all men, for justification of life." Or, "by righteousness of one."

The same word is translated "justification" in verse 16 of the Revised Version, and why it is rendered "one act of righteousness" here, we can not understand, nor do we believe it can be maintained.

The verb *δικαιωσις* expresses the *act* of justifying or making righteous. The noun *δικαιωμα*, the *state* of righteousness or justification that results from this act. How they can get the act out of the state we can not see.

But even if we accept the new translation, it must be in a sense which excludes Burney's "act of *obedience.*" That most certainly *δικαιωμα* never can be.

Burney.—"I answer, it was preceptive obedience—the doing *purposely*, and even *joyfully* (Heb. xii. 2), just what the law required him to do."—Page 196.

Comment.—A precept is a command intended as a rule of action. An *act* of obedience (if preceptive) implies that the specific thing done was commanded to be done. But Christ's death was never commanded by the law.

Burney.—"If Moses, under a higher degree of mental agony, had died on this occasion [when he said, Blot me out of thy book], he would have died of love, or obedience; from loving God and his neighbor as himself—not in their stead, but on their account.

"We know that the human organism is capable of only a limited amount of mental disturbance. Excessive joy and excessive grief often induce death. Christ's sinlessness probably rendered him pre-eminently capable of love or obedience unto death from mental suffering . . . This liability to death, he, of course, had power to overcome. But this was not his purpose. He came to lay down his life for man—to give it for men. This life was all he had to give, all he could give. This obedience unto death was just what the law required—not a *jot* more nor less."—Page 196.

Comment.—1. This is a strange philosophy. That loving ever directly killed any one is an absurdity. As the love that is commanded by law requires, in order to obedience, an act of the will, it follows that a man may put an end to his own life by an act of will alone, if Burney's philosophy is true.

A sudden shock when the constitution is weak, or the heart is diseased, may cause death, or a person may pine away from unrequited love, but no one was ever killed by loving. If Dr. Burney means

that his love led him to endure great mental agony or suffering, and this suffering resulted in his death, that is another thing. If there was no direct necessity for this agony or suffering, as when a man injures himself in saving the life of another, then the law of love can not require it. The suffering can never be required unless a direct benefit comes from the suffering itself.

A mother grieves over the waywardness of her son, and this grief leads to her death. But is it in fulfillment of the law of love that she dies? By no means. Love to God implies trust and submission, and where this is found there will never be such excessive grief. Such grief is itself a violation of the law of love. Such love is degraded by selfishness; and such love God never asks.

2. Dr. Burney holds that death is the result of the frailty of the "human organism," but clearly holds that there was no such necessary frailty in Christ. He could only die if he so willed. Passive obedience Burney regards as utterly "inconceivable;" hence he says, "no act of his ministry was more purely voluntary than was his death, which was in the highest sense an act of obedience—not passive, but active." There can be no mistake here. Love itself would never have destroyed Christ; his death had to be his own voluntary act.

A voluntary death never fulfills any law, unless there is a distinct good to be accomplished by that death. If that death was essential to the salvation of men, love would lead him to endure that death.

If it was not essential, then, if voluntary, it was simply suicide.

To say that it was necessary, that he might fulfill the law of love, and then to say that the law of love required it because it was necessary, is to reason in a circle. A need for that death must be shown apart from the law of love, before the law could ever demand that Christ should die. This need the non-penal theory can not show.

Burney.—"Does the law require such obedience of all its subjects? I answer, the law requires us to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves, but it does not require useless sacrifices."—Page 197.

Comment.—This evades the issue. Does the law require me to love until that love shall be so great as to deprive of life? If the law does not require this of all, it does not require it of Christ. A useless sacrifice is no more demanded of Christ than of any one else; and his death would be useless unless a distinct need can be shown for it, and that need is not shown by saying the law of love demands it.

Burney.—"If my soul could be saved only by the sacrifice of my animal life, fidelity to God, and to myself as well, would require the sacrifice.

"But equal love to my neighbor, would, under the same circumstances, require me to make the same sacrifice for him as for myself. But mere human sacrifices can not sanctify, nor save sinners. Hence, mere men are not required to offer themselves in sacrifice in such a manner and for such a purpose."—Page 198.

Comment.—1. That a man should sacrifice his life to save his soul, if necessary, is contradictory. We can not conceive of any case where suicide would be right.

2. As we can not make such a sacrifice for ourselves, it is equally impossible for us to make such a sacrifice for our neighbors. What good could one man's suicide do another? None, but positive harm. To call such suicide a sacrifice is absurd. We call special attention to this because it is the great effort to explain that which is fatal to the non-penal theory, namely, the utter impossibility of giving a rational explanation of the sufferings and death of Christ.

Burney.—"But Christ was not a mere man, but the God-man. This union of the human with the divine rendered him capable of redeeming humanity by the sacrifice of himself. This the law required him to do, just as it would require me to sacrifice my body for the sake of my soul, if it could be saved in no other way."—Page 198.

Comment.—As Dr. Burney admits, the voluntary death of a mere man would avail nothing, hence, would be simply suicide. But he argues that the death of Christ would avail, because he is the God-man. And because his death would "sanctify and save," the law of love demands it. We ask, Was this obedience rendered by him as man or as God? If he says as God, then it would be God loving himself. If as man, Burney has shown that man's voluntary death would be of no avail.

As Dr. Burney repudiates any theandric acts, and

denies the real theandric character of Christ, how will he make Christ's death differ from that of a mere man?"

The truth is that the non-penal theory, while professing to avoid the weak places of Calvinistic substitution, is open to the same objections itself, while bristling with absurdities that Calvinism was never charged with. It is but another illustration of the inconsistencies of error. As Dr. Burney denies that Christ did any thing not purely human or divine, what he here says is unmeaning.

Burney.—"Paul asserts this obligation of Christ to humanity when he says (Gal. iv. 4): 'God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem them who were under the law.'

"Christ himself affirms it when he says, after his resurrection (Luke xxiv. 26):

"'*Ought* not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory,' and (verse 46), 'Thus it is written and thus it *behooved* Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day.'"

Comment.—This is Burney's proof that Christ's death was required by the law, the words in italics, he thinks, indicating this obligation.

If our readers will examine Luke, they will find that the argument there is that this obligation came from the fact that it was predicted. Having shown that it was taught in the Bible that Christ should die, he asks them, "Ought not," etc. Not one word about the law.

Burney.—"1. But you ask, how comes this loving obedience unto death to be an all-sufficient

sacrifice for the sins of the whole brotherhood of humanity?

"I answer, not because it was the act of a mere man, offering his blood or life in behalf of others; nor because it was the act of a divinely-appointed priest, commissioned by God as was Aaron, but because it was the act of the God-man, or God in man, and the grand High-priest—a priest consecrated forever because a priest in his own right, offering his own blood or human life as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, that is to say, the divine in Christ offering the human, or human life in Christ as a sacrifice for the sins of humanity. As God or divine he was holy, and the union or contact of the human with the divine sanctified, made holy the human, and rendered it acceptable to the divine, just as the sanctified altar, which sanctifies every thing that touches it, renders acceptable the sacrifices placed upon it. (1 Cor. vii. 14.)

"2. Now, this sanctified human nature is offered as a sacrifice for all unsanctified humanity, and because an accepted sacrifice sanctifies that for which it is offered (Heb. ix. 13; Rom. xii. 1); all humanity is sanctified, or consecrated to God, in such a sense as to render their approach to God possible."—Page 200.

Comment.—We quote this and what follows in full, because it is the non-penal theory, and we want it fairly before our readers.

1. Like Bushnell, he makes the blood a symbol of life. This, we have abundantly shown, is not the Bible thought. Burney, however, makes a different application of the symbol. Bushnell made it a symbol of the worshiper offering his own life, or consecrating that life to God. Burney makes it the

offering of Christ's human life as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, and that is substitution, after all. If he offered that life for himself, it would not be; but if it was offered *for* others, it certainly was. God's anger is turned away by the offering of Christ's life *as a sacrifice*. Then, as the sacrifice was not for himself, it was vicarious.

But we will examine Burney more at length.

Burney.—"For the sake of greater distinctness, I recapitulate as follows:

"1. Christ as divine is truly holy, not by divine appointment, as was Moses, nor by formal consecration, as was Aaron, the altar, etc., but because he is God, who is holy of himself.

"2. Christ is as truly human as he is divine, and his humanity is sanctified by its contact or union with the divine; and precisely in this way we have the divine holiness transmitted from God to Christ's human nature, and, hence, into the sphere of humanity."—Page 201.

Comment.—1. The Doctor simply means in his first proposition that Christ, being God, is holy. What he says about Moses and Aaron is foreign to the argument, and confuses it, because they were only holy in the ritual sense of "set apart."

2. As to the essential fact that because Christ was divine his humanity was holy, we are fully in accord with Burney. We object, however,, to the statement that his humanity was sanctified and so rendered acceptable to God. The Bible does not teach this. The miraculous conception insured the holiness of his humanity, which never needed to be sanctified, and as *holy*, could not be.

Burney.—"3. As a priest in his own right, he is adequate to consecrate by sacrificial offerings in a higher sense than Aaron or any other mere human priest. Aaron, by sacrifice, could impart to altars, men, etc., only a ritual and symbolical holiness or sanctification. But Christ, because he was a priest in his own right, could, by sacrifice of his humanity, impart a real holiness and his own spiritual life to those whom he sanctifies. (Heb. xii. 10; 2 Peter i. 4.)"—Page 202.

Comment.—1. The altar, laver, the holy vessels, and the tabernacle, were all sanctified—that is, consecrated or set apart to the service of God. But this was done by Moses and not by Aaron, and done *by* the blood and the oil. This shows confusion as to the distinction between a prophet and a priest. Moses was a prophet, not a priest, and to consecrate was the work of a prophet.

2. He fails to discriminate between sanctification and regeneration. Because Aaron (as he erroneously asserts,) could sanctify in the sense of consecrate, therefore Christ can regenerate. But this is illogical and shows a failure to distinguish that is fatal to his theory.

3. Moses, Joshua, and Samuel are said to sanctify the people. At other times the people are told to sanctify themselves. And again we read of men sanctifying houses and goods. It was not necessary that it should be done by a priest—even the ritual sanctification.

4. It was never said that the sacrifice sanctified, although the blood did. But the blood had this power only because it made atonement.

5. The idea that Christ could impart "real holiness" instead of a ritual, because he was a "priest in his own right," is a strange misapprehension of Scripture. What does he mean by "in his own right?" The Bible shows that Christ, like Aaron, was called to his work (Heb. v. 4, 5), and, like Aaron, was consecrated and set apart. It would be hard to find a greater medley than Dr. Burney gives in this extract.

Burney.—"4. Whatever is offered in sacrifice by priestly authority sanctifies that for which it is offered, so as to render it acceptable to God in either a ritual or real sense."—Page 202.

Comment.—This indicates the same mis-conception as to priest and sacrifice. A sacrifice was never offered to sanctify the offerer, but to make *atonement* for him, and only as it did this was he accepted of the Lord.

Burney.—"5. Therefore, when the great High-priest made his soul a sacrifice for sin, he sanctified all humanity in such a sense that God can be just in justifying them that believe in Jesus. God is just in justifying such, simply because they by faith are made partakers of Christ's holiness, or nature, or spiritual life, just as the ingrafted scion partakes of the life of the stock into which it is inserted. Because of this ethical and spiritual union with him, he is the Lord, their righteousness."—Page 201.

Comment.—1. He here fully recognizes the imparting of life, and in this we are in full accord, with this difference: that we look upon it as a part of redemption, but not the whole.

2. The sacrifice of Christ makes all men acceptable—sanctifies all. Then, are they acceptable *as sinners*, or because sin is not imputed to them? If sin is not imputed to them, on what ground? What becomes of it?

3. This being made acceptable is the same old difficulty in another form. They are made acceptable, and they are not. Christ's sacrifice sanctifies, and it does not.

4. "Made his soul a sacrifice for sin, he sanctified all humanity in such a sense that God *can* be just in justifying them that believe in Jesus." Then God could not *justly* justify the believer without the sacrifice. That is the plain and only meaning of the words. But in the next sentence we read, "God is just in justifying such, simply because they by faith are made partakers of Christ's holiness," etc. Here it is just "simply" because of life being imparted. But this contradicts what goes before. This is the logical result of trying to put the non-penal theory into garments made for substitution. But let us press the matter a little further.

Would the impartation of life *alone* be sufficient to save? Burney must answer this in the affirmative. He holds that God only requires the removal of the criminality.

If this is all that is needed, why is the sacrifice of Christ required? We pass on to find further light, if we can.

Burney.—"6. But you wish to know the authority for the assertion that Christ by his sacrificial death did sanctify, set apart, or appropriate, humanity to

God in such a sense that each individual can come to God by faith in Christ and be accepted and saved through him. This authority is clear and explicit. 'Wherefore Jesus, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate.' (Heb. xiii. 12.)"—Page 202.

Comment.—1. He here recognizes that men could not be saved by faith without this sacrifice. Does he mean that the sacrifice was necessary to make it just for him to do it, or that it was necessary as the means to the end, the end being the imparting of life. If he means the last, it is a play upon words to speak as he does in the last quotation.

2. This authority, "clear and explicit," what does it teach? Does it teach that he *did* or "*might*" sanctify the people? If Burney's exegesis is true, it logically results in Universalism. Let us see. "By the which will we are sanctified by the offering of the body of the Jesus Christ once for all." (Heb. x. 10.) This evidently is the same truth, a parallel text. Again, "For by one offering he hath perfected forever them that *are* sanctified." (x. 14.)

If the truth applies to all men, then all men are saved. The true application is to the Christian. Never in any scripture does the blood of Christ sanctify a sinner.

Burney.—"7. That this sanctification is not the personal, saving sanctification of believers is proven by the facts that it was accomplished at the time of his death, that it was irrespective of faith, and that the people—all nations indiscriminately—are the objects of it.

"It was the grand antitype of the atonement made on the great day of the atonement . . . . *for all the people; by virtue of which, and only by which, the individual could* daily, or as often as he pleased, during the succeeding year, bring his individual sacrifices before the altar."—Page 203.

Comment.—1. Burney's idea as to the relation of the Day of Atonement to individual sacrifices has no Bible foundation. Long before the Day of Atonement had a place, sacrifices were offered. The Day of Atonement was special to the Jew, sacrifices were universal as the race.

2. The work of the Day of Atonement was for all the Lord's people, but not for any beyond. If Burney's parallel is true, then as the Day of Atonement was for the chosen people only, logically, we have a limited atonement.

3. "That he *might*" does not imply that he did. It only shows *availability*, leaving the question of *actual* sanctification to be settled on other grounds.

Summing up the whole examination, it seems that Dr. Burney holds that all that is needed is the removal of the depraved nature. Yet he recognizes that God is angry, and needs to be propitiated. We frankly say that just here we find it difficult to comprehend the meaning of Burney. Sometimes he seems to make the removal of the sin propitiate, and then again, he seems to recognize more. If we understand him here, the sacrifice of Christ propitiates, appeases the anger of God, in such a sense as to make it possible for God to impart life to the believer. In this we are in exact accord.

But the question comes, how does Christ's sacrifice propitiate?

Burney.—"The sacrificial death of Christ seems to propitiate, because it was an act of perfect obedience—obedience unto death—which, as a sacrifice, was to God a sweet-smelling savor, and which furnishes an expedient by which justice and mercy fully concur in the salvation of believers and all the prerogatives of God as universal Father and Governor are fully honored—that is, we are saved by grace, not by law, nor in violation of law, but in accordance with law."—Page 310.

Comment.—Certainly very disappointing. Burney discusses largely "penal substitution," law and penalty, Bible atonements, etc., but here at the heart of the question where every thing hinges, he has but little to say. How does Christ's sacrifice propitiate God? Substitutionists say by his meeting the demands of God against the sinner, in their stead or place. What Burney says is found in this extract.

First. It makes Christ's death an act of obedience to law. We have sufficiently examined this.

Second. It makes *his* sacrifice propitiate God *for us.* But how? We have been impressed that Dr. Burney really gives two answers to this question—one real, the other unreal. This seems to be necessitated by the effort to harmonize his theory with Bible language and Bible facts. They are indicated in the double language of the extracts we have given. It propitiates because it was an act of obedience. It propitiates because it furnishes an expedient, etc. If we understand Burney, he really

teaches that the removal of the depravity is that which propitiates God. This depravity is removed by the impartation of Christ's holy life to men when they believe; this can be imparted because it is brought into the sphere of humanity by the union of the divine and the human in Christ. This is the non-penal theory, and all it requires. "To disobey is to be put under penalty." "To return to obedience is to be freed from the penalty." Burney can not show a rational ground for the death of Christ on this theory, nor even for the Incarnation. Divine life could be imparted without either, if nothing more is needed than its impartation. Dr. Burney will hardly hold that we are made partakers of the human nature of Christ, for the word says, "partakers of the divine nature." Nothing less will do. Dr. Burney sees that this, while the true logical conclusion from his premises, will not harmonize with what the Bible says of the sufferings and death of Christ. He thus recognizes that God is propitiated by the death of Christ, but as to *how*, he has *no theory* at all, for in answer to what is practically the same question, he answers:

"Omniscience alone, I suppose, could answer the question."—Page 311.

Is there any ground, in justice, for God's anger? Is it more than capricious humor? If there is any just basis for that anger, must it not be removed before the anger can be?

We believe the anger is appeased, because Christ met and satisfied the demand for retribution.

Dr. Burney believes that the "one act of obedi-

ence" propitiates, yet there is nothing to link the sinner with this obedience, it not being vicarious. But *how* it propitiates he fails to tell us.

Burney.—"The Bible sometimes refers Christ's propitiatory work to his sufferings, and sometimes to his death. When the word suffering is used, it should, I think, be always understood in a metonymical sense; or, as the cause put for the effect, and is equivalent to death, which is the natural effect of suffering."—Page 258.

Comment.—It is one objection to Burney's theory that he has to explain away the force of so many plain scriptures. Suffering and death are never synonymous, and are never so used in the Scriptures. Blood shedding and death are.

Burney.—"Had it been possible for Christ to experience a sacrificial death without suffering at all, either bodily or mentally, the propitiatory sacrifice would have been accepted."—Page 259.

Comment.—1. If the sufferings were unnecessary, why did he suffer? He was not under the necessity of death, and, therefore, was not under the necessity of suffering. His death, being in the highest sense voluntary, could have been endured without suffering.

2. In the text Burney quotes, "Ought not Christ to have *suffered* these things?" the ought, or obligation, was *to suffer* as well as to die. Substitution fully recognizes the sufferings of Christ, the non-penal theory does not. Every text that speaks of the sufferings of Christ is therefore a proof text against the non-penal theory.

3. And here we advance an argument that forever destroys the non-penal theory. It is a fact that Christ did suffer, and that those sufferings were the greatest known to men. According to Burney, sin and penalty are causally connected, *what, then, was the cause of Christ's sufferings?* Can obedience to the law of love causally produce suffering? This, according to Dr. Burney's own philosophy and logic, is impossible. Can we have an effect without a cause? That, also, is impossible. How, then, are we to explain the sufferings of Christ? What caused them? We believe that the sufferings and death of Christ are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the non-penal theory, and forever destroy it.

CHAPTER XXII.

BURNEY'S OBJECTIONS TO SUBSTITUTION.

We begin with those that ought to be the most weighty, his "Scripture proof." His first quotation is Eph. v. 2: "A sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savor." On this he says:

Burney.—"If Christ's sufferings were penal—a real punishment for sin—then we are required to believe that God, who is love, delights in, takes pleasure in, inflicting penal woe upon the innocent and the good."—Page 208.

Comment.—1. No substitutionist so holds. To charge it as a logical consequence is to ignore important Bible distinctions between the offerings, those that are sweet-savor offerings, and those that are *not.*

2. But while not true of substitution, the objection may be properly urged against the non-penal theory. Dr. Burney does teach that the sufferings of Christ are a sweet smell, which we utterly repudiate as dishonoring to God, and "repugnant to the instincts that God has endowed us with." He says, "Christ's sufferings were to him a sweet-smelling savor."

How can God find pleasure in suffering? The non-penal theory, when it advances this heathenish

idea, affirms that God is cruel—having pleasure in suffering—when the Bible says that "God is love." Every text that teaches the love and goodness of God is a protest against the non-penal theory.

Burney.—"Every text in the Bible that represents Christ as a voluntary agent, acting in the interests of humanity, is a protest against this passive and penal obedience theory, for the sufficient reason that what is voluntary can not be either passive or penal."—Page 212.

Comment.—1. We are not concerned about "passive and penal obedience," as they are terms we do not like or use. But that substitution requires that Christ should be a stick or stone, entirely destitute of volition, is certainly an unwarrantable assumption. The essence of his work was in "coming" to do the Father's will, and only as he assumed, of his own volition, our place, could he be our substitute. Just what Burney means by "what is voluntary is not . . . . penal," is not plain. If he means the penalty, of course it is not; volition belongs to persons only. If he means that the infliction of the penalty is not voluntary, then he divorces God from it, and it is wrong to speak of God as punishing sin. If he means that submission to a penalty is not voluntary, we say that many a man has surrendered himself to the law and borne its penalty. If he means that its assumption by a substitute would not be voluntary, it is manifestly untrue, as to assume is a voluntary act, and no one holds that Christ was a substitute against his will. If he means "penal" in his own sense of a conse-

quence, it is a begging of the question. We reject his definition of penal *in toto.*

2. The only text he quotes is "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God." But this text is squarely opposed to the non-penal theory, because it tells us what Christ's object was *in coming.* Dr. Burney makes it his object *after he came.* Then Christ's coming from heaven to earth, his becoming poor when he was rich, was all purposeless. The will Christ came to do was God's will as to the salvation of men. The non-penal theory reduces it to Christ's law keeping, hence it necessitates that we are saved by a legal righteousness, whether it be imputed or imparted (if such can be).

Burney.—"Every text in the Bible that specifies the object of Christ's mission is a protest against the penal scheme.

For example, "Jesus came into the world to save sinners." How save them? The penal theory answers, By bearing the punishment of their sins in their stead. The answer is unnatural, not to say impossible."—Page 213.

Comment.—The penal theory of Dr. Burney teaches some very strange things. He sees substitution in a convex mirror. Our answer to the question would be that the sufferings of Christ, being in their stead, saves from the penalty of transgression, while the imparted life saves from depravity and its consequences, thus fitting for heaven.

If he saves them, how does the statement *that* he saves conflict with it? Burney answers, be-

cause salvation is impossible, according to his opinion, by substitution. As salvation without substitution *is* impossible, every such text is a protest against Burneyism.

Burney.—"Christ 'appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.' Substitution requires this to mean that Christ came to suffer the punishment of sin as a penal sacrifice."—Page 213.

Commeut.—Dr. Burney here mixes up condition and consequent. In the text he quotes, we have the condition—Christ's sacrifice, and the consequent —sins put away. Dr. Burney, in his statement, makes a condition of both clauses. To "suffer the punishment (penalty) of sin," and a "penal sacrifice," are synonymous. To give a fair statement it should be, "Christ puts away sin by offering himself as a penal sacrifice."

As the essential part of the sacrifice was the death of the victim, Dr. Burney, having no logical use for the death of Christ in his theory, the text is a protest against it.

Burney.—"'For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.' "Substitution requires us to say that Christ destroys the works of the devil by enduring the punishment of all the sins Satan is able to instigate. This is like saying that physicians destroy disease by suffering the pains that it produces in their patients."

Comment.—1. This is what substitution would say if it ignored (which it does not) the moral aspect of the atonement.

2. As it is "works," not work, what are these? Is not the exposure to the curse of the law one of the works of the devil? As Burney ignores the legal aspect of the atonement, we may say of the non-penal theory that it is like saving a murderer from the gallows by making a Christian of him.

Burney.—"Every text that gives any insight into the character of Christ's feelings or sufferings is a protest against penality. We know, if we know any thing of the laws of mind, that obedience and disobedience to law are productive of radically distinct states of feeling."—Page 213.

Comment.—He assumes that substitution requires that Christ should experience the same mental states as the sinner. This we utterly repudiate. He confounds the consequences of depravity, which can never be borne by a substitute, with the penalty of transgression.

Burney.—"For God to satisfy his own justice in the place of the sinner would be to suffer the penalty of his own law—that is, to suffer the consequences of not loving himself, which is inconceivable. But if this were possible, it would be the same thing as pardoning sin without any satisfaction at all."

Comment.—1. Still confusion between penalty and consequence.

2. The penalty suffered was for the sins of others, not his own, and was endured without any criminality on his part.

3. It is as man that Christ suffers, not as God.

4. Burney's theory is open to the same argument;

Christ died of love to himself, if his logic above is sound. The whole objection ignores the personality of the Lord Jesus and the moral government of God, with its claims.

5. While substitution is not pardon without satisfaction, it is to poor sinners the highest grace; and pardon is an act of grace, because the whole salvation is provided by Him, and is unmerited by us.

Burney.—"If penalty endured by a substitute compensates God, or justice, or any thing else, then, of course, it can *do no less* when endured by the principals. Hence, it inevitably follows that Satan and his hosts are compensating God or justice for all their sins."

Comment.—1. We do not accept the term "compensating," and if any penalist has used it, we leave him to bear the brunt of Burney's logic, which here is certainly sound. The law-giver demands obedience, and threatens a penalty for disobedience. Where there is disobedience, there is therefore the demand that the penalty shall be inflicted. This penalty, when borne by a substitute, meets—satisfies—this demand. We abide the logic, that if this is done by a substitute, it must do the same when done by the principals. If this were not true, how would punishment be just?

2. Bearing the penalty, vicariously or personally, never saves from depravity and its consequences, and gives no title or fitness for heaven. As this comes only from union with Christ, no devil can ever be saved.

Burney.—"Sins pardoned are not punished, and sins punished are not pardoned; that pardon is exemption from punishment on conditions satisfactory to the pardoning power."

Comment.—Deliverance is not pardon, nor is pardon deliverance. Past sins, having been punished, can not be pardoned. Sins not committed can not be pardoned, for they have no existence. Then the non-penal theory has no pardon; for, according to its teaching, *every* sin has been punished when committed.

"Sins pardoned are not punished," etc., is true as to an offender in person, but does not apply to substitution, where the conditions are changed.

Burney.—"The non-penal denies that there is any propitiation in penal suffering."

Comment.—1. Then it is wrong to say, "he has been punished enough," and it is a mistake that there is any thing that prompts us to so speak.

2. We most certainly deny that there is any propitiation in the non-penal theory.

Burney.—"It is impossible for one person to obey the moral law—or to love God, in the room of another, and to suffer the penalty (which is the consequence of not loving him) in the place of another; that Christ obeys the law in his own place; that his own personal righteousness or obedience is imparted to believers, in the act of believing, as was Adam's vitiated nature and corruption evidently imparted to us by heredity." Page 192.

Comment.—1. The same old confusion between penalty and consequence!

2. An imparted obedience is absurd and impossible; as well talk of Adam's personal disobedience being imparted. It is *life*, not obedience, that is imparted. Acts can not be imparted, a nature may; hence, we are made partakers of the divine nature. But if the act can not be imparted, the mental state, we suppose, can not be awakened; and therefore, to obtain the "mental state," we must have an imparted obedience. It is the same difficulty again, that we pointed out before, giving the sense of δικαιωσις to δικαιωμα.

Burney.—"How can penal suffering be as a sweet savor to any being less than satanic?—Page 209.

Comment.—Dr. Burney utterly fails to comprehend the distinction between sweet-savor offerings and those that are not. Substitution does not teach that Christ's sufferings were a sweet savor.

Burney.—"If he was a substitute for men, and every sin determines its own kind and degree of punishment, then he, of course, endured all the different kinds of punishment possible to men, and also an amount equal to all that would be possible to men."—Page 215.

Comment.—1. Sin never determines any thing. To determine is to exercise a judgment, and no one is competent to do this but God. The idea of sin determining and fixing punishment is on the face of it absurd. It is God alone who, in the judgment, *will* determine the penalty and inflict it. We have explained this, however, in full.

Burney.—"Christ, by the obedience which he learned through what he suffered, became our great High-priest, and consequently the author of eternal salvation to them that obey him. But it is pertinent to inquire, is penal suffering—penal fire—a prerequisite to the priesthood? If it *is*, then, of course, Christ suffered it. If it is not, then Christ did not suffer it. The bare conception that Christ was named of God a priest after the order of Melchizedek, because he endured penal wrath, shocks all reason. Why might not devils become priests according to this theology."—Page 217.

Comment.—1. Burney is here commenting on Heb. v. 7–10, and his exposition is that Christ became a priest on the ground of his sufferings, and that because a priest, the author of salvation. This misplaces the order of Paul. He learned obedience by suffering; and having been perfected, became to all that obey him the author of salvation. Called, or saluted, by God as a priest. His priesthood rested upon his being the author of salvation, and by his priesthood he finished it. Priesthood is founded upon atonement, as we saw in the case of Phinehas.

2. It must be remembered that while there was a sweet savor—a burnt-offering—aspect of the work of Christ, there can be no such to the sufferings of devils. If the sufferings of devils could make atonement, the Doctor's argument might have force.

Burney.—"No high-priest or any other priest, Jewish or pagan, ever bore the guilt and punishment of those for whom he ministered. Substitution requires no priest. As a theory an executioner is all it needs."—Page 27.

Comment.—1. "No priest, Jewish or pagan," was ever both priest and sacrifice. In this Christ is unique.

2. Christ bore our sins as the lamb, not as priest.

3. Substitutionists show that after the offerer has slain the victim, a priest is needed to present the blood to God and make intercession for the believer; this is a *real* need. His idea of an executioner is a misconception of the priest's work. But as Burney has shown no real need for the *death* of Christ, the non-penal theory, by rejecting substitution, rejects a priest.

Burney.—"It is a self-evident proposition that the right to substitute one kind and one amount of punishment for another is the right to set aside punishment altogether, and to save the sinner without any atonement, or expiation, or satisfaction to justice."—Page 104.

Comment.—1. It is not a question of "right," but can God consistently clear the guilty?

2. While this objection has force against some theories of substitution, it does not apply to that advocated in this book. We do not hold that one penalty is put in the place of another.

Burney.—"A child in rebellion against a loving but indignant parent needs to be changed, not the parent."—Page 143.

Comment.—1. The relationship that is here assumed has no existence, as nowhere does the Bible affirm that the sinner is a son. Christ repudiated

the claim when made by the Jews, saying, "Ye are of your father, the devil."

2. Arguments founded upon the *natural affection* of fallen men, with the moral sense blunted, and the affection supreme over all moral considerations, must be faulty. The relation of God to fallen humanity is *totally different* from that of a loving father and a rebellious child. This figure is only true as to believers. Such ideas necessitate a failure in seeing the true ground of the need of atonement.

3. Burney recognizes propitiation as necessary; is this a change in the mind of the sinner, or what?

4. Again, the sinner can not change himself. What then? On what ground does God regenerate him?

Burney.—"How could Christ's sufferings reconcile God's justice and love, which had no quarrel? Does sin disharmonize the divine attributes, as well as abnormalize the human soul? Surely if sin can array one attribute against another, or create disharmony in the divine nature, then it must be mightier than God himself."—Page 144.

Comment.—This argument properly belongs to the substitutionist. Dr. Burney will agree that God is holy, and that this holiness leads to separation from the sinfulness of the creature and anger against the wrong-doer. He will also agree that God is love, and therefore desires the happiness of all his creatures. Substitutionists claim that to save men without meeting the demands of his holiness,

would be "to disharmonize the divine attributes;" and as this is impossible, men can not be saved without atonement. Dr. Burney teaches that this is done when depravity is removed by imparting life. If this is all, is God able to remove this corruption by an act of will? If he is able, and this is all that is needed, will he not save all? To admit that God can and will not, is to admit a barrier in the divine nature—to admit that God *must* be propitiated—that he can only save on grounds that are just. In the light of Burney's objection, we see no logical alternatives but a recognition of the demands of God's holiness, or Universalism.

To recognize this demand does not "create disharmony" in the divine nature, for his attributes remain in all their perfection immutably and eternally the same; but so far as men are concerned, the perfection of God renders salvation impossible without atonement.

Burney.—"No man voluntarily, much less joyfully, encountered penalty. Penalty is necessarily involuntary, for any suffering voluntarily endured in the interest of another is not penalty, but benefaction."

Comment.—1. When it says, "who, for the joy that was set before him," it does not mean that his sacrifice of himself was the joy, that would be a contradiction. There is no sacrifice in what is a joy. It means the joy that was set before him in the *results*—the glory—coming as the fruit of it; hence, he "*endured*" the cross.

2. That if a penalty be voluntarily assumed, it

ceases to be a penalty, is pure assumption. If he simply means that penalty can not be so assumed, because it is a consequence (from his stand-point), then he begs the whole question. That the voluntary assumption of the penalty by a substitute destroys the vicarious nature of the transaction is self-evidently false. Of course, from *any* theory of the atonement, even the most rigid Calvinistic, salvation is benefaction—a benefit conferred—upon the saved. But what has that to do with the manner in which this benefit accrues to us?

Burney.—"I repeat with emphasis that the substitutionary theory requires *no risen or living interceding Christ.*"

Comment.—The non-penal theory requires no dead, and therefore no risen, Christ, if it is consistent with its own fundamental principles. Every reader of Burney's book can see that the death of Christ is an *incubus* to his theory. The substitution advocated in these pages requires—necessitates—*both* a dead and a risen Christ.

Burney.—"Let me emphasize this immutable truth: *The penalty can never remove the disobedience or guilt of which it is the consequence.*" —Page 257.

Comment.—1. True, therefore, from any stand-point, on *any* theory, it must remain eternally true that we did commit the sin, and that its demerit is ours. We all recognize this and sing—

"Amazing grace, how sweet the sound
That saves *a wretch like me.*"

How an act of disobedience can be undone, or its demerit ever removed, even Dr. Burney fails to tell us.

2. If he means that bearing the penalty does not remove *depravity*, we fully agree, as that is another thing. On the other hand, while the removal of the depravity removes its consequences, it remains eternally and immutably true that its removal never saves from *penalty* already incurred.

CHAPTER XXIII.

BURNEY ON THE PERSON OF CHRIST, AND THE TRINITY.

Burney.—"Christ possesses both a divine and a human nature. This fact is expressed by the use of these composite terms. The terms themselves are mere names or symbols of things, and not themselves substantial entities."—Page 20.

Comment.—This will not be disputed by any one. While these words themselves are not entities, but only words, they still, as the signs of ideas, represent substantial entities. The word God, it is true, is only a name; but when we use it of the Deity, it represents what is real. When we say that "God is love," we do not mean the term itself, but the Being the word represents to the mind. So with the term man. We suppose Dr. Burney would assent to this. But, if we correctly understand him, he holds that, while the terms God and man have substantial entities back of them, the term God-man has not, and simply means, in the reality it expresses, God and man. If this is what he means, it is a denial that the human and the divine are so united that there is a real unity, in virtue of which Christ is one — the God-man. Then Christ as God is one person, and Christ as

man another, separate and distinct. Then the Jesus of the Bible was not really divine, and all worship rendered to him is idolatry.

Burney.—"We call Christ a theandric person. But this does not imply that he did or could perform any theandric acts, or any acts neither strictly divine nor human, but something essentially different from both. His divine and his human nature were not amalgamated, forming a *tertium quid*, and of course his acts, none of them, were amalgamated acts, comprising a human and a divine element. On the contrary, his every act was either purely *human* or purely *divine*.

"Man has a body and a mind, but all his sufferings are purely physical or mental — they are not amalgamated sufferings, but all have their source either in the body or in the mind, not equally in both. They deeply sympathize with each other. But this they could not do if the suffering had its source equally in both.—Page 21.

Comment.—1. What does Burney mean by *physical* suffering? Does he mean that the body *feels*, that matter is capable of suffering? Then why does not a dead body suffer? And if matter can feel, why can it not know and will? More, how can it feel unless it knows that it feels? The truth is, there can be no feeling unless there is at one end of the nerve an intelligent mind to receive impressions. Dr. Burney's illustration, to be pertinent to his argument, requires that the body should feel independently of the mind. What we call "physical" suffering depends upon the close *union* of mind and matter. Not amalgamation, but union.

His illustration, therefore, properly belongs to a theandric act.

2. Dr. Burney denies that there is any such thing as a theandric act — that is, an act the human and divine in Christ unite in performing — claiming that every action of Christ's was either a God or a man act. But they were all done by the same person, so that every act of Christ's life may be said to be theandric. The whole life of Christ stamps him as being more than a man, so that it would be impossible to separate into God and man acts. We, therefore, properly call them theandric (Greek, *Theos*, God, and *aneer* or *andros*, man) — literally, God-man acts.

For example, meeting the leper, he says, in response to his appeal, "I will; be thou clean." Who is meant by the "I?" If there are not two personalities, then this "I" means the God-man—the Lord Jesus himself. "I will," the living personality addressed responds, and to separate, as Dr. Burney would, the "I" from the "will" is impossible.

Again, when Jesus came walking upon the sea, was it a human or was it a theandric act?

More, as Dr. Burney denies so strongly the existence of three wills in the Godhead, we would ask, what of the Lord Jesus? Did he have two wills? And if he did, were they united in one person, or was Christ two distinct persons? If Dr. Burney holds the first, he answers his own objections to the Trinity. If the last, then we have Unitarianism pure and simple—the divine manifesting itself through the human.

3. It is so important that we understand this question that we will examine it more at length.

Dr. Burney rightly denies any amalgamation of the human and the divine (the old Eutychian heresy, that had but few followers) in the person of Christ, but he errs in denying any real union between them (the old Nestorian error). Truth, as held by the Church generally, lies between these extremes.

Mind and matter are not amalgamated in man so that a *tertium quid* is formed, that is neither mind nor matter, yet their union is real. More, by virtue of this union the lower is influenced by the higher. How mind and matter are united we do not know and can not define. So with the union of the human and divine in the one person of our Lord.

The question is, Do the Scriptures teach that the two natures exist in union (not amalgamation) in the *one* person?

First. In many scriptures both natures are predicated of the same person.

Second. The attributes of one nature are predicated, while the person is designated by the title of the other.

Third. The personal pronoun is never used to distinguish one nature from the other.

Fourth. The person of Christ, as revealed in the Scriptures, is the proper object of worship, which could not be if the person is not *one*.

Of the many scriptures that support these propositions, the following may suffice as proof.

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1. "For unto us *a child is born*, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and *his* name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace."—Isa. ix. 6.

The "Mighty God" is the name of the child that was *to be born*, which can only be understood as we recognize the unity of his person.

2. "But thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall *he* come forth unto me that is to be Ruler in Israel; *whose* going forth *have been* from of old, from everlasting."—Micah v. 2.

"Whose going forth has been from the days of eternity" [margin], is here said of the one who was to be born at Bethlehem, which could not be unless the union was such that he was *one* person.

3. "Whose are the father's, and of whom as concerning the flesh, Christ came, *who* is over all, God blessed forever."—Rom. ix. 5.

A plain affirmation of the divinity of the same person who was born a Jew.

4. "Who, being in the form of God, ... took upon him the form of a servant."—Phil. ii. 5–9.

Here both natures are spoken of, where only one and the same person is intended.

5. "I am the *root* and the *offspring* of David."—Rev. xxii. 16.

How could this be true, if there be not two natures in one person? "I"—the same I—is both "*root*" and "*offspring.*"

6. "To feed the church *of God*, which *he* hath purchased with his own blood."—Acts xx. 28.

Here the unity of the person is so emphatically brought out that God is said to have purchased the church with his blood.

7. "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing."—Rev. v. 12.

Here divine honor and worship is given to the Lamb *that was slain.* To separate the divinity and humanity, as Dr. Burney does, would make this to be idolatry.

A careful consideration of these, and similar verses, will show why the church has always held strenuously to the truth of the union of the two natures in *one* person.

Burney.—"If we choose to predicate three personalities of the divine nature, and do not take the word person in *a unique and nondescript* sense—in a sense utterly exclusive of the will, which is the central attribute of person in its ordinary and proper sense, we are hopelessly involved in *Tritheism.* For if there are, in some unique and indefinable sense, three personalities in the divine nature, there are not certainly three wills, or if there are, then it is sun-clear that there are three Gods."—*Atonement and Law*, page 212.

Comment.—1. We believe it is true that the advocates of all forms of the Moral Influence theory

of the atonement, have generally held Sabellian views of the Trinity.

Sabellius denied that there was a trinity of persons, but held that the Godhead was revealed as a trinity. This, however, being simply three different ways in which the same person was revealed, three different points of view from which God may be looked upon, three different relations in which he places himself before the world. In other words, he taught a trinity of manifestations, or offices, instead of a trinity of persons.

Horace Bushnell, who stands as the foremost representative of the Moral Influence theory in America, held to what he called an "instrumental trinity," or three impersonations of one and the same being. Abelard discussed the Trinity under the divine attributes. Maurice, Young, McLeod Campbell, and others, all held views that were practically Sabellian.

A careful examination of what Dr. Burney has written shows that this is substantially his position. True, he retains the word "person," but it is in "some unique and nondescript sense," and not in "its proper" and "ordinary" meaning.

In the Cumberland Presbyterian of Feb. 9, 1888, he uses the following language as to "person:"

"Will is real, but person is nominal—a mere name."

"Assuming (his opponent) that the word person expresses reality and not a mere conception of the mind."

"I, with my views of personality, can assert

three persons in one substance, without asserting three Gods."

Dr. Burney regards the word person as a "mere conception," that can be applied in almost any sense. As the one God has manifested himself in three relations, the distinction between these is expressed by the personal pronoun, and for this reason alone he speaks of three persons.

Person, with Burney, is a "mere name," and does not express reality. Logically, he is on Sabellian or Unitarian ground, and the trinity is simply one of offices or manifestations.

The great objections to this are:

First. When the Son became Incarnate, the Father ceased to be, and with the coming of the Holy Ghost the Son passed away. Or else each represents but a part of the Deity.

Second. There is no reason why the number of persons should be limited to three. Why not extend the same figure to all offices of the Godhead?

Third. The language of the Bible is irreconcilable with such a theory of the Trinity. How can Jesus be our Advocate with the Father? How a Mediator? These and hundreds of similar questions may be asked, all showing how utterly it is out of harmony with the Bible language.

This has never been the faith of the church, but as expressed in the Confession is substantially that:

"In the unity of the Godhead there are three persons of one substance, power, and eternity—God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."—*Confession of Faith, Cumberland Presbyterian Church*, Sec. 7.

This embraces the following points:

1. That there is *one* and only one God.

2. While the Scriptures proclaim one God, they reveal *three distinct persons*, "of one substance, power, and eternity," and invested with every attribute of Deity.

These appear to be contradictory propositions, but they are taught in the Bible. Everywhere in the Bible these three persons are distinguished constantly from each other. To make them different manifestations of the same person, is to violate all the rules of language. We must insist as Bible teaching, the reality, and the distinction of these persons. The doctrine of the Trinity is that these three divine persons "co-exist in a manner incomprehensible to mortals, *as one supreme and everlasting God.*"

That the Deity exists as a Trinity is taught in many ways other than the use of the personal pronouns, and *the way in which the pronouns are used.* We can not here discuss the great question of the Trinity, but only call attention to a small part of the evidence, of a trinity of persons.

First. The term "Godhead" implies it.

Second. It is taught in the first verse in the Bible. The word for "God" in the Hebrew being plural—"Gods."

Third. It is taught in the language used in the account of creation and of the fall.

"And God said, let *us* make man in *our* image, after *our* likeness."

"And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become *as one of us*, to know good from evil."

"Go to, let *us* go down and there confound their language."

Fourth. It is taught in Isaiah vi. 8, especially when compared with John xii. 40, and Acts xxviii. 25.

"I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for *us?*"

Who is meant by *us?* To whom was God talking? Does not the whole tenor of the Bible point to the existence of three distinct persons in the Godhead? Yet it does *not* teach Tritheism—three Gods—but Tri-unity.

Burney.—"If there are three divine persons, there are not three divine wills; else there would be three Gods."—*Atonement and Law*, page 141.

Comment.—1. Burney here logically denies that there are three persons in the Godhead. The word can not be used in any material sense, and if it has, therefore, any real meaning—that is, if it expresses a real distinction in the Godhead (as the church affirms), it must include the will, which, as Dr. Burney says, is "the central attribute of person, in its ordinary and proper sense."

The denial that the word person, when used of the Godhead, includes will, is, then, a denial of any proper or true personality. Dr. Burney's "nondescript" person, however "unique," can not be defined, because it has no real existence.

2. The Bible indicates that the will of the Father is distinct from that of the Son. "Let *us* make." Does this not imply separate intelligences and wills? If God made the word, to create requires an exercise of will. If there was but one will acting, then the plural has no meaning.

Again, we read that God *sent* his Son into the world. To send, where an intelligent agent is concerned, implies the action of two wills when the agent responds and comes.

Again, it is taught that Christ *came* to do the Father's will. His descent *from* heaven was for this purpose. Clearly this implies that it was the Father's will that he should come and that the Son obeyed that will and came. This is all unmeaning if the will of the Son is not distinct from that of the Father.

Burney.—"A man with three heads would be a monster, and a man with three wills a maniac."—*Cumberland Presbyterian*, February 9, 1888.

Comment.—1. We are surprised that any theologian should gravely put this forth as in any sense an objection or argument against the doctrine. A rabid skeptic, ignorant of the doctrine of the church, might be excused, on the score of his ignorance, for such a parody, but that a trained theologian should advance it is almost incredible.

2. "A man with three heads would be a monster." Yes, and so would a man *with* four feet. But a horse *without* four feet would be a monster. The fallacy is that he applies his reasoning to man.

Again, it is not three heads that is in question, but three wills. His objection could only have force if the doctrine of the Trinity was that God had a material body, with three heads. But as no one so teaches, it is wide of the mark. All *material conceptions must be banished* when we contemplate the Deity.

3. "A man with three wills a maniac." Not of necessity. If each will had its own appropriate sphere of manifestation, and they were always in harmony, there would be no madness. Dr. Burney's thought was of three wills *in conflict*, or without any channel for separate action. In other words, three wills and their necessary *sets of faculties*, in a material body. And again it is not a question of a man—a finite being—with three wills, but of the Deity—of three *persons* in the Godhead.

Material and mental conceptions drawn from his own experience are the foundation of the difficulties he conjures up. The idea of a set of faculties, such as men possess, existing in the Godhead, is an absurdity. As we have already shown by the extract from R. F. Underwood, in Chapter II., it is a fruitful cause of error to think of God as reasoning. We must take a broader view of the divine intelligence than that. We must remember that God is infinite, and that, therefore, he exists as a pure intelligence, incomprehensible to us with our finite and limited ideas. Then, we may grasp the truth of three persons—real persons—in the Godhead existing, as a trinity, without being required to

believe that this means three heads upon one body, or madness.

The doctrine of a trinity of persons (and not of offices), existing in union as one God, has been the faith of the church in all ages. This belief is substantially expressed by Augustine, who says:

"This Trinity is one God; . . . . nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons."—*City of God*, chapter x.

From the Apostolic Fathers until Augustine, the three persons are constantly distinguished, while their unity as one God, together with the divinity of Christ, is always affirmed. It is simply impossible for any one to read the Fathers without knowing that they believed in a trinity of persons. A few quotations only can be given here.

"He did not, as one might have imagined, send to men any servant, or angel, or ruler, or any one of those who bear sway over earthly things, or one of those to whom the government of things in the heavens has been intrusted, but the very Creator and Fashioner of all things."—*Epistle to Diognetus*, chapter vii.

"Wherefore also I praise thee for all things, I bless thee, I glorify thee, along with the everlasting and heavenly Jesus Christ, thy beloved Son, with whom, to thee, and the Holy Ghost, be glory both now and to all coming ages."—*The dying prayer of Polycarp, Epistle of Church at Smyrna*, chapter xiv.

"God himself being manifested in human form."—*Ignatius*, *Epistle to Ephesians*, chapter xix.

"Reverting to the Scriptures, I shall endeavor to persuade you that he who is said to have appeared to Abraham, and to Jacob, and to Moses, and who is called God, is distinct from him who made all things—numerically, I mean, not [distinct] in will. For I affirm that he has never at any time done any thing which he who made the world—above whom there is no other God—has not wished him both to do and to engage himself with."—*Justin Martyr*, *Dialogue with Trypho*, chapter lvi.

"And that you may not change [the sense of] the words just quoted, and repeat what your teachers assert—either that God said to himself, 'Let us make,' . . . . or that God spoke to the elements, to wit, the earth and other similar substances out of which we believe man was formed, 'Let us make'—I shall quote again the words narrated by Moses himself, from which we can indisputably learn that [God] conversed with some one who was numerically distinct from himself, and also a rational being. These are the words: 'And God said, Behold, Adam has become as one of us."—*Justin Martyr*, *Dialogue with Trypho*, chapter lxii.

"All types of the Trinity, of God, and his word, and his wisdom."—*Theophilus to Antolycus*, chapter xv.

This last passage is interesting because it is the first time we find the word Trinity (*Τριάδος*, *Triados*) used in history.

Theophilus of Antioch was born within twenty years of the death of John, and as he uses the word as if it were in common use, it gives almost apostolic authority for the use of the word.

By wisdom he means the Holy Spirit, and indicates a trinity of persons.

The earliest discussions were with Jews, and these Jewish arguments at last found formal expression in the doctrine of Sabellius. This led to fuller statements of the faith of the church. Thus, Novatian combats Sabellianism as a new heresy in the church, and in his argument says:

"But from this occasion of Christ being proved from the sacred authority of the divine writings not man only, but God also, other heretics, breaking forth, contrive to impair the religious position in Christ; by this very fact wishing to show that Christ is God the Father, in that he is asserted to be not man only, but also is declared to be God. For thus say they, If it is asserted that God is one, and Christ is God, then say they, If the Father and Christ be one God, Christ will be called the Father. Wherein they are proved to be in error, not knowing Christ, but following the sound of a name; for they are not willing that he should be the second person after the Father, but the Father himself."—*Novatian, Treatise Concerning the Trinity*, chapter xxvi.

Novatian then quotes many texts from both Old and New Testaments in proof of the distinction of the persons, closing the argument by saying:

"And what can be so evident *proof* that this is not the Father, but the Son, as that he is set forth as being obedient to God the Father, unless, if he be believed to be God the Father, Christ may be said to be subjected to another God the Father."

As it is the essence of Sabellianism that the Father and Son are the same person under different manifestations, he then examines such texts as are supposed to teach this identity. We close this brief historical sketch with his exposition of John x. 30, which is the best exegesis of this text given by the Fathers:

"But when he says I, and afterward introduces the Father by saying 'I and the Father,' he severs and distinguishes the peculiarities of his, that is, the Son's person, from the paternal authority, not only in respect *to the sound of the name*, but moreover in respect of the order of the distribution of power, since he might have said, 'I the Father,' if he had had it in mind that he himself was the Father. And since he said '*one*' *thing*, let the heretics understand that he did not say 'one' *person*. For *one*, placed in the neuter, intimates the social concord, not the personal unity. He is said to be one *neuter*, not one *masculine*, because the expression is not referred to the number, but it is declared with reference to the association of another. Finally, he adds, and says, 'we are,' not 'I am,' so as to show, by the fact of his saying, 'I and the Father are,' that they are two persons."—*Novatian, Concerning the Trinity*, chapter xxvii.

For sixteen centuries the doctrines of Sabellius have been rejected by the piety and scholarship of the church, and it is too late to resurrect them and the view of the atonement with which they are logically associated, with any hope that they will be received, even when labeled "new theology."

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CHAPTER XXIV.

MISCELLANEOUS.

On a careful examination of Dr. Burney's book, the vulnerable points are legion. A large number of these have been passed by because they have been touched upon already, or because they are mere side issues, or are connected with theories that we have no sympathy with.

There are, however, some not directly connected with the subjects of previous chapters, that are of sufficient importance in the controversy to demand an examination.

SECTION I.—*Burney on the Prodigal Son.*

Burney.—"The prodigal's repentance, as evinced by his actual return to his father, was, as to himself, reconciliation; as to his father, it was propitiation, or what pleased him, satisfied him, delighted him, because it brought back to him his son who was lost and dead, but now found and saved."—Page 156.

Comment.—1. This teaches that all that is required for salvation is repentance, and that repentance is that which propitiates the Father. True that he teaches elsewhere the need of something more, but it is in a vague, unsatisfactory way.

Here it is repentance alone. This is consistent with his theory.

2. But if repentance propitiates, salvation is by works and human merit. As God could not be pleased with what has no merit, the repentance, in order to propitiate, must have been meritorious in his sight. Clearly salvation by works.

3. If the repentance propitiates, there is no need for the death of Christ, other than as it may influence the heart and mind of the sinner. This is all that a Moral Theory can make of Christ's death and sufferings.

4. Propitiation is here made synonymous with *what pleases*, or delights. As Dr. Burney repudiates the dictionaries, an appeal to them would be useless. The only appeal that can be made from the dictionaries is to usage. Dr. Burney appealed from the lexicons to "the crucible of common sense" (page 162), but failed to tell us just how to find this tribunal. We deny that the Hebrew *kaphar*, the Greek *hilasmos*, or the English propitiation, are ever used in the sense of "please" or "delight." Dr. Burney can never induce scholars to agree to abandon the dictionaries until he shows by the *usage* that the dictionaries are wrong.

Burney.—"These facts also teach us with sufficient fullness and clearness that pardon does not consist, as penalists teach, in the removal of penalty, leaving the soul in its moral pollution or criminal state. A murderer may be arbitrarily pardoned by gubernatorial fiat. This releases him from the gallows, but not from his guilt; but pardon of sin

consists in deliverance from the guilt itself which causes the punishment. This is done simply by restoring the disobedient to obedience, much like the removal of effects by the removal of their causes."—Page 157.

Comment.—1. This definition of "pardon" will necessitate that Dr. Burney shall once more repudiate the dictionaries, because none of them define pardon as he does. We venture the assertion that no one would get from the word pardon the idea of deliverance from depravity. Nor can Dr. Burney find such a use of the word in any book, ancient or modern, Greek, Hebrew, or English. He simply gives *new* meanings to old words, and thus tries to uphold his theory. Any theory, no matter how wild or visionary, could be established thus.

2. This utter repudiation of the legal aspect of pardon might well lead to the inquiry, Why has God selected words having this forensic or legal sense, if he did not mean to teach the legal aspect of atonement? The inspired writers could not possibly have used terms that set forth legal ideas more forcibly than those they do employ. Surely they made no mistake, and we are justified in believing that there is a legal as well as a moral side to the atonement, and that "pardon" belongs to the legal.

SECTION II.—*Burney on the offering of Isaac.*

Burney.—"The atonement is the giving of the blood, or life, to God. The blood and life are

equivalents. To give one was in intention to give both. Hence, the bloodless sacrifice of Isaac."—Page 168.

Comment.—What the Doctor says about the offering of Isaac is contained in this one sentence; but, taken in connection with what precedes it, it teaches that Isaac was actually and personally offered up by Abraham, and, therefore, it is possible to have a burnt-offering without the shedding of any blood.

Is there any authority for such a statement? Can it be inferred from Bible facts? Most certainly not, and the whole narrative would have to be ignored in every detail of it, before such an assumption could be received.

1. The only foundation for his assumption is the statement that the blood and life are equivalents. This is the opposite of the fact. Blood shedding and death are synonymous, which is fatal to the thought of a bloodless sacrifice.

2. There can be no dispute as to the fact that Abraham regarded the command to go and offer up Isaac as involving the death of the boy. Not to refer to the wood provided for burning the body, and other facts out of harmony with the thought of a bloodless sacrifice, the Bible plainly affirms it.

"And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife *to slay* his son."—Gen. xxii. 10.

"By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac; and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, of whom it was

said, that in Isaac shall thy seed be called; accounting that God was able to raise him up, even *from the dead;* from whence also he received him *in a figure.*"—Heb. xi. 17–19.

Abraham had evidently never heard of a non-penal theory, nor had he been taught that blood and life were equivalents, and that he could offer Isaac and still not slay the boy, else his soul had never been tried. God had told him that Isaac should be the ancestor of the Messiah, and he believed what God said. In what way could his faith have been tried, if the command did not imply the death of Isaac, and so the putting a barrier in the way of the fulfillment of the promise?

3. If Abraham expected to slay Isaac, but did not, and yet, in the language of Paul, "offered up Isaac," how did he offer him? The key to this is indicated by the words "in a figure."

"And Abraham lifted up his eyes, and looked, and behold behind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns; and Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt-offering *in the stead* of his son."—Gen. xxii. 13.

The narrative shows that Isaac was *not* offered up personally, but that the ram was offered *in his stead.* So far from its being a bloodless sacrifice, we have, fully stated, the fact of the shedding of the blood! It is a simple case of substitution, that throws a flood of light upon the meaning of a sacrifice. This substitutionary offering is called by Paul the offering of Isaac. But Dr. Burney's

"color blindness" as to substitution leads him to ignore the ram, so that he sees nothing but a "bloodless sacrifice."

SECTION III.—*Burney on the prayer of Jesus on the cross.*

Burney.—"Luke xxiii. 34: 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,' is irreconcilable with the assumption that he suffered penalty.

"If substitution is true, Christ by enduring the penalty in the place of sinners did by that act really expiate, pardon, take away the *reatus poenæ* of those for whom he suffered, and did by that expiation or pardon bring God under obligations to regenerate and save them.

"Now, if this is true, why this prayer? Why pray for the doing of a thing that is already done? Why ask a creditor to forgive a debt that is already paid, and which of course does not exist? The theory takes all significance and pertinence out of this prayer which when rightly interpreted is a peerless exhibition of moral sublimity and a model for the world."—Page 221.

Comment.—1. Even the most rigid Calvinist could answer Burney by referring to the fact that at the time Christ prayed the debt had not been paid, as Christ had not suffered or died.

2. He has "pardon" introduced here in strange company—"expiation or pardon." We would like to see some of these words pinned down to a definite meaning. Then, again, he assumes that if sin is expiated God would be under obligations to regenerate and save. Can he show that this logically follows?

3. Whatever force there might be in this argument, it can only be against the Calvinistic theory of substitution. Dr. Burney denies that any thing else is substitution, and his readers need to be constantly reminded of this in the application of his arguments. This is one of the Doctor's weaknesses —giving new meanings to old words. In the theological world the term substitution is used with a much wider application than he gives to it. This being its recognized use, it is idle to deny that any thing else is substitution. We can not take from a word a recognized meaning, and use alone fixes the meaning. Burney has therefore undertaken the impossible. He suggests "salvation by sovereign prerogative" and "benefaction" as better terms. But as all salvation by grace is benefaction and by "sovereign prerogative," there is nothing clear-cut or distinctive in these. They are open to more serious objection than the word he would have them supplant, and, it may be safely said, will never be adopted. Substitution will be used centuries after we are dead. The theory of this book is as truly vicarious as the Calvinistic, and against the "medium theory" Burney's objections do not apply.

4. The dying prayer of Jesus *is* "irreconcilable" with the non-penal theory. It is fundamental to that theory that sin and penalty are inseparable. Dr. Burney says:

"I have elsewhere and repeatedly defined penalty of *any* divine law to be the forfeiture or loss of the good which the law is intended to conserve. If

this is true, how is it possible to transgress God's laws, and yet escape the penalties he has wisely affixed to transgression?"—Page 117.

If so, there being no escape from the penalty, sins committed are always punished, and Dr. Burney is in exactly the same position as the Calvinist, with this difference: Dr. Burney's principal suffers the penalty, but the Calvinist's substitute endures it. In both cases the debt is paid.

The prayer of Jesus, according to Burney, is a prayer for God to forgive them, *after they have been punished!*

If this is what he means by "moral sublimity," we can not agree with his conception of what is "peerless."

Destroy substitution, and the light and beauty of the cross fade away. It is only in the light of his sufferings being vicarious that the height and depth and moral glory of this dying prayer can be apprehended.

Burney.—"Penalty endured by the principal of a crime is purely infamous, nor could it be less so in the substitute, if penal substitution was possible," etc.—Page 223.

Comment.—1. This is one of those glittering generalities that may mean something or nothing. "Penalty endured . . . . is simply infamous." Is this true? If it was infamous to "endure" a penalty, it is right to resist the lawful authorities when attempting to inflict it. No man can be required to submit to the infamous.

2. This logically makes God responsible for the infamy, for the logical alternative is that there is no infamy if the penalty is not endured. If it is the penalty that makes infamous, then, as God inflicts it, he is responsible for it.

3. While this is what Burney says, it can hardly be what he means—at least we hope so. We suspect it is only a new form of the old quibble that you can not separate the demerit from the penalty. Does it render a man infamous who pays (endures) a fine for his friend to save him from prison?

SECTION IV.—*Burney's contrasts of the penal and non-penal theories.*

Burney.—"Truth and error are generally more clearly apprehended and discriminated when set in contrast with each other."—Page 191.

Comment.—Yes, but it does not follow that when two statements are contrasted either one o the other must be true. Nor does it follow that the one seemingly the weakest is therefore an error. There is such a thing as so presenting the views o an opponent as to easily refute them. We call this "setting up a man of straw."

Burney.—"1. The penal theory asserts that Christ's death was a penal sacrifice — made primarily to satisfy justice, as the most central attribute of God, 'to satisfy which is to satisfy God himself.'

"The non-penal theory denies and alleges that this sacrifice was primarily purely moral in character, and satisfies justice, because it serves God's

purposes in meeting the exigencies of man's moral and religious condition."—Page 191.

Comment.—1. This is not a satisfactory statement of what the penal theory teaches. If meant to represent what Anselm taught, we have no fault to find, except that he should have said, "The penal theory, *as taught* by Anselm, asserts," etc. To take the extreme utterances of some advocate, and represent them as the teaching of the theory, is not a fair representation. Very few substitutionists, even of the most extreme Calvinistic school, would agree with Anselm that justice was "the most central attribute of God." Dr. Burney not only ignores any other theory of substitution but the Calvinistic, but he ignores any other exposition of even that, except Anselm's. If he intended his contrast to be comprehensive, embracing all schools of substitutionists, it should have been:

"The penal theory asserts that Christ's death was a penal sacrifice — made primarily to satisfy the demands of God against the sinner."

Substitutionists differ as to the source of this demand, some holding that it arises from the divine justice; others, from the holiness of God; and still others, from the law.

2. The last clause of Burney's definition of what the non-penal theory teaches—"and satisfies justice, because it serves God's purposes in meeting the exigencies of man's moral and religious condition" — is not distinctive, as any substitutionist would subscribe to it in full. The only part of the

statement distinctive to the non-penal theory is found in the words "primarily purely moral in character." According to the theory of the book, we are saved by the removal of the depravity, and that is what he means by "moral." But if we give to the word this meaning, a moral sacrifice is a pure absurdity. If the death and sufferings of Christ were for the purpose of removing depravity, we may look upon the idea of one man drinking poison and another experiencing its effects as no longer an impossibility. Its parallel would be found in a physician committing suicide to cure a patient of disease!

The whole trouble with Dr. Burney's non-penal theory is that it denies *in toto* the legal aspect of Christ's death, and the legal, or administrative, penalties of sin. The death of Christ is the one fact utterly out of harmony with the non-penal scheme.

Burney.—"2. The penal teaches as its ground principle that all pardon is the result of punishment; that there is absolutely no pardon without prior punishment as its ground and reason.

"The non-penal protests, and alleges that sins pardoned are not punished, and sins punished are not pardoned; that pardon is exemption from punishment on conditions satisfactory to the pardoning power."—Page 192.

Comment.—1. This statement of what the penal teaches is not true, because many substitutionists reject it. It is no part of a vicarious theory of atonement. A true statement embracing what all substitutionists believe would be:

"The penal theory teaches as its ground principle that all pardon is the result of satisfaction; that there is absolutely no pardon without prior satisfaction as its ground and reason."

2. The non-penal theory has no pardon, if we accept Dr. Burney's definition above, for, on his theory, there is no exemption from punishment. He says:

"Sin and its punishment are coterminous, just as cause and effect."

Burney.—"3. The penal teaches that Christ's death propitiates only because it was a punishment for the sins of mankind.

"The non-penal denies that there is any propitiation in penal suffering, and affirms that Christ has become through his death and resurrection the propitiation for the sins of the world."—Page 192.

Comment.—1. The penal teaches that Christ's death propitiates because it satisfies the demand of God against the sinner. Dr. Burney fails to distinguish between burnt-offering and the sin-offering.

2. Burney tells us what the non-penal denies—this is distinctive. But when he states what it affirms, his readers are misled, because he leaves the impression that in this it is in contrast to the penal. *Yet every substitutionist believes what is here affirmed.* The penal theory tells *how* he became the propitiation, the non-penal is mute.

Burney.—"4. The penal teaches in its only self-consistent form that Christ obeyed the divine law in man's stead, and thus satisfied justice in man's behalf, and that God, as an act of justice, regenerates and saves men.

"The non-penal protests, and affirms that it is impossible for one person to obey the moral law—or to love God—in the room of another, and to suffer its penalty (which is the consequence of not loving him) in the place of another; that Christ obeyed the divine law in his own place; that his personal righteousness or obedience is imparted to believers, in the act of believing, as was Adam's vitiated nature and consequent condemnation imparted to us by heredity."—Page 192.

Comment.—1. This is a cool setting aside of every vicarious theory as unworthy of notice—a ruling of them out of court except the most extreme and obnoxious Calvinistic form of substitution. We appeal from Dr. Burney to our readers, as to the "self-consistency" of the theory of this book. It is certainly not chargeable with what is here stated as being the penal theory.

2. Dr. Burney here admits that the double imputation of the Calvinistic theory is "self-consistent," when his great guns are aimed at this very thing as a contradiction. For Dr. Burney to speak of it as the "only self-consistent form" is to make his own arguments any thing but "self-consistent."

3. The non-penal theory, as here stated, is open to many and serious objections. It confounds consequence and penalty. It uses legal terms, while denying the legal aspect of the atonement. It presents an absurdity when it speaks of personal obedience being imparted.

Burney.—"5. The penal teaches that to suffer the penalty of the law is to obey the law. . . . .

"The non-penal objects, and affirms . . . . that

there is no obedience in penalty, ... or, if there is, ... Satan and his hosts are as truly obeying the divine law as are the saints in heaven."—Page 193.

Comment.—So far as the writer knows, all Calvinistic writers distinguish between the "active" and "passive" obedience of Christ. Dr. A. A. Hodge thus explains it:

"His 'active' obedience embraces his entire life and death viewed as vicarious obedience. His 'passive' obedience embraces his entire life, and especially his sacrificial death, viewed as vicarious suffering."

It will be seen that these are technical terms, used in a theological sense only, and that the word obedience is used, not as connected with penalty, but with the sufferings of Christ, because they were *voluntarily* assumed. It is used in the same sense as "became obedient unto death"—voluntarily submitted to death. While we repudiate this distinction, we believe that Burney has not fairly represented the Calvinistic position. We doubt if any theologian would assent to the statement that "to suffer the penalty of the law is to obey the law." What penalist has so affirmed? But, leaving the question of this Calvinistic distinction, most certainly the theory of this book does not so teach.

SECTION V.—*Burney on the salvation of infants.*

Burney.—"Unless it [the infant] has the mind of Christ, it is none of his. This it can not have

except by being made partaker of Christ's nature in regeneration. If this regeneration is unconditional, it seems hard to escape the doctrine of a necessitated virtue or obedience. . . . . I think, however, that *conditional* infant regeneration is not an impossible or absurd thing.—Page 58.

Comment.—1. Why does Dr. Burney say "the *mind* of Christ?" The Bible says:

"If any man have not the SPIRIT of Christ, he is none of his."—Rom. viii. 9.

Why does he substitute "mind" for "Spirit?" They are certainly not synonymous.

The Greek *pneuma* (spirit) is never translated in the New Testament by the word "mind." In the text he quotes from Romans, the whole context shows that the Holy Spirit is meant.

Just here we would say that we have been deeply impressed with the little use Dr. Burney has for the Holy Spirit in his non-penal theory. In a work on the atonement of four hundred pages, more than three hundred are written before the Holy Spirit is named, while in the whole book it is only referred to about half a dozen times! Has the non-penal theory no use for the Holy Spirit? The Holy Spirit's work in connection with the atonement is all-important, as we have shown. Dr. A. A. Hodge has a chapter devoted to the "mystic union" in his work on the atonement. This is utterly ignored by Dr. Burney in "Soteriology." The doctrine of a vicarious atonement has not been apprehended when this is overlooked. If Dr. Burney fully apprehends the theory of substitution, the

absence of all reference to this union, in a book assailing substitution, is hard to understand. How can we explain his utter silence as to this, which is one of the most important factors? This being omitted, we regret that it is true "that no one can obtain a fair idea of the doctrine of substitution by reading Soteriology."

2. We believe that infants must be regenerated to fit them for heaven (if they die in infancy), but do not see any difficulty in this being done unconditionally.

Dr. Burney says that if unconditional "it seems hard to escape the doctrine of a necessitated virtue or obedience." This would be true if regeneration destroyed freedom.

If an unconditional regeneration, where there is no actual transgression, leads to a necessitated obedience, then, logically, an unconditional depravity leads to a necessitated disobedience. But this Burney does not believe.

Burney.—"1. What changes actually occur in the capacities of the soul as the spiritual world begins to open upon the mental vision—whether the mind becomes more vigorous and capable of clearer apprehension of the truth—we do not know.

"But assuming that such favorable changes do occur at this juncture in the capacities of the intellect, then, of course, the emotional and volitional power will be proportionately increased, and the voluntary acceptance of Christ becomes possible to the infant mind before it has left the body."—Page 59.

Comment.—That there is intellectual expansion in the hour of death, as the spiritual world opens to the vision, we believe; but something more than mental growth is needed before faith is exercised.

"Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God."—Rom. x. 14.

"How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?"—Rom. x. 17.

But the infant is destitute of this knowledge; and as knowledge is essential to faith, how can it be exercised? The nature and conditions of faith present a fatal objection to this theory.

Burney.—"But assuming that no such advantageous changes occur, still it is not impossible for regeneration — such as is needed to fit the soul for communion with Christ — to occur by its normal method.

"2. As the beatific vision unfolds to the infant spirit, unconscious of evil, in its transit across the border line, it, ere it leaves the body, may be so enamored of the loveliness of Christ and the heavenly world as to yield to him with all its will power — though it may be little more than instinct — and be filled with the love of a new-born soul. If it is not distinctly conscious of faith in Christ it may be rapturously conscious of a new-born love, and *love is bliss.*"—Page 59.

Comment.—1. The first scheme of infant regeneration necessitates a false definition of faith, this second "assumption" rests upon a false theory of regeneration.

The doctrine of depravity teaches that the *dispo-*

sition to love and trust the Savior is lacking. If Dr. Burney's theory above is correct, it is not disposition, but want of light or evidence. If the vision of Jesus will cause an infant (with expanded intellect) to become "enamored" of Christ, why not an adult? And if depravity bars the way in one case, why not in the other?

2. This view of regeneration ignores the work of the Holy Spirit. The Bible teaches that we are "born of the Spirit." Dr. Burney ignores the Spirit's work in the regeneration of the infant utterly, and attempts to explain a supernatural fact (regeneration) by natural means. More, as he says of this that it occurs by "its normal method," and fits "the soul for communion with Christ," the logical inference is, that he ignores the Holy Spirit in the regeneration of the adult. How plainly error as to the atonement leads to error in every vital doctrine of the Bible!

Burney.—"3. We know that very young children have a ready capacity for the beautiful, and without any rational comprehension of beautiful objects, seek to appropriate them.

"Why, then, may not the infant spirit, as it approaches the spirit-land, be enamored of the loveliness of the glorified Christ, and seek to appropriate him as it is wont to do with other objects that delight it?"—Page 60.

Comment.—If the first of Dr. Burney's theories of infant regeneration requires a false conception of faith and the second erroneous ideas of regeneration, this last embodies a false notion of the object of faith.

It puts Christ's physical beauty in the place of Christ as a Savior. According to Burney, just as the infant seeks to appropriate a flower or painted toy, the physical beauty of Christ's glorified humanity will attract it in the same way. The appropriation of Christ that saves is not such as this; but from *a sense of need* and of the ability and willingness of Christ to save, a heart appropriation of him as a personal Savior. Without convictions of this need Christ will never be appropriated.

Burney.—"I do not offer this as a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem of infant salvation. It, however, avoids the extreme monergism of Augustinianism, on one hand, and on the other the ungracious notion that infants may be saved without regeneration."—Page 60.

Comment.—1. As in neither case have we the infant *regenerated*, it can hardly be said to avoid these extremes, unless it be in the sense that a man avoids infringing the laws of France who never crossed the sea.

2. The difficulty of the problem lies in the non-penal theory. There being no actual transgression on the part of an infant (and therefore no penalty), the work to be done is purely moral. But if the salvation of the infant by moral means is purely by the power of God, it would be an unanswerable objection to the non-penal theory. Hence the difficulty.

According to the doctrine of this book the atonement is both moral and legal. Redemption by

purchase delivering from the curse of the law, redemption by power from depravity and its consequences. The legal demand that stands against the transgressor has no place in the case of the infant. The need, in the one case, is a remedy both moral and legal; in the other one, purely moral alone. The one demands a vicarious atonement, the other does not. Hence, the power of God alone is needed in the case of the infant. If we ignore this distinction between the infant and the adult, the problem of infant regeneration is incapable of solution. The non-penal theory places them upon the same footing exactly, so far as the need and the character of the remedy is concerned.

SECTION VI.—*Burney on the harmony of the non-penal theory and science.*

Burney.—"The impartation of spiritual life not in conflict with natural law."—Page 364.

Comment.—1. We call attention to this section because running through it is the quiet assumption that the non-penal theory is scientific, while the penal is not.

2. "Not in conflict." Does Dr. Burney affirm that a vicarious atonement is? We challenge the proof. As it lies beyond the sphere of *natural* law, conflict is impossible.

Dr. Burney's analogies are all of the impartation of spiritual life, and as we agree in this, they are analogies of that which is common to both theories.

But he gives no analogy of his non-penal theory, nor can he. Analogies of substitution, however, can be found, especially if we consult medical works. *Vicarious* menstruation is a term well known to science, and other illustrations of substitution can be found.

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